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Abstract
This thesis examines the macroeconomic impact of remittances in
developing economies, using data from 1990 to 2016. Despite
poverty-reducing and welfare-enhancing characteristics for recipient
households, remittances remain to inhibit macroeconomic policy in
developing economies; by producing Dutch Disease effects, by creating an
indeterminate effect on long run economic growth, and by reducing the
quality of financial institutions. This thesis explores these key issues
surrounding remittances along with a overall theme on fiscal policy, financial
development and monetary policy. The significant contributions of my thesis
are as follows: it provides insight into the effects of remittance inflows on
fiscal cyclicality in developing economies; it provides new understanding into
the relationship between remittances, financial development and economic
growth; it provides a newly constructed measure of the financial
development index across the panel dataset; and it shows the effects of
remittance inflows on monetary policy by incorporating dynamics.
The use of different empirical techniques enable the thesis to investigate the
effects of remittances on key macroeconomic aggregates across several different
continents. It first uses empirical techniques to examine how remittances
affect fiscal policy over the business cycle. The empirical analysis consists of
developing countries that are split up into six datasets: Africa, Middle East
and North Africa (MENA), Asia, Latin America, Europe and the full dataset
which combines the countries from all regions into one dataset.
The thesis examines the potential for remittance inflows to influence
fiscal policy over the fiscal cycle. The empirical evidence confirms that
remittance inflows have a direct impact on the fiscal cycle. Moreover, the
full dataset confirms that remittance inflows contribute for fiscal policy to be
procyclical over the fiscal cycle. The Remittances-Output gap interaction
term shows a positive coefficient which could be explained by the negative
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impact of remittances on labour supply. Similar to previous literature,
Justino and Shemyakina (2012) find that the amount of remittances received
by a household has an overall negative impact on labour force participation.
The main finding here is that Asia, MENA, Europe and the Latin America
regions corroborate the full dataset results but the effect of remittance
inflows on the cyclicality of fiscal policy is countercyclical for Africa.
This thesis further investigates how the level of financial development
can influence the relationship between remittances and economic growth. By
incorporating how remittances can influence the financial sector with the use
of cross country panel data analysis this thesis aims to bridge the gap in the
existing literature in remittances and financial development. Moreover, the
creation of the financial development index is intended to capture financial
sector development by bringing together several existing measures of financial
development. The outcomes for the full sample indicate that there is a positive
impact of remittances on economic growth with those countries that are less
financially developed. The results in this regard differ for the regional datasets.
Does monetary policy in developing countries influence remittance
inflows? This is what Chapter five explores. It investigates how developing
countries can effectively understand how monetary policy responds to
remittances in the short and long run. The chapter provides analysis into
the dynamics of remittances and monetary policy, whilst controlling for
country specific effects. The use of impulse response analysis enables the
study to capture the impact of shocks from each system variable. This
chapter finds a complex web of relationships between remittances, monetary
policy and economic growth. The results indicate that a depreciation in the
domestic currency causes an increase in the level of remittances for the full
dataset and for the other regional datasets with the exception of MENA.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Macroeconomic Effects of Remittances
Remittances and the potential impact of these flows have attracted the attention of
global policymakers and researchers considerably in recent years. The three most
prominent features of remittances that provide impetus for studying the
macroeconomic effects of remittances: are the size of these flows relative to the GDP
of remittance recipient countries, the likelihood that these flows will continue
uninterrupted in the long term through globalisation trends, and the fact that these
flows are separate from official aid flows and private capital flows which are greatly
discussed in the literature. These features suggest that the macroeconomic effects of
remittances are likely to be substantial and significant over time. Consequently, this
could have unique implications for policymakers in these countries.
First, regarding the size of remittances, the literature addresses the increasing size of
these flows during recent years. International financial flows in many countries during
the past decade have been influenced by money that migrants send back home (Singer
(2010)). These private money transfers from migrants to their family members they
leave behind, add up to billions of dollars annually. Moreover, because remittances flow
from high income to developing countries, the figures often reported tend to understate
the relative importance to the economies that receive them. In the context of numbers:
net private capital flows to developing countries reached $1.12tn in 2013 (including FDI,
private debt and portfolio equity). In 2013 workers’ remittances to developing countries
were £435bn, an increase of 5% over 2012. Remittances, represent a staggering 38%
of total net private capital flows to developing countries which is large fraction of total
capital inflows into these economies.1 This increase may be in part due to the reduced
average transfer cost as a result of the rapid growth of money transfer institutions.
The number of migrant workers who send money home is increasing and can go some
1Data is obtained from the World Bank database online at: http://econ.worldbank.org World Bank (2018)
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way in tackling global inequality. Furthermore, it could be seen as a positive
demonstration of globalisation through the movement of labour. According to the
World Bank, after two consecutive years of decline, remittance inflows to Low and
Middle-Income countries (LMICs) in 2017 increased by 8.5%, rising to $466 billion.
Globally, this figure reached $613 billion where the rebound was driven primarily by
economic growth in the European Union (EU), the Russian Federation, and the
United States (World Bank (2018)). Furthermore, the increase in remittances could be
explained by the increase in oil prices along with the strengthening of the Euro and
the Ruble against the U.S dollar. However, long term risks remain as in many
remittance source countries, anti immigration sentiments are on the rise along with
stricter immigration policies. Figure 1.1 shows the top remittance receiving countries
in 2017 in dollar terms are predominantly from the Asian region. The figure shows
that India and China are the top two receivers and belong to Asia. Furthermore, the
Philippines, Pakistan, Vietnam, Bangladesh and Indonesia feature in the top 10 and
belong to the Asian region. Nigeria is the top remittance receiver in Africa, Mexico is
the top remittance receiver in Latin America, and Egypt is the top remittance receiver
in the MENA region. It is evident from the countries in the top 10 that Asia is an
important and popular remittance receiving destination.
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Figure 1.1: Top Remittance receivers in 2017. Source: World Bank (2018), World Bank staff estimates,
World Development Indicators
Given the large size of remittance inflows, they are expected to have a significant
effect on the countries that receive them. Remittances have been identified as a
potential source of enhancing economic development. Thus, the main issues of interest
facing policymakers in these countries is how to manage the macroeconomic effects of
remittances and how to harness the development potential of remittances. This thesis
provides an insight to the issues mentioned through a global study which examines the
influence of remittances on economies that receive these flows. The ultimate purpose
of this thesis is to explore how remittances can affect policy decisions in developing
economies and to draw policy implications for countries that receive a significant
amount.
For many developing countries, the inflow of remittances received is equal to or
exceeds that of foreign direct investment, official development assistance or portfolio
flows from financial markets. Since remittance inflows are large in number, they affect
many households in developing economies to cause affects at the macro level,
influencing firms, households, financial intermediaries, market prices and the
government. Moreover, the continued growth of remittances is not subsiding as many
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countries have employed policies designed to liberalise their economic systems. During
this period policymakers have focused their efforts on understanding the effects of
globalisation, economic growth, foreign direct investment, trade oneness, and the
magnitude and direction of capital flows. There are key features which show key
distinctions between remittances and official aid flows, and while it may be convenient
to view remittances in a similar view to official aid and private capital flows, there still
remains a difference which sees remittances behave differently and to have different
economic impacts. The crucial difference between remittances and official aid and
private capital flows is the presence of familial relationships within remittances. This
element emphasises the uniqueness of remittance behaviour as family members are
largely involved in these economic issues. This is demonstrated by Becker (1974) who
explores the economics of the family which underlies much of the research today on
the microeconomic implications of remittances. Subsequently the relationship between
the remitter and his or her family can be explained by two ways. The first is in terms
of altruism where remittances are driven by poor economic performance at home or by
exchange, and the second is determined by a steady stream of remittance inflows that
are received irrespective of the recipient country’s economic performance.
The importance of remittance receiving is not only restricted from the size of the
remittance inflows but also to its potential effects on society and on policy decisions
by the government. Arguably, the inflows of remittances to developing countries can
alter the dynamics of the macroeconomic policy interactions which are essential in
enhancing sustainable economic development within their regions. Higher remittances
are positively correlated with better outcomes in labour markets as Orrenius and
Zavodny (2010) found in their study. Studies on high migration states such as Mexico
have found conclusive evidence that employment and wages rise while the
unemployment rate falls. This suppresses the wage effects of remittances perhaps due
to remittances responding poorly to the home country’s economic conditions. Imai
et al. (2014) overcome the endogeneity concerns with a study of the effects of
remittances on the growth of GDP per capita using annual panel data for a set of 24
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Asian and Pacific countries. Their results confirm that remittance flows have been
beneficial but at the expense of being the primary source of output shocks. In this
scenario, the volatility of remittances can be harmful to economic growth but can be
eliminated. This can be achieved if remittances are targeted directly by the
government for physical and human capital investments which can support economic
development within the region.
It is important for governments in the developing world to analyse the impact on the
economy in a macroeconomic viewpoint to seek how they can achieve the best possible
fiscal and monetary policy combinations from remittance inflows. The tendency of fiscal
policies in many emerging markets and developing countries is to be pro-cyclical rather
countercyclical in nature which in the literature is known as part of the Keynesian or
neo-classical theory. The theoretical rational behind this is that in developing countries,
government spending as a share of GDP increases during boom periods and falls during
recession periods. The growing literature in this area has been developed in particular by
Gavin and Perotti (1997) (Latin American countries) who have identified possible causes
for this result, namely policies which are sub-optimal such as social unrest, institutional
flaws and boom-bust cycles in international credit markets. However, empirical studies,
such as those of Woo (2009) and Alesina et al. (2008), come to drastically different
conclusions with very few explanatory variables in common.
Given the growth of remittance inflows and monetary amounts of remittances recently,
and especially in the last decade, it is argued that the impact of remittance
fluctuations on the macroeconomic policy decisions are critical to promote positive
and sustainable economic growth in developing countries. The existing research has
focused primarily on microeconomic issues such as income distribution, poverty and
household consumption to name a few. Sharma (2010) highlights the importance of
the role of remittance inflows in smoothing household consumption through adverse
shocks relating to natural disasters, crop failure, job loss and health crises.
Amuedo-Dorantes (2006) highlight the key microeconomic issues by analysing the
remitting patterns of migrants to the U.S. who are from the Dominican Republic,
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Costa Rica, Haiti, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Peru. In particular this study evaluates the
impact of remittances on various spheres of economic development as in the case of
education, employment, health care investments, and business ownership in two Latin
American and the Caribbean (LAC) countries. The findings of the study underline the
importance of remittances as a resource for the accumulation of human capital in both
health and education. Melkonyan and Grigorian (2012) focus on developing an
overlapping generations’ model of household behaviour that seeks to explain
remittance transfers through the elements of altruism and self interest. More
specifically they model the dynamic strategic interactions between the migrant and
the remittance receiving households. The analysis departs from the traditional Nash
Bargaining approach adopted in the literature, whereby a scenario is adopted in which
the two parties can implement a self-enforcing agreement to ensure their choices
maximise their total surplus. Furthermore, their empirical results suggest that there is
a role for policy measures in influencing remittance flows and their subsequent impact
on the behaviour of households. For example, the households’ rate of time preference
can be influenced by policy (Epstein and Hynes, 1983) but there is scope to reduce the
disincentive to work, whilst the decision to consume or invest is influenced by interest
rates. This too can be controlled by government policy measures aimed favourably
towards greater remittance inflows. Therefore, the literature on the microeconomic
impacts of remittances is extensive, however there needs to be research which focuses
on the macroeconomic impacts of remittance inflows. The economic effects of
remittance inflows has both macroeconomic and microeconomic effects. It is
sometimes argued that remittances may increase inequality, because it is the rich who
benefit from the process of migration and sending back remittances, making recipient
households even richer. The developmental impact on households and the question of
inequality remain central to the economic issues surrounding developing economies.
This thesis aims to shed further light on these issues in terms of macroeconomic policy
and the relationship between financial development and remittances.
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1.2 Research Aims and Objectives
This research examines the role of remittances and its macroeconomic effects in
developing economies. This thesis aims to explore key themes related in
macroeconomic policy in developing economies with an added emphasis on the
benefits or costs of remittance inflows. The primary objective of Chapter 3 is to
analyse the relationship between fiscal policy and remittance inflows and to determine
whether the cyclicality of fiscal policy is affected. By employing panel data methods
Chapter 3 is able to provide cross country level analysis on this issue. The notion that
remittances could affect fiscal policy may at first be suprising, since governments are
not directly involved in remittance transfers. The fact that remittances enter the
recipient economy and influence the recipient-receiving households activities, primarily
through their saving patterns and consumption decisions. This fact, distinguished
remittances from natural resources, which governments may derive their revenue from.
Moreover, public aid transfers and natural resources enter the government budget
constraint directly. Moreover, remittance inflows contribute to higher consumption of
imported and domestic goods, which may affect the government revenues thorough
trade-based and consumption taxation. Furthermore, remittances may increase the
level of private saving if the marginal propensity to consume is less than unity.
Additionally, remittances could increase bank deposits in the banking system. Both of
these factors are channels through which remittances can influence fiscal policy
through credit market activity.
Furthermore, Chapter 4 aims to explore the role of the financial sector and the impact
of remittances on monetary policy efficiency. Chapter 4 evaluates if remittance inflows
affect the breadth, depth and the efficiency of the financial sector within developing
economies. Chapter 4 determines whether financial development enhances the effects
of remittances on economic growth. This chapter will seek cross regional analysis to
determine if the heterogeneity in financial development across countries is a significant
factor in affecting the relationship between remittances and economic growth. The
current literature explores the financial development and remittances theme in regard
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to a regional analysis study. Ramirez and Sharma (2013) use a fully modified OLS
technique on a sample of Latin American and Caribbean countries, and finds that
remittances exert a greater positive impact in lower income countries in the region.
Chami et al. (2008) claim that a remittance-receiving country’s state of financial
development may cause remittances to positively impact domestic investment. The
argument is centered on a poorly developed domestic financial system within a
developing country. In this scenario a large number of households are rationed out of
formal credit markets, because the cost of providing credit them is sufficiently too
high. Such households are therefore unable to finance potentially highly productive
investment oppurtunities. The inflows of remittances allows these households to
undertake these projects and thus increase the level of investment and economic
growth. This thesis will explore the key themes of remittances, financial development
and economic growth to test these underlying theories.
Chapter 5 aims to explain the relationship between remittances, economic growth and
monetary policy. In addition, this chapter aims to give insight into the relationship
between monetary policy and remittances and seeks to understand how monetary
policy responds to remittance inflows and vice versa. With the use of monetary policy
indicators such as the nominal exchange rate this chapter will explore the differences
in how developing countries react to these flows. An important issue pertaining to
developing countries is that these countries face challenges to monetary policy on
various issues. Moreover, many of these countries experiencing these challenges to
their monetary policy are also remittance-recipient countries. The natural question
that arises is whether these remittance inflows can influence or play a role in monetary
policy. This in turn could impact the monetary policy transmission mechanism which
could have serious implications for these countries to maintain an effective and
credible monetary policy. This thesis will explore the effects of the monetary policy
rate on remittance inflows and vice versa. The thesis will for consistency purposes use
the same country list for each empirical chapter. The 51 developing countries under
consideration for this panel data research has been selected according to remittances
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data availability and is presented in Table 1.1.
Table 1.1: Developing Countries Covered by the Study
Europe MENA Africa Latin America Asia
Bulgaria Algeria Cameroon Argentina Azerbaijan
Hungary Egypt Côte d’Ivoire Brazil Bangladesh
Kosovo Jordan Ghana Chile India
Latvia Kuwait Kenya Colombia Indonesia
Lithuania Lebanon Nigeria Ecuador Pakistan
Macedonia Oman Senegal Honduras Philippines
Malta Sudan South Africa Mexico Sri Lanka
Moldova Syria Tanzania Panama Tajikistan
Poland Yemen Uganda Peru Thailand
Serbia Venezuela Vietnam
Slovakia
Slovenia
Turkey
1.3 Research Contributions
The aim of this thesis is to provide an empirical investigation of the macroeconomic
impact of remittances in developing economies since the beginning of the 1990s. Three
main issues are investigated:
1. Following the work of Gavin and Perotti (1997), Chapter 3 tests the
hypothesis of the influence of remittances on the cyclicality of fiscal policy
using a dynamic panel data framework. Through the use of cross-regional
analysis the dataset is split up into five regions including the full sample. To
the best of my knowledge, no existing empirical literature addresses the
impact of remittances on fiscal cyclicality. The analysis conducted utilises
fixed effects, Difference GMM (D-GMM), and System GMM (S-GMM)
models to measure the influence of remittance inflows on the business cycle.
Chapter 3 builds on the work by Alesina et al. (2008) in terms of the
empirical framework and provides an insight into the relationship of
remittances and fiscal policy with the use of the Remittance-Output gap
interaction variable.
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2. The second theme investigates the relationship between remittances,
financial development and economic growth. The thesis, using a D-GMM
model investigates if the level of financial development in a country can
hinder the benefits of remittance inflows. The aim here is to see if
remittances and financial sector development are complementary with each
other or otherwise. The current literature uses proxies of financial
development that encapsulate narrow measures such as financial depth
(Beck et al., 2000). This thesis adapts the approach by Sahay et al. (2015)
by modifying the construction of the financial development index to include
a comprehensive measure including financial institutional efficiency, the size
of the financial system, and financial institutional depth.
3. The impact of remittances on monetary policy has eluded empirical
researchers, which has resulted in a limited understanding of the relationship
between these two variables (Vacaflores, 2012). As limited as the research is
in the field, the evidence has proven the results to be contradictory. Ruiz
and Vargas-Silva (2010) investigate the relationship in Mexico and find no
link between domestic monetary policy and remittances while Adenutsi and
Ahortor (2008) find significant results between domestic monetary policy
variables and remittances in Ghana. This chapter, employs Panel Vector
Autoregression (PVAR) to overcome endogeneity problems, and to establish
short term and long term results between remittances, monetary policy and
economic growth. The use of Cholesky decomposition enables the chapter to
demonstrate robustness in the results by comparing two ordering systems.
The chapter explores the dynamic effects of these variables through the
implementation of the PVAR. By focusing on the long term effects this
benefits long-term policy solutions for these developing economies.
Furthermore, the chapter provides scenario analysis by simulating the
response of remittance inflows and economic growth to expansionary and
contractionary monetary policy scenarios.
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1.4 Thesis Outline
The ultimate aim of the thesis is to shed further light on the potential uses of remittances
and to draw summary policy implications which rely on remittance inflows. This thesis
is organised as follows. Chapter 2 surveys the remittances and macroeconomic policy
literature while providing the gaps in the literature and how this thesis fits in. Chapter
3 shows the effects of remittance inflows on fiscal cyclicality in developing economies.
Furthermore, Chapter 4 examines the relationship between remittances and financial
development whilst Chapter 5 presents the effects of remittances on monetary policy.
Chapter 6 concludes the thesis by providing summaries and the main contributions of
the empirical chapters. Chapter 6 also provides potential policy implications from the
research which could benefit policymakers across developing countries.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
This chapter reviews the relevant literature surrounding this research in relation to
fiscal and monetary policy in developing economies, the macroeconomic policy
implications of remittances and how remittances influence the labour market in
developing economies. The expanding literature investigates various aspects of the
macroeconomic consequences of remittance inflows. Chami et al. (2008), first surveyed
these issues by examining the impact of remittance inflows on exchange rates, fiscal
policy, on institutions and governance, monetary policy, and long term economic
growth. On exchange rates, Barajas et al. (2011), Hassan and Holmes (2013), and
Makhlouf and Mughal (2011) show how the persistent flows of remittances contribute
to an upward pressure on the long-run real exchange rate. This results in the decline
of the recipient countries’ tradable sectors also known as the ‘Dutch Disease’ effect.
The remainder of this chapter will analyse these issues in further detail and show how
this research fits within the current literature on remittances.
Furthermore, the key macroeconomic effects of remittances in the economics literature
are explored in detail. This review, focuses on various studies which provide an insight
into the role of fiscal and monetary policy on remittances. Moreover, the established
studies in the literature including Chami et al. (2008) and Jansen et al. (2012) have
provided key insight into the negative effects of remittances on economic growth. This
thesis addresses an important theme in investigating how the financial sector can play
a pivotal role in ensuring remittance receiving households benefit from these flows.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.2 details the main literature
on remittances; Section 2.3 outlines fiscal policy in developing economies; Section 2.4
outlines the monetary policy institutions and framework in developing economies;
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Section 2.5 documents the theoretical literature on macroeconomic policy and
remittances; Section 2.6 investigates the relationship between political budget cycles
and remittances; Section 2.7 examines how remittance inflows can influence the labour
market; and the last section (Section 2.8) outlines the relationship between
remittances, financial development and monetary policy.
2.2 Remittances in Developing Economies
Remittance income is an important source of income for countries that are dependent
on remittance inflows. This income source can help bring families out of poverty, and its
beneficiaries can abstain from energy and time dependent activities to engage in pursuits
that collectively stimulate economic growth in the receiving country. More specifically,
the safety net also known as the ‘consumption smoothing’ effect of remittances allows
households to engage in high risk but more profitable activities that reduce poverty,
without the presence of migration would be difficult to achieve. Studies of the growth
effects of remittances are split up into two strands of literature. One focuses on the
development impact of remittances, whilst the other type focuses on the determinants
of remittances and how financial infrastructure influences the households propensity to
remit.
The literature on remittances has primarily focused on the microeconomic issues in
terms of household welfare rather than the macroeconomic policy issues of both the
sending and the receiving countries of remittances. Of these microeconomic models,
migration is an informal family arrangement, that only benefits the support of
intergenerational financing of investments and risk diversion.2 Remittances form a key
component of such a contract by combining different components, such as strategic
decisions made by the households, insurance, investment, inheritance and altruism.
Rapoport and Docquier (2006), find that migration and remittances have an overall
positive effect on the receiving country’s long-term economic performance. However,
they note the state policies employed by countries such as China, require mandatory
2see Rapoport and Docquier (2006)
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transfers for the condition of exit permits. This policy has obvious drawbacks in terms
of economic freedom and welfare due to the state having full control of the labour
migration process.
Macroeconomic models on remittances are relatively limited with the focus of the
literature exploring the macroeconomic effects of remittances and the real exchange
rate movements in general equilibrium models. However, Agenor and Montiel (2008)
explore various models related to exchange rate regimes and the effects of capital
inflows in to economies. Additionally, another strand of literature uses IS-LM-BP
(Mundell Fleming model) and real business cycles to analyse the possible implications
of pro cyclicality and counter cyclicality for the stabilisation policy in relation to
remittance inflows. In these models, remittances are viewed in terms of aggregate
demand as positive or negative exogenous shocks. To model these effects, the dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium model has widely been used by many studies. Acosta
et al. (2009b) focus on the exchange rate effects with respect to remittances (usually
represented in dollar form). Acosta et al. (2009b) find that remittance inflows can
generate ‘Dutch Disease’ effects in the receiving countries. The ‘Dutch Disease’ effect
originates when remittance inflows into the receiving country causes the domestic
currency to appreciate, hence making foreign products cheaper than domestically
produced products and thus reducing international competitiveness, subsequently
resulting in a fall in domestically produced goods and services (Amuedo-Dorantes and
Pozo, 2004; Acosta et al., 2009b).
However according to Barajas et al. (2011) this ‘Dutch Disease’ effect should be
viewed with a sense of skepticism as this phenomenon could arise from specific
modelling assumptions in theoretical models, but can be reversed or altered by a few
modifications. Although the work of the study corroborates empirically, the main
result in the study regarding the effects of remittances on the real exchange rate is
that the ‘Dutch Disease’ effect is quantitatively very small. Proceeding on from this
result, Acosta et al. (2009a) find that the effects of remittances diminishes as the
degree of financial development increases. Mongardini and Rayner (2009) note that
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this result would be entirely dependent upon non-tradable goods and tradable goods
in the remittances context.
The data on remittances during the past five to ten years has remarkably improved
which has contributed to the large amount of cross country studies researching the
macroeconomic effects of remittances. Moreover, the recent and growing literature has
attempted to seek the impact of remittances on economic growth. The first studies
of such was by Chami et al. (2005) who focused on a cross country study of workers’
remittances. The overall conclusion from the study shows that the remittances are
altruistically motivated in order to compensate for the bad economic outcomes, which
consequently create moral hazard problems. The moral hazard problems that originate
from the remittances can reduce economic growth due to its severity in terms of stalling
economic development. The study specifically uses a sample of 83 countries during
the 1970-1998 period and panel regressions to regress the growth rate of real GDP
per capita onto workers’ remittances to GDP. Subsequently another regression uses
the same dependent variable onto the change in workers’ remittances to GDP as an
explanatory variable, conditioned on the rate of inflation, the investment rate, regional
dummy variables, and the ratio of net private capital flows to GDP.
The findings of both regressions concluded that the workers’ remittances to GDP ratio
was found either to be negatively related to growth or insignificant. However, private
capital flows and domestic investment were found to be statistically significant and
positively related to Real GDP growth. In addition the annual changes in the workers’
remittances to GDP ratio were calculated and found to be negative and statistically
significant on the growth in real GDP. To account for the possible endogeneity problems
encountered in the study the authors conducted an instrumental variables estimation.
The first stage method of regression analysis was used to model the workers’ remittances
to GDP ratio as a function of each country’s real interest rate gap and income gap in
line with the United States. As the predicted value of the workers’ remittances to GDP
ratio is an explanatory variable, the second stage estimation confirmed that Real GDP
growth is negatively related to the changes in remittance inflows.
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Another recent study by Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009) focuses on a panel data set
of 73 developing countries. The study finds that countries with less developed
financial systems benefit from remittances which provide a solution to counteract the
effects of liquidity constraints. Remittances can also be seen as an alternative method
to finance investment, by changing the effectiveness of monetary policy through the
loosening of the credit constraint. The empirical analysis applied by the authors
confirms that agents compensate for the lack of development of the local financial
markets, by utilising remittances to help alleviate the liquidity constraints to ensure
resources are channelled towards productive investments to help increase economic
growth. To merit the validity of the proposition imposed by the authors they analyse
the interactions of remittances and financial development using a large sample of
countries. The analysis uses standard financial market indicators to study the impact
of these variables with the interactions of remittances on economic growth by using
growth regressions. The growth regression employed is the standard OLS and the
System of Generalised Method of Moments regressions (SGMM). The OLS model
suffers from a drawback in that the variables under consideration do not vary over
time in a panel framework. Therefore, the authors address this endogeneity issue by
employing SGMM regressions. The conclusive result from the study confirms that
remittances can help alleviate the credit constraints imposed by becoming a substitute
for the inefficient and inexistent credit markets. Furthermore, this results into the
improvement to the allocation of capital to boost economic growth in the economy.
The findings of the study suggest that remittances can promote economic growth
through an investment channel where the credit needs of the population are not
sufficiently provided by the financial sector.
The study by Makhlouf and Mughal (2011) is another useful and recent study which
studies the symptoms of the ‘Dutch Disease’ in the Pakistan economy which originates
from international remittances. In the study the authors conclude that the presence of
international remittances contributes to a less competitive economy which results in a
slowdown in economic growth. The rise in remittances during recent years in developing
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countries like Pakistan has made the government less reliant on other financial inflows
for their respective foreign exchange requirements. Remittances are also viewed upon
to be a stable source capital inflow compared to FDI and portfolio inflows, which can
help countries tackle difficult economic conditions (Makhlouf and Mughal, 2011).
The study concludes that the Pakistani economy exhibits signs of the Dutch Disease
effects as a result of the migrant remittance inflows. It is important to note that the
remittance flows to Pakistan have improved the country in respect to lowering poverty
levels, improving health amongst citizens and higher educational attainment amongst
the rural recipient households (Mansuri, 2007). The implications of the remittance
flows means that the country will have a greater educated and healthier workforce
contributing to the improvement of the country’s long-run international
competitiveness. The authors state that there will be a lag for the beneficial impact of
remittances to be realised through human capital accumulation, and through the
monetary channel as subsequent negative effects will emerge. The main result from
the migrant remittance inflows over the years, has been a resource allocation shift via
the consumption of non-tradable goods. Consequently, in the foreign exchange
markets, imports will be attractive for investors and exports are less competitive in
international markets. The study finds another interesting result in that the
detrimental effects of remittances on the country’s international competitiveness is
opposite to that of FDI inflows in which the authors find in their empirical analysis.
This is because remittances in comparison to other foreign capital inflows have a
larger appreciating effect on the real exchange rate as a result of these remittances
containing a gradually developing social process (migration). This implies that sudden
stops or reversals do not occur for these inflows. The main result states that fiscal and
monetary measures can only partially deal with the real exchange rate and the
competitiveness of the economy. Moreover, the loss in external competitiveness needs
to be solved through improvements in internal competitiveness within the domestic
economy.
Building on the general equilibrium modelling of remittance inflows is the study by
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Baas and Maja Melzer (2012), focus on the sending country (Germany) and the role of
remittance outflows and its impact on international competitiveness for this country.
The authors develop an open-economy general equilibrium model with heterogeneous
households. Moreover, the model stipulates that the flow of remittances is dependent
upon the altruistic preferences of these households. Remittances in the model are
endogenous because of the utility maximising households, whereby the authors
integrate a microeconomic altruistic model in the general equilibrium framework
similar to Hoddinott (1996). The conclusive result from the study states that stronger
remittance outflows from Germany depreciate the real exchange rate. This enables the
reallocation of goods from the non tradable sector to the tradable sector which
translates in the opposite Dutch Disease phenomenon.
The limitation of Baas and Maja Melzer (2012), study is that the results are limited to
the analysis of one country without considering other advanced economies that receive
a substantial amount of migrant workers. One of the main aspects of this research is to
provide a comprehensive analysis of the Dutch Disease effects and Balassa Samuelson
effects for both the remittance receiving country and the remittance sending country.
In particular there will be an emphasis on analysing the labour movements between the
tradable and the non-tradable sectors.
2.3 Fiscal Policy in Developing Economies
In comparison to the empirical literature on the effects of monetary policy, fiscal policy
has received very little attention until recently. The surge of attention was attracted
from the arguments arising from the Balanced Budget Amendment in the US and the
Growth and Stability Pact in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). This
attention has been enhanced through independent institutions and countries regarding
fiscal policy as a useful tool for stabilising business cycle fluctuations. However, for
fiscal policy the bigger picture depicts a alternative view as the neoclassical and
Neo-Keynesian theories predict different outcomes. A shock to government spending
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on goods and services and other key variables such as private investment, private
consumption and the real wage will have completely opposite results for these theories.
The central issue regarding fiscal policy for the governments in developing countries
is to investigate the degree of cyclicality in fiscal policy, and to determine if fiscal
expansion or fiscal contraction policies in the business cycle are correctly timed. Gavin
and Perotti (1997) were among the first to conclude that fiscal policy is procyclical
within Latin American countries. In addition to this finding, Talvi and Végh (2005)
claim that this finding is not restricted to the Latin American countries but extends to
the rest of the developing world. Talvi and Végh (2005) study the causation between
GDP and the cyclical component of government consumption which for each of the 36
developing countries is positive with an average of 0.53. In contrast to this finding,
the average correlation for the G7 countries is zero. Many authors worldwide have now
come to conclusion that procyclical fiscal policy is a prominent and existing feature
within developing economies (Braun, 2001; Lane, 2003; Kaminsky et al., 2005; Alesina
et al., 2008; Ilzetzki, 2011).
The majority of literature aimed at explaining the fiscal cyclicality puzzle is based on
two strands of literature. The fiscal cyclicality puzzle explains why developing countries
experience pro-cyclical fiscal policies whilst in developed economies fiscal policies are
generally countercyclical. Firstly, literature based on imperfections in international
credit markets inhibit developing countries from borrowing in bad times (Gavin and
Perotti, 1997; Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2004; Mendoza and Oviedo, 2010) and
also literature based on political economy theories contribute to the fact that fiscal
profligacy and rent-seeking activities are encouraged during the upturn of the economy
(Talvi and Végh, 2005; Alesina et al., 2008; Ilzetzki, 2011).
As mentioned by Acemoglu and Robinson (2010) the understanding of why different
countries get trapped in an unfavourable political equilibria situation which result in
bad economic choices by the economic institutions is imperative. Acemoglu and
Robinson (2010) take Africa as an example to show that if democracy is promoted
with accountability, then this would almost definitely lead to better economic policies
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and institutions. Acemoglu and Robinson (2010) counter argue their case in stating
that governments should be careful in promoting good economic and political
institutions as this does not always lead to greater accountability and hence better
growth paths.
A typical reason for the sub-optimal policies are based around institutional weaknesses
and social tensions to name a few examples. A common answer revolves around a bad
supply of credit. Developing countries during economic downturns tend to borrow and
can only do so at high interest rates, as a result they have to cut spending as they
cannot afford to run larger budget deficits. Whereas in booms, they increase public
spending as they can borrow more easily (Gavin and Perotti, 1997; Catao and Sutton,
2002; Kaminsky et al., 2005; Manasse, 2007). It is imperative, to view this proposition
with caution as two fundamental questions are left unanswered. Firstly, given that
countries face binding credit constraints during recessions countries should think about
creating a buffer of reserves in good times. Secondly, even in a recession why would
lenders not provide the sufficient funds to these countries, with the assurance that the
borrowing would optimally smooth out the cycle (Alesina et al., 2008). The answer to
these issues are based around the findings by Acemoglu and Robinson (2010) who state
that reform is revolved around the political equilibria of each government worldwide
and change can only occur when we understand the exact determinants of the political
equilibria.
2.4 Monetary Policy Institutions and Framework in Developing Economies
The main distinction of monetary policy in developing countries from developed
countries originates from the notion of credibility in monetary policy. It should be
acknowledged that developed countries are not immune from this problem but it is a
more prevalent problem in developing economies where corruption is more apparent.
The general consensus regarding economic models with a monetary prospective are
that they attempt to identify a reaction function for the central bank activities in
developed countries. In contrast, developing countries receive much less attention,
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persuading us to believe that central banks in these countries were created in the
mindset of reducing the government deficit. The view from many industrialised
countries stipulate that developing countries lack the suitable credibility in their
monetary policy, and hence should follow a system where the currency is pegged to a
major currency from a low inflationary country (for example the United States dollar),
or have a currency board. The results from Huang and Wei (2006) reveal that
developing countries that use pegged exchange rates or currency boards, whilst
providing the motive of a lack of credibility in a developing country’s government.
Therefore, this has lead to below optimal outcomes typical to countries with high
levels of corruption. Furthermore, Huang and Wei (2006) focus on modelling weak
institutions in their analysis to represent the difficulty governments in these countries
face when collecting tax revenue through formal tax channels. Under an inflation
targeting framework the authors aim to study how weak institutions can affect the
socially optimum level of the inflation target. Lastly the analysis examines the
implications of several other monetary frameworks which focus on dollarisation,
including a currency board, and evaluating a Rogoff-type conservative central banker,
and then ranking them in terms of their impact towards social welfare.
Habermeier et al. (2009) provide comprehensive analyses on the monetary policy
response by researching how 50 emerging and developing economies respond to rising
inflation associated with food and oil price shocks. The main conclusions for their
study acknowledge that both aggregate demand pressures with surging commodity
prices contribute largely to rising inflation in these countries. Moreover, the study
states that inflationary pressures are largely determined by tighter labour markets and
growing capacity constraints. They conclude that many central banks in these regions
have tried to combat these problems by tightening monetary policy thereby
constraining aggregate demand to control inflation expectations. However, they note
that the timing and speed of the monetary policy decisions are likely to be negated by
the delayed actions in many countries caused by the lag effects in policy transmission.
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2.5 Macroeconomic Policy and Remittances - Theoretical Foundations
The interdependence of fiscal and monetary policy is a recurrent theme in
macroeconomics based on the traditional analyses of the optimal policy mix when
both instruments are under control of a single policymaker who chooses policy targets
that are mutually inconsistent. Most recently, the scope of theoretical literature on
macroeconomic policy has changed in relation to independent central banks and fiscal
authorities. This change has been instigated by the focus on the analyses of fiscal and
monetary policy interactions which are dependent upon the differing objectives of the
policymakers.
The general consensus on policy research is that fiscal and monetary policy in
macroeconomic policy has been largely ignored. The focus is centered on how
remittance inflows can influence government decision making Chami et al. (2008). In
this respect, a number of studies have focused on monetary and fiscal policy
interactions using the New Keynesian dynamic general equilibrium models or game
theoretic models (Galí and Perotti, 2003) without modelling remittance inflows into
the fully specified general equilibrium framework. In a simple flex-price closed
economy model, Leeper (1991) demonstrated that equilibrium in an economy is only
achieved by means of a mix between fiscal and monetary policy. In such a case an
‘active’ monetary policy (which satisfies the Taylor rule principle), must be supported
with a ‘passive’ fiscal policy to enable the fiscal authorities to adjust tax revenues in
order to stabilise the government’s liabilities. On the contrary, if fiscal authorities do
not act in order to stabilise their debt stock, the active monetary policy will have to
be abandoned by the monetary authorities.
For members of a monetary union, the compatibility between fiscal and monetary policy
has been examined by Leith and Wren-Lewis (2006). However, analysing such issues
under flexible exchange rates has been conducted in terms of flex-price models consisting
of infinitely lived consumers (see Dupor 2000; Canzoneri et al. 2001). This inhibits the
potential real effects of spillovers between fiscal and monetary policies. Leith and Wren-
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Lewis (2006) build upon the initial model by including sticky prices and finitely lived
agents in the model. A significant result is possible if there is a lack of fiscal feedback
in one country which subsequently can have significant macroeconomic implications for
its trading partners. The model employed by Leith and Wren-Lewis (2006) generates
several interesting results, namely if one country’s fiscal authority fails to stabilise their
debt stock. To ensure the uniqueness of the perfect foresight equilibrium path there
are two possible regimes which could be employed by the government. In the first case,
a passive monetary policy can ensure equilibrium by ignoring the Taylor principle and
by failing to raise real interest rates in response to excess inflation in that country.
However, the inclusion of fiscal shocks is essential as we need to include global linkages
within the economy. Fiscal shocks in this case will have significant real and nominal
implications in both economies, even in the case where the second country is engaged in
an active monetary policy (a monetary policy which satisfies the Taylor rule principle)
accompanied by a sound fiscal policy. Secondly, the situation can arise by which a
country operates with a lax fiscal policy which is ’active’. In this case, stability can still
be achieved if the second country completely ignores the ‘Taylor principle’ as it needs to
support the lax fiscal policy imposed by the first economy. This is a compatible policy
because in the definition of consumer prices you can include the traded goods prices
which is used to deflate nominal debt stocks in each economy.
However, in one of the simulations performed by the authors, they find that such a
regime is unlikely to be optimal because it exacerbates the macroeconomic consequences
of the original fiscal shocks. In order to generate these results Leith and Wren-Lewis
(2006) follow a closed economy model outlined in Leith and Wren-Lewis (2006). The
study combines forward looking consumers with Calvo contracts but not infinitely lived
and policy operating through simple rules. In these Calvo contracts price changes are
staggered exogenously, whereby a chosen fixed percentage of firms will change prices
at a given time. The study shows that in this economy there were two policy regimes
in which the price level was the dominant factor. The first regime, is a conventional
regime whereby the fiscal authority actively adjusts taxes and spending to control its
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debt and the monetary authority operates an active ’Taylor rule’ which is consistent
with the Taylor principle. The second regime consists of insufficient fiscal feedback from
the debt, whereby the unstable debt dynamics of the economy effectively rules out the
monetary authority to follow the Taylor principle.
Overall the results of Leith and Wren-Lewis (2006) suggest caution upon the
macroeconomic implications of a lax fiscal policy (where the feedback from debt to
spending or taxes is absent) are confined to the country with the relaxed fiscal policy.
In the case of an accommodating (passive) monetary policy, the multiplicity and
perfect foresight equilibrium paths cannot be avoided through such a policy in that
country. The spillover effects to other countries from the exchange rate movements
may be substantially large.
This study corroborates the results of the study by Leeper (1991) , but the presence of
non-Ricardian consumers enables the degree of fiscal feedback required to support the
active monetary policy to be increased as a result. The idea of a non-Ricardian
consumer is that consumers are not rational. For example, these consumers cannot
anticipate future tax increases or government spending cuts in the future. With the
assumption of non-Ricardian consumers at the expense of the government it knows it
can increase government borrowing. However, the government assumes that it will be
able to conduct its fiscal policy smoothly without consumers anticipating an increase
in taxes in the future. The more recent study by Davig and Leeper (2011) embeds a
Markov regime switching model for U.S. monetary and fiscal policy into a calibrated
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model. The DSGE model with
nominal rigidities enables Davig and Leeper (2011) to deliver some empirical
predictions regarding the impacts of government spending. The study states the
economy depends upon current and expected monetary and fiscal policy behaviour
and concludes that the estimated joint policy process is stipulated on a conventional
new Keynesian model. The model states that government spending creates positive
consumption multipliers in some policy regimes.
Much of the literature has focused on whether monetary and fiscal policy operate as
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strategic substitutes or strategic complements. Dixit and Lambertini (2000) explore a
model of the independence between the central bank and the fiscal authority, where the
central bank only has partial control of inflation and it directly affects the stance of fiscal
policy. In particular the study shows that both policies are complements when fiscal
expansions have an effect on output and inflation in a non-Keynesian (contractionary)
method. Buti et al. (2001) imply that this interdependence might be shock-dependent
and should not necessarily be viewed in terms of conflict or cooperation. In their model
the supply shocks drive the conflicting policies, whereas the opposite holds true for the
demand shocks. Muscatelli et al. (2004) focus on a New Keynesian DSGE model which
is used to see how fiscal and monetary policies interact in terms of policy analysis. In
effect, the authors seek the implications for the degree of inertia (persistence) in the
structural model and in the policy rules for both fiscal and monetary policies in regards
to performance. Additionally, they find that the inertial government expenditure rules
tend to be less efficient than those of the taxation rules. This is because there is a greater
impact of the taxation rules on output compared to the government expenditure rules.
Finally, their results corroborate those of Galí and Perotti (2003). Galí and Perotti
(2003) state that the presence of the rule of thumb consumers creates greater instability
in the model but this can be offset by the presence of automatic stabilisers which
counteract the effects of the rule of thumb consumers as it is based on taxation. A rule
of thumb consumer in this model is denoted by the proportion of households who follow
a rule of thumb, and consume out of current disposable income in addition to supplying
a constant amount of labour.
The study by Muscatelli et al. (2004) was one of the earliest to model monetary-fiscal
interactions in a New Keynesian context. The model they use incorporates liquidity
constrained consumers on US data. Therefore, by using the New Keynesian IS curve
and the Philips Curve, the study is able to determine the effects of government spending
and taxation by using these models. The key conclusion from the policy analysis found
that the automatic stabilisers based on a policy of taxation seemed to combine more
efficiently with the forward looking inertial monetary policy than those of the feedback
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government spending rules. Muscatelli et al. (2004), simply take the monetary policy
rule as data which is estimated from the post-1982 period, but in the perspective of
fiscal policy the monetary authority will change its behaviour. Henceforth, one can
specifically ask the question in terms of the optimising monetary playmakers, of how
the different fiscal rules will perform in this environment? The difficulty in this approach
results from the difficulty in assigning appropriate assumptions of the welfare function
for the central bank originating from the complexity of the framework (Benigno and
Woodford, 2003). Some earlier seminal works, Barro and Gordon (1983) and Kydland
and Prescott (1977) conclude that in models with benevolent monetary authorities and
nominal bonds, price commitment results in higher welfare for the consumers. These
papers specifically deal with the time inconsistency problem of nominal debt in a Philips
curve rather than focusing directly on the government’s budget constraint.
A more recent line of research by Miller (2016) takes a different approach by
investigating the interactions of fiscal and monetary policies. This study contributes
to the literature through exploring the consequences of price commitment in a
political economy model. This is achieved by pairing an independent monetary
authority which issues nominal bonds with a fiscal authority whose endogenous
spending decisions are politically distorted.
Miller (2016) study finds the opposite result to Barro and Gordon (1983) and Kydland
and Prescott (1977) in that price commitment leads to lower welfare. As an
alternative to the benevolent fiscal authority imposed in many economies, this study
focuses on a micro founded political economy model. Fiscal decisions are made
endogenous to the nominal bond and environment levels and if the monetary authority
commits to a price level, the politically motivated fiscal authority will spend with no
liability resulting in welfare losses for society. The study views price commitment as a
dangerous policy for the monetary authorities. Specifically, discretionary monetary
policy keeps fiscal policy in balance whereas monetary commitment gives the fiscal
authority undue power to disregard monetary constraints. On the contrary, giving the
monetary authority commitment dampens overall welfare from the lack of power it has
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over the fiscal authority. The main conclusion from the study states that monetary
policy in the model benefits from a distorted fiscal policy. Both monetary and fiscal
authorities utility functions will differ, however, the overall result is more beneficial for
the monetary authority’s goal of maximising welfare compared to when both utility
functions are identical in nature. The study concludes that the modern economy
structure should focus on an efficient outcome where fiscal decisions are controlled by
a political entity and monetary decisions are independent of government (non-political
organisation) without price commitment and the inclusion of nominal bonds. In this
case bonds need to be issued, but not to an extent to where it creates political
distortion which distorts the optimal macroeconomic policy of the economy.
A large amount of recent empirical literature has focused on the interactions of fiscal
and monetary policy rules for some emerging and developing countries. Cevik et al.
(2014) most recently focus on some emerging European economies with the use of a
Markov regime-switching model. The paper estimates a variant of the monetary policy
rule by using the Taylor (1997) rule. Cevik et al. (2014) explore further by including the
fiscal and monetary policy interactions in the framework provided by Davig and Leeper
(2011). The empirical results suggest that six European economies including, Czech
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and the Slovak Republic, followed both
an active and passive monetary policy rules in the sample. The main result from Cevik
et al. (2014) concluded that the majority of countries exhibited passive monetary policy
regimes which were more persistent and have a higher duration than active monetary
regimes except for Poland. With the exception of Slovenia and the Slovak Republics
all countries displayed ‘dove regimes’, a phenomenon where output stabilisation takes
a greater priority over inflation targets in the passive monetary policy regimes.
In general the policy interactions point to a diverse picture in their selected countries. In
addition this study corroborates to many other studies which focus on other European
countries. It is necessary to compare the developing countries with advanced countries
to see how the policy regimes compare. Thams (2006) focus on an advanced country
and conclude that Spain has an unsustainable policy combination mix. Additionally,
38
Semmler and Zhang (2012) show that the relationship between fiscal and monetary
policy interactions is weak for both France and Germany. In more detail, the study
reveals that the policies have been counterproductive rather than supportive to each
other.
The recent study by Abdih et al. (2012) focuses on a panel data set covering the
Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia. Their paper finds that the external
remittance shocks to receiving countries influences private demand, which
consequently affects tax revenues in these countries. Moreover, the study signifies that
remittances affects imports and private consumption positively but domestic
investment negatively and insignificantly. The analysis of the study has several
important implications in relation to the operation of fiscal policy in these countries.
Firstly, for the countries who are not resource rich, remittances can prove to increase
fiscal space for these countries. Fiscal space relates to the room in a government’s
budget to provide resources for a desired purpose without jeopardising the stability of
the economy. Consequently the remittance inflows not only improves household
welfare but also leads to an increase in the tax base to improve the fiscal position of
the government. On the other hand, studies by Chami et al. (2008) and Abdih et al.
(2012) show that there is moral hazard on the governments side as a result from the
increased fiscal space.
In other words, remittance income makes governments less accountable to households
because corruption is less costly to bear in addition to purchasing public goods rather
than relying on the government to provide it. A shortcoming of this study and a
further avenue for this research is based upon the authors primarily focusing on the
negative partial effect of remittance inflows on institutional quality. On the contrary,
this research will be based on the model by Alesina et al. (2008) but with
modifications regarding the explanatory variables. In more detail, there will be a
remittances variable which will determine if there is any relationship between
remittances and government expenditure in addition to see if there is a significant
relationship between fiscal cyclicality and remittances. Therefore, this thesis will
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explore the potential for analysing how remittances evolve over the fiscal cycle and the
need for the government to acknowledge that they are not free riding the system. Of
particular interest are the effects of remittances on monetary policy and in particular
exchange rates and inflation. First of all, remittances can influence consumption in the
recipient country, whether migrants are motivated to remit for self interest, altruistic
reasons or simply as an investment (Lucas and Stark, 1985). Aside for the motivation,
remittances can increase and stimulate the levels of economic activity within the
receiving country, through investment directly and consumption indirectly, leading to
increases in employment, production and hence disposable income (Durand et al.,
1996; Widgren and Martin, 2002; Heilmann, 2006).
While the literature generally provides links to economic growth, there still remains a
cloud over the positive effects of remittances (Keely and Tran, 1989; León-Ledesma and
Piracha, 2004; De Haas, 2006). In particular, De Haas (2006) focuses on the extent
to which migration and remittances are fully realised in terms of development. More
specifically, De Haas (2006) postulates that there is no automatic mechanism which can
confirm that migration and remittances leads to greater economic development. The
authors postulates that the level of remittance inflows are essentially determined by key
issues such as the levels of corruption, the trust in government institutions. Furthermore,
remittances are also influenced by the poor access to key international markets which
prevents migrants from taking the risk to invest their money in their country of origin
which can lower the chances of them returning. In conclusion, the author emphasises
that the general development of the sending region or country can only be fully realised
through sensible immigration policies which do not deter migrants from circulating from
the sending country to the receiving country. Under unfavourable economic conditions,
migration and remittances may contribute to households effectively permanently settling
in the destination country which for them represents ‘development’. De Haas (2006)
empirically analyses these issues by focusing on a migrant-sending region located in
southern Morocco by investigating investment patterns by local households.
León-Ledesma and Piracha (2004) focus on the effect of remittance inflows on
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employment performance for Central and Eastern European (CEE) economies. The
results show that remittances significantly contribute to the higher investment levels
in the receiving country whilst the consumption effect is less strong compared to
investment. Keely and Tran (1989) examines the effects of labour migration on
remittance inflows in 50 countries consisting of developed and developing countries.
An important observation by Keely and Tran (1989) is that “Remittances may have
helped countries hold their own but have not narrowed the per capita income gap”
(P.524). It is important to acknowledge that in order to understand the
macroeconomic consequences of remittances we need to investigate how remittance
receiving families spend their income in relation to household consumption or
household savings.
The negative effects of remittances, are primarily documented in the literature as
initially channelled through on to exchange rates, inflation, policy responsiveness and
work effort. Heilmann (2006) shows that inflows of remittances can generate
inflationary pressures within the economy, especially if internal demand for imports is
stimulated via the inflow. Narayan et al. (2011) study largely corroborates these
findings for a set of 54 developing countries for the period 1995-2004, signifying that
remittances can generate inflationary pressures that are accentuated in the long run.
Another study by Vacaflores and Kishan (2014) represent a similar result in that
remittances give rise to an increase in inflation. The study focuses on Latin America
and empirically explores the determinants of international reserves which shows that
the accumulation of international reserves is significant and originates from the inflows
of remittances. To redeem the foreign currency remittances, the central bank has to
inject money into the economy, resulting in the money supply to increase if the flows
are not fully sterilised.
Recent studies including Chami et al. (2008); Acosta et al. (2009a); Jansen et al.
(2012) show that remittances can be counter effective to economic growth. This is
because of the reduced incentives to work for the recipient households, henceforth
putting downward pressures on output. While this effect is profound in the literature,
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the behaviour of the receiving household is altered in addition to inhibiting the
negative effects on leisure. This is based on the assumption of considering the migrant
process as a household decision which eliminates the role of altruistic behaviour
(Jansen et al., 2012). In a recent cross sectional study some interesting results occur
where Cox-Edwards and Rodríguez-Oreggia (2009) empirically show that persistent
remittances have a limited effect on labour force participation rates in Mexico.
Funkhouser (2006) reinforces this outcome by finding no major effects of remittances
on the labour force rates in Nicaragua with the use of longitudinal data, with only
teenagers in the remittances’ receiving households experiencing a decline in
employment.
The effectiveness of monetary policy could be affected via the rise in the level of
remittances by having an impact on policy responsiveness. This is accentuated in
particular if the additional income is a significant portion of the household’s income.
In this respect, the ability of the central bank to stimulate household consumption
through lower interest rates could be constrained if the level of remittances is already
at a high rate otherwise they could be some inflationary consequences. The challenge
for the remittance receiving government is to design policies that allow for the benefits
to flow to the households and the economy without limiting the effectiveness of the
effects and producing unwarranted side effects. It has been notably documented in
this area that higher remittances enable households to offset the potential influences of
government policy to some degree, without substantial fluctuations in work effort due
to consumption smoothing actions by the households. This potential influence has
been recently researched upon by some recent studies to examine the possible
implications.
Chami et al. (2008) use a stochastic DSGE model which is based upon the
responsiveness of government policies. They seek to understand how government
policies react to the changes in remittance inflows which could affect both fiscal and
monetary policy in the recipient country. The main result from the study is the
optimal monetary policy will differ between the remittance dependent country and the
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country with no remittance inflows. The general equilibrium framework employed
finds positive and negative economic effects from the remittances mainly from the
inflows of private capital. This study finds that remittances contribute to increased
macroeconomic risk via higher business cycle volatility. This is because of the
increased correlation between labour and output. Consequently, consumption increases
through the consumption smoothing effect. This is seen to influence the functioning
and cost of policy instruments. Additionally, economies who employ labour taxation,
find that remittances hinder the ability of the policymakers to enable the Friedman
rule. Subsequently this increases the incentives to use the inflation tax. The likelihood
of increasing the negative externalities of remittances is related directly to the use of
the inflation tax. Therefore, the important finding from the study concludes that
policymakers need to make use of the correct instruments to achieve their objectives
simultaneously. These objectives consequently may vary according to the correct set of
instruments in the presence of remittances. Objectively, the study concludes that the
policymakers need to make use of the correct set of policy instruments amongst
simultaneously adjusting their policy preferences following the presence of remittances.
In a recent piece of research, Mandelman (2013) develops a DSGE model to analyse
monetary policy in remittance receiving countries. The DSGE model consists with
preferences of heterogeneous agents, market frictions and monopolistic competition in
which positive remittance shocks exhibit inflation. However, the model proposes the
government controls inflation through the contraction of the money supply which
raises the interest rate. The study follows a format similar to the monetary policy rule
proposed by Taylor (1997). This model is more representative of developed countries
and is characterised with an automatic response to fluctuations in remittances. Jansen
et al. (2012) focus on the same area with the use of a DSGE model, where they find
that countries with differing degrees of sterilisation (policies aimed at countering the
effects on the money supply caused by a balance of payments surplus or deficit)
exhibit a differential effect of remittances shocks. In particular, as part of their
robustness checks they show that the labour leisure trade-off is compounded because
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of the indirect effects of money growth and inflation. Leeper (1991) demonstrated
with the use of a flexible price closed economy model, equilibrium determinacy in the
economy is only achieved with the mix of monetary and fiscal policy, such that ‘active’
monetary policy must be supported by a ‘passive’ fiscal policy. This result is based on
the policy following an ‘active’ or ‘passive’ regime depending on its responsiveness to
government debt shocks.
A recent study by Bahadir et al. (2018) uses the same open economy New Keynesian
DSGE model. However, they concentrate on how remittance inflows can affect the
response of the economy from the interactions between the distribution of remittances
across households and their ownership of capital. Using data from El Salvador, the
authors find that an increase in remittances applied to households with no capital
ownership have a contractionary effect on the economy. Conversely, when households
have capital ownership there is an expansionary effect on the economy. The conclusive
finding from the study reveals that the result depends on the ability of remittances
to smooth out the business cycle. This is reliant upon the remittances distribution
across heterogeneous households. The main limitation in this study and the potential
for analysis in this study is the endogeneity of remittance inflows and the effects of
migration and human capital skills in the domestic labour market. Such an analysis
would need a multi-country panel set up which models the costs of migration and the
composition of human capital skills in the labour market.
The interactions of fiscal and monetary policies need to be researched further. This
would help examine external factors such as the political effects in terms of election
induced increased government spending and the effects of remittances to be included in
the analysis. In particular, remittances play a huge role in developing nations in terms of
GDP and the overall development of these emerging nations. Disentangling the effects
of the remittances post the 2008 crisis is critical to determine the economic and social
situations of these developing countries. The majority of the literature on remittances
focuses on the microeconomic implications of the respective sender and receiver countries
of remittances (Rapoport and Docquier, 2006; Sharma, 2010). However, economists
have ignored the impact of potentially higher remittances in terms of their fiscal impact
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and the implementation of monetary policy.
2.6 Remittances and the Political Budget Cycle
Before discussing how remittances can influence the political budget cycle it is
important to understand the interactions between migrants and remittances and how
the literature has evolved in finding a link to corruption within governments. The
political influence of remittances is embodied within the political budget cycle
theoretical framework. In order to understand the complex relationships between the
political impact of remittances and macroeconomic policy it is useful to consider
beforehand the theoretical underpinnings of the political business cycle literature.
There are two main schools of thought when investigating the notion of political
intervention in economic policy. The first line of thought, initiated by Nordhaus
(1975), the electoral political-business cycles theory characterises politicians as
identical and opportunistic, meaning that their only preference is to remain in power.
The new perspective on elections was pioneered by William D. Nordhaus, with his
theoretical paper named ‘political business cycle’ in 1975. His argument originated
from incumbents who aim to maximise votes during the election season. The electoral
political-business cycles theory characterizes voters as myopic and naive (e.g., as
having adaptive expectations and thus voting retrospectively) and prone to vote for
incumbents when times are good prior to an election. Nordhaus claimed that when
voters have limited information about party policies, they will seek to form
expectations about incumbent parties by observing past performance. Subsequently, if
the party seeking re-election fails to meet these expectations the voter will vote
against the incumbent (Nordhaus 1975, p172). Nordhaus’s cycle also known as ‘the
opportunistic cycle’ seeks to explain the Philipsian dilemma between inflation and
unemployment.
The traditional model was criticised for characterising voters as myopic and naive. Hibbs
(1977) introduced modifications to the original model known as the partisan political
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business cycle which attacked the notion that politicians are characterised purely by
opportunistic behaviour, at the expense of partisan preferences over policy outcomes.
The argument proposed by Hibbs focuses on lower income and occupation status groups
who are best served by low unemployment-high inflation macroeconomic outcomes. On
the other hand, a combination of high unemployment and low inflation configuration
is synonymous with the upper income and occupational status groups. The original
partisan model of Hibbs (1977) is modified by Alesina and Tabellini (1990) to allow for
fluctuations in unemployment and inflation to be driven by election outcomes combined
with partisan differences.
The reliance on voters with the characteristic of being myopic voters with adaptive
expectations is criticised by many studies. Based on the opportunistic political
framework, Cukierman and Meltzer (1986); Alesina and Tabellini (1990); Rogoff and
Sibert (1990); Persson and Tabellini (2003); Stein and Streb (1998); Lohmann (1998)
revise the initial model to merge rational expectations among voters. Consequently,
the dependence on asymmetric information between voters and politicians is a key
assumption amongst these models. The level of competence is known to the
politicians, however for voters it is discovered with a lag (e.g. post election) effect.
The endowment of rational expectations amongst voters is conditional on the
information set available to them at any given time. Hence, voters judgments are
based on observed economic outcomes and ‘rational retrospective’ voting is
determined where opportunistic government are incentivised to manipulate
macroeconomic policy variables to appear more proficient prior to an election.
Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) use the proposition of asymmetric information to
explain the government’s preference for discretionary policy action. The study shows
that discretionary policy imposes a social cost and the costs are only eliminated if all
voters have the same information as the government. They termed the resulting loss
as the “cost of democracy” and this cost only disappears, without a constitution when
the public is fully informed. The model implies that social welfare is not maximised by
the government with private information who maximise the probability of getting
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re-elected. In the model, the prediction states that the public expects the government
to increase its welfare before an election.
2.7 Remittances and the Labour Market
There has been substantial amount of data documented on international migration in
both host and home countries. The general perception in this field is that migration
enhances the welfare of people living in the host country with only some exceptions
(Friedberg and Hunt, 1995). For example in this study the authors report the analysis
on the United States which concludes that a 10% increase in the fraction of immigrants
in the population reduced the native wage by as much as 1%. The analysis of net
migration is far from complete and what is needed is to analyse the effects on the
home country (sending country) labour market. The general perception on these issues
follows that the most skilled workers will leave the home country and hence there will
be a brain drain which could negatively affect the productivity of the labour market
back home. Although it should be noted that a brain drain does not necessarily imply
a negative impact in developing countries. For example, Beine et al. (2001) conclude
that there are conditions under which the brain drain can be beneficial to the home
country’s economy. Similarly Dos Santos and Postel-Vinay (2003) state that the main
benefit from international migration is when migrant workers improve the efficiency of
their home country’s economy. This is through the process of diffusing the knowledge
back home which has been acquired from overseas in the form of physical and human
capital.
For the remainder of this section the focus will be on documenting on the literature
concerned with the effects of remittances on the labour market in the home country.
The study by Djajić (1986) advances the work of Rivera-Batiz (1982) in examining the
effects of migration on the welfare of the remaining residents in a small open economy
producing both tradable and non-tradable goods. The study shows that if remittances
inflows exceed a critical amount, there will be benefit to the remaining residents from
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migration even if they do not receive any remittances themselves. The study finds that
emigration has been encouraged by many Mediterranean countries with the ambition
of attracting large flows of remittances into to these countries. The model used in the
study follows a simple process whereby remittances received by the families back home
increase consumption demand in the home economy.
Furthermore, the returning migrants spend their extra income in durable and non-
durable goods. At the same time part of the remittances could still be used in a
productive way through direct investment in local projects or alternatively as savings
through the use of the banking system.
Funkhouser (1992) focuses on the relationship between mass emigration and
remittances in El Salvador to examine if there are any effects on labour force
participation rates, brain drain and wages in the Salvadoran labour market.3 The
study concludes that remittance inflows have significant effects on the labour force
participation of the remaining households. This is prevalent in the result primarily
because of the income effect whereby workers in the home country rely too heavily on
remittances and hence reduce their working hours for more leisure time. Furthermore,
Funkhouser (1992) suggests that aggregate demand may increase following the high
levels of remittance inflows into local labour markets and the demand for labour would
increase. The study’s main finding concludes that the labour force participation rate
are higher for women compared to men when there is emigration of a household
member. The second result of the paper follows that changes in the labour force from
migration causes changes in wages. More specifically, the effects of the shortages of
skilled labour are not as severe. This is as a result of an increase in the demand for
labour increased in conjunction with an economic recovery where the skilled migrants
do not return to El Salvador.
In analysing remittances effects on the labour market, it is important to focus on
employment and unemployment and the interactions between migrants. Zachariah
et al. (2001) provide an alternative view of remittances as they view them as
3The author uses six data sources on emigrants from El Salvador and two data sources for the native El Salvadoran
population.
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responding in a similar way to welfare payments. The study focuses on the Kerala
state in India where a sample survey shows that the worker population ratio was much
higher for non-migrant households (55%) compared to emigrant households (31.6%).
They suggest that this finding originates from the fact that the emigrant households
are more selective when searching for work compared to non-migrant households. This
is confirmed by the data collected by the authors whereby emigrant households
depend more on self employment (48%) than non-migrant households (45.3%). The
study’s section on the effects of migration on employment and unemployment
concludes with the powerful statement that “because unemployed persons belonging to
emigrant households enjoy the financial support of the emigrant members, they are
not in any hurry to get employed” (p. 55).
Galasi and Kollo (2002) build on previous studies by analysing the effects of
unemployment benefits on the duration and incidence of unemployment. Galasi and
Kollo (2002) view remittance inflows similar to the effect of increasing unemployment
benefits thereby increasing the individual’s reservation wages and replacement rate.
The authors acknowledge that counter arguments exist to the common view that an
increase in benefits is unfavourable for job search intensity which results in a decrease
in the probabilistic chances for re-employment for the unemployed workers. A longer
search period for a job will allow a better job search match by allowing individual
workers greater time to match their skills to the appropriate job. Furthermore, this
provides greater market knowledge for individuals who are not searching for jobs.
Therefore, to answer these issues there needs to be extensive in depth analysis and
greater coverage of household data survey for remittance receiving households to seek
their employment status, education levels, income levels and their opinions on seeking
re-employment.
49
2.8 Remittances, Financial Development and Monetary policy
The idea that a well functioning financial system is an essential requirement for a
country’s economic growth and considered almost as an obvious prerequisite by most
scholars (Miller, 1998). Given the sheer magnitude of global remittance flows, it is not
surprising that the literature on remittances also focuses on financial development and
monetary policy. The empirical relationship between financial development and
economic growth has been studied extensively within the literature across both
developed and developing countries. The empirical evidence finds that remittances
contribute to economic growth be it through consumption, investment, or savings.
Glytsos (2002) models the indirect and direct effects of remittances on incomes and
investment in Pakistan, India, and Morocco. This study gathers conclusive results and
concludes that the evidence varies among the Mediterranean countries, however finds
that investment rises with remittances in six out of the seven countries.
The direct relationship between remittances and financial development, incorporates
several demand side and supply side channels. With the demand side, we see
remittance receiving households’ use of the formal remittance service improve the
financial literacy rate. Therefore, these unbanked migrant households are more likely
to manage their remittance receipts in an efficient way by opening bank accounts to
deposit their money because of the high fixed costs of sending remittances due to their
irregular characteristics. Furthermore, remittance receiving households widen their use
of bank services and financial products with the opening of bank accounts. On the
supply-side, the wider range of remittance deposits enables banks to increase the
availability of loanable funds and thus the banks’ ability to lend to both remittance
and non remittance receiving households is expanded. On the other hand, an
alternative approach is to model the relationship between remittances and financial
development through the indirect, growth focused approach which allows for possible
interactions between remittances and financial development in estimating growth
equations for the recipient countries. Remittances provide an alternative source of
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funding through the alleviation of credit constraints. Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009)
provide empirical evidence through standard growth equations, by estimating the
interaction of remittances and financial development for a sample of 73 countries over
the 1975-2002 period.
The current focus in the literature between remittances and financial development
centers on determining whether these variables are complements or substitutes. The
studies in the literature which consider the complementarity hypothesis (Aggarwal
et al., 2011; Mundaca, 2009) or the substitutability hypothesis (Ramirez and Sharma,
2013) analyse the combined effects of remittances and financial development on
economic growth. What the literature fails to address is to provide a wider range of
study which enables us to compare cross country and cross regional differences in the
results. As shown in the literature, remittances are transferred through official and
unofficial channels (World Bank, 2018). Furthermore, Nyamongo et al. (2012) show
that when remittances are channeled through formal avenues they positively impact
the growth of and the quality of bank loan products which they can take advantage of
in the future. If the effect on the financial sector is significant and large enough then
we would expect financial development. Nyamongo et al. (2012) examine a panel of 36
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and reveal that remittances appear to be an
important source for economic growth and work as a complement to financial
development. In addition, a more developed financial system within the home country
should entail lower costs of transferring money from the source country (Freund and
Spatafora, 2008). Therefore, this would reduce the number of households who are less
likely to remit due to budget constraints and increase the amount remitted by the
migrant.
More importantly, the two closely related studies that examine the link between
financial development and remittances include Gupta et al. (2009) and Aggarwal et al.
(2011). Gupta et al. (2009) use a sample of 44 Sub Saharan African countries for the
period 1975-2004 and find that remittances have a positive impact on bank deposits.
The study stipulates that in all instances, remittances are statistically significant as a
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positive determinant of financial development. Furthermore, the study finds that while
GDP per capita seems to have a significant effect on financial development, the
magnitude of the effect is small. Although Gupta et al. (2009) provides an insight into
how remittances can affect financial depth, it provides little information regarding the
effects of remittances on financial inclusion. Anzoategui et al. (2014) go further in
analysing the effects of remittances on financial inclusion. Financial inclusion is not
the same as financial depth as financial inclusion focuses on those businesses and
individuals who have access to useful and affordable financial products and services to
meet their needs in a way that is responsible and sustainable. Anzoategui et al. (2014)
concentrate on the impact of remittances on financial inclusion directly and unlike
other literature in the field, the study considers other formal financial institutions in
El Salvador such as cooperatives, credit unions and financiers. Furthermore, the study
looks at whether households apply for loans and examines the impact of remittances
on credit demand. This enables us to assess to what extent remittances might relax
credit constraints.
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Chapter 3
Remittances and Fiscal Cyclicality in Developing countries
3.1 Introduction
Understanding remittance flows requires understanding why these flows are unique and
are distinct from those of official aid or private capital flows which are documented more
extensively in the literature. In more detail, remittance inflows in comparison to official
aid or private capital flows are direct private transactions between people in different
countries which represent the actions of individuals rather than government actions. The
underlying figures support this statement as remittance inflows into developing countries
represent a staggering 38% of total net private capital flows.4 This development in part
may be due to the reduced average transfer cost as a result of the rapid growth of money
transfer institutions. International capital flows in developing economies over the past
two decades have seen a large increase to over 12% of GDP since the 1990s where
they represented only 4% of developing-country GDP (World Bank, 2010). Figure 3.1
reinforces the importance of remittances as officially recorded remittances exceed total
development aid by 50%, amounting to a value of $125 billion in 2004. Remittances
only suffered a drop during the recent global financial crisis in 2008 because the impact
of the real-sector spillovers were quite severe, and fell heavily on energy-exporting and
developed countries, the primary sources of immigrant remittances (Barajas et al., 2011).
Remittance flows to developing countries are projected to slow down during 2015, owing
to the weak economic conditions in Europe and Russia. Flows are expected to accelerate
in 2016, with a projected value of $479 billion by 2017 in line with the more positive
global economic outlook. Furthermore, remittances have proved to be more stable than
private debt and portfolio equity flows and also less volatile than official aid flows as
reported by the recent analysis by the World Bank’s Global Economic prospects 2015
report (World Bank, 2018).
4Data is obtained from the World Bank database online at: http://econ.worldbank.org World Bank (2018)
53
Figure 3.1: Remittances, Private debt & portfolio equity and ODA, 1990-2019. Source: World Bank
(2018), World Bank staff calculations and forecasts, World Development Indicators
Researchers have attempted to understand these flows on these economies primarily
through a microeconomic aspect (Melkonyan and Grigorian, 2012; Amuedo-Dorantes,
2006). Understanding the benefits of these flows through the impact on economic
development in developing countries will enable governments to maximise the
potential of these flows. Consequently, understanding the macroeconomic implications
of remittances will allow policymakers in developing economies to make informed
decisions regarding the potential benefits and costs of migration. To the extent
governments in developing economies need to be mindful of the potential loss of skilled
workers also known as ‘brain drain’ and evaluate the potential gain from the
investment by remittance receiving households is greater than the loss of the skilled
workers. However, the ‘brain drain’ phenomenon is dependent on the migrants’
education level and the well being of the remittance receiving families. Niimi et al.
(2008) present findings which confirm that skilled migrants earn more than unskilled
migrants. However, they often come from better-off families whose demand for
remittances may be lower than those from poorer families.
It can be perfectly reasonable to assume that remittances have the same economic
impact as the official aid flows and private capital flows but they differ greatly in some
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aspects. There are three key differences between remittances and other international
flows which are agreed upon in the literature. The widely accepted definition of
remittances are that they are non-returnable, nonmarket personal transfers between
households across countries. The main difference between remittances and the official
aid flows are that the former are exchanged in small transfers between private
individuals whereas official aid flows are government to government transfers usually
in large amounts. Crucially, the presence of familial relationships sets remittances
apart from the official aid flows and contributes to the uniqueness of remittances.
Furthermore, when analysing remittance behaviour we can see the interactions among
family members is dependent upon the economic situation of the family.
The documented literature consists of contrasting views on the macroeconomic
consequences of remittances on investment, economic growth, consumption and
poverty (Chami et al., 2005, 2008; Barajas et al., 2011; Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz,
2009; Combes et al., 2015). Conventional wisdom regarding remittances centers on
issues; with a few exceptions; that remittances are a stable and reliable source of
foreign exchange; they reduce poverty; they minimise macroeconomic volatility; they
alleviate credit constraints; provide a buffer against consumption shocks and enhance
investment in physical and human capital. Furthermore, there is a tendency amongst
policy makers to highlight remittances to be the ‘cure’ for the economic challenges
facing developing countries.
The purpose of this chapter is to broadly examine how remittance inflows can affect
key macroeconomic decisions made by the government and macroeconomic policies in
developing countries. In more detail, the study will explore how the cyclicality of fiscal
policy responds to remittance inflows. By using panel data methods this research will
investigate the degree to which remittance inflows are effectively utilised by households.
This is achieved by investigating the timing of government expenditure and government
taxation policies in relation to remittance inflows. However, governments could abuse
their position in receiving these extra flows by timing their expenditure policies. For
example, government could increase government expenditures when remittance inflows
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are high (higher taxation) and vice versa irrespective of the country’s economic cycle.
Whilst many studies have specifically attempted to seek the effects of remittances on
macroeconomic volatility (Chami et al., 2008), economic growth (Giuliano and Ruiz-
Arranz, 2009) and competitiveness Acosta et al. (2009b), few studies have attempted to
seek the effects of remittances on fiscal cyclicality. From the perspective of a developing
country it is important to understand how remittances affect the decisions made on
fiscal related policies which are crucial not just from an economic point of view but also
from a political perspective. Furthermore, this chapter will assist developing nations
governments to understand their expenditure policies and tax policies in regard to the
influence of remittances on household family incomes, attitudes to employment and the
flow of migration between countries.
Most economists (Alesina et al., 2008; Christiano et al., 2011) agree that discretionary
government expenditure and tax revenues should remain constant over the business
cycle. The issue regarding the cyclicality of fiscal policy originates from the prescribed
view that if governments followed this rule then fiscal policy would follow a
countercyclical pattern. Furthermore, during a boom period the level of government
expenditure as a percentage of GDP would decrease because of automatic stabilisers,
whilst government revenues as a percentage of GDP should increase (with a degree of
progressivity and constant tax rates) following the reinforcement from tax cuts in
recessions and tax increases in booms. The opposite result would occur in recessions.
Most notably, in developing countries fiscal policy would follow the opposite scenario
where fiscal policy is procyclical. Government expenditure as a percentage of GDP
decreases during recessions and increases during boom periods, whilst deficits decrease
in recessions and increase in boom periods.5 Gavin and Perotti (1997) were one of the
earliest authors to note that fiscal policy is procyclical in the Latin American region.
Several others including Kaminsky et al. (2005); Manasse (2007); Talvi and Végh
(2005); Catao and Sutton (2002); Alesina et al. (2008) explore this phenomenon and
note that this result is not only restricted to Latin American countries but is common
5In OECD countries the general convention is that fiscal policy is countercyclical. Galí and Perotti (2003)go in to
more detail to explore the cyclical properties of fiscal policy in OECD countries.
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in many though not all developing countries. As a result, developing economies follow
sub-optimal procyclical fiscal policies that contribute to long term macroeconomic
instability. The reasoning for this is concentrated around the difficulty in attaining the
supply of credit, where in bad times developing countries experience difficulty in
borrowing, or can only do so at higher interest rates. This argument may be flawed as
it fails to address several key issues. Namely, why do these countries not self-insure
whilst in ‘good’ times where they can accumulate reserves, so that they are subject to
less budget constraints. Additionally, why are lenders deterred from providing these
countries with extra funds. There have been cases that some countries have tried to
self-insure in ‘good’ times to build up an accumulation of reserves as was the case with
Nigeria. A country like Nigeria should be brimming with foreign reserves up to now
but has failed to build on the large accumulation in the level of reserves from $4.98bn
in May 1999 to $59.37bn in March 2007 (CBN, 2007). The cause for concern in
Nigeria’s case was its inability of its government to create stable economic
management whilst an over-reliance on oil for foreign exchange inflows during the past
two decades. Furthermore, the recent decline in foreign reserves has exacerbated the
problem due to the continuous fall in global oil prices.
To address these issues one needs to consider other factors which could influence the
government fiscal decision making process. In this chapter, remittances are analysed
to determine if they create potential moral hazard problems which could affect the
cyclicality of fiscal policy. More specifically, there needs to be consideration towards
the potential distortion towards excess or insufficient government spending when
remittances are increasing or decreasing without considering the economic conditions.
The aim of this chapter will help build on the existing literature of fiscal policymaking
in developing countries whilst providing an alternative view of fiscal sustainability
through the impact of remittance inflows. The study emphasises the wider impact of
remittances on macroeconomic policy and why fiscal policy is often considered to be
more volatile in developing economies compared to major developed economies.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows, Section 3.2 provides an overview of
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the methodology; Section 3.3 outlines the data sources, definitions; Section 3.4 reviews
the descriptive statistics; Section 3.5 presents the empirical results consisting of the
regression results for each region, while Section 3.6 concludes the study and presents
some possible areas of further work.
3.2 Methodology
The methodology in this chapter follows the underpinnings of Gavin and Perotti
(1997) theoretical framework which stipulates that credit constraints faced by
developing countries would prevent them from raising money in international capital
markets during economic downturns and would consequently force them to adopt a
contractionary fiscal policy. In this study the following dynamic model in Equation (1)
and (2) allow us to test the hypothesis of the influence of remittance inflows on the
cyclicality of fiscal policy in a panel data framework.
Gi,t = α + φGi,t−1 + β0ΔYi,t + β1Ri,t + C
′Xi,t + β2R ∗ΔYi,t (1)
+εi,t
TRi,t = α + φTRi,t−1 + β0ΔYi,t + β1Ri,t + C
′Xi,t + β2R ∗ΔYi,t (2)
+εi,t
where t denotes the time subscripts and i indexes the countries, Gi,t and TRi,t are the
fiscal policy indicators (government final consumption expenditure and tax revenue
measured as percentages of GDP), ΔYi,t is a measure of the business cycle,6 Ri,t
denotes remittance inflows into the receiving country, Xi,t is a matrix of control
variables which could affect changes in the fiscal policy indicator. Two alternative
measures of public spending are used which is why there are two different econometric
6The output gap and the GDP growth rate are the two variables used for the estimation. The output gap is defined
as the log deviation of GDP from its Christiano-Fitzgerald trend (Christiano and Fitzgerald, 2003). The Christiano-
Fitzgerald trend is used in this study rather than the Hodrick-Prescott trend as it is a bandpass filter which is more
efficient in modelling business cycles compared to the Hodrick-Prescott trend.
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estimations: general government final consumption expenditure (as % of GDP) and
tax revenue (as % of GDP). Kaminsky et al. (2005) argue that taxation revenues
constitutes an outcome which is endogenously related to the business cycle. Indeed,
taxation revenues increase during booms and fall during recession periods as the tax
base moves positively with the business cycle. The vector Xi,t is included in order to
capture cross country differences in fiscal policy. The control variables included in this
study are: foreign direct investment (FDI) (net inflows), net official development
assistance and official aid received (NODA), net barter terms of trade index (NBTT),
Inflation (annual %), Polity Democracy variable (Polity), Real GDP per capita, and
Population, ages 15-64 (% of total) (Pop).
The FDI variable is included as part of the empirical methodology in order to control
for some countries that potentially are over dependent on investment by companies
which have the potential to influence the potential spending power of the government.
Similarly, the NODA variable is included to create an even ‘playing field’ for some
countries who are not heavily dependent on aid flows which exert an influence to their
current spending levels. Inflation is included to represent the same purchasing power
across all the countries in the panel dataset. The Polity variable is chosen to represent
the potential for ‘democracies’, ‘anocracies’ and ‘autocracies’ to spend more or less
compared to one another. The population variable gives the model true validity
regarding countries that have greater populations compared to other countries are
more likely to spend more and vice versa. The net barter terms of trade index is given
as the relative price of a country’s exports compared to its imports. This variable
provides an outlook for the government as it represents the gain from international
trade which could affect the government’s fiscal decisions in order to improve domestic
industries for the benefit of its exported goods and services. The Real GDP per capita
variable is used as a control variable as it enables the model to estimate the regression
coefficients whilst controlling for countries that are economically more advanced than
others which could influence the potential for greater government spending.
Equation (1) follows the same format employed by Arellano and Bond (1991);
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Arellano and Bover (1995); Blundell and Bond (1998). The Generalised Method of
Moments (GMM) is the estimation method used in this study because it controls for
the unobserved country-specific effects as well as the bias caused by the lagged
dependent variables. Country fixed effects or random effects7 are included, so that the
regression estimates also reflect within-country variation.
The control variables are utilised as separate components as the strictly exogenous
instrumental variables which will help in explaining the cross country differences in
government final consumption expenditure and taxation revenue. The model
described above in equations (1) and (2) are able to model the cyclical conditions of
the economy via the Output Gap variable and financing constraints through the
foreign aid variable (net official development assistance and official aid received
(NODA)). The lagged dependent variables (φGi,t−1, φTRi,t−1) are included in both
models to capture the lag effects of government final consumption expenditure and
taxation revenue. The inclusion of the output gap variable (ΔYi,t) is important as it
enables the study to analyse the cyclicality of fiscal policy for the subsequent analysis
of the impact of remittances on fiscal cyclicality. Moreover, the reason for including
the R ∗ΔYi,t (Remittance and Output gap interaction term) interaction variable is to
determine whether remittances enhance, diminish, or has no affect on the cyclicality of
fiscal policy.
Chami et al. (2008) examine the relationship between remittances and government
spending and conclude that there is a positive relationship between the two variables in
remittance dependent economies. They conclude that countries that receive remittances
in large quantities, can support higher future debt levels, a finding that corroborates
the correlation between remittances, public debt levels, and banking sector credit to the
public sector. Moreover, the higher debt levels tend to be associated with an increase
the level of government spending.
Similarly, Alesina et al. (2008) study the cyclical response of the budget surplus and
total government spending in two samples of countries (OECD and Non-OECD
7The use of the fixed effects or random effects model are determined according to the Hausman test.
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countries). The Output Gap coefficient is positive for the OECD countries and
insignificantly different from zero in developing countries. Thus, fiscal policy is
countercyclical in developed countries, a result which is synonymous with previous
empirical studies (Kaminsky et al., 2005). This result is consistent with the political
agency model which stipulates that corruption is more widespread in developing
countries. This type of procyclicality occurs in both booms and recessions, and should
be more prevalent in countries where political corruption is at the forefront and can
affect the accountability of the incumbent government in respect to the voters.
The hypothesis tested in equation (1) determine whether remittance inflows enhance
the cyclicality of fiscal policy, diminishes the cyclicality of fiscal policy or does not have
an effect on the cyclicality of fiscal policy.
H0: If ∂Gi,t∂R∗ΔYi,t < 0 or
∂TRi,t
∂R∗ΔYi,t > 0,
then an increase in remittance inflows into country i contributes to a countercyclical
fiscal policy.
HA: If ∂Gi,t∂R∗ΔYi,t > 0 or
∂TRi,t
∂R∗ΔYi,t < 0,
implies that an increase in remittance inflows into country i will contribute to a
procyclical fiscal policy.
In the case of ∂Gi,t
∂R∗ΔYi,t = 0 or
∂TRi,t
∂R∗ΔYi,t = 0,
an increase in remittance inflows into country i will have no impact on the cyclicality
of fiscal policy (‘acyclical’).
H1: Furthermore, if ∂Gi,t∂Ri,t > 0 or
∂TRi,t
∂Ri,t
> 0,
an increase in the level of remittances into country i will increase government
expenditures or taxation revenue.
HN: If ∂Gi,t∂Ri,t < 0 or
∂TRi,t
∂Ri,t
< 0,
an increase in remittance inflows into country i will force the government to reduce its
expenditures or experience a decline in taxation receipts.
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If ∂Gi,t
∂Ri,t
= 0 or ∂TRi,t
∂Ri,t
= 0,
the level of remittance inflows into country i will have no impact on government
expenditures or taxation revenue.
The extensive literature concludes that fiscal policy in developing economies follows a
procyclical trend as described by Alesina et al. (2008) who infer that voters seek to
“starve the Leviathan” to reduce political rents. This translates as voters who initially
observe the state of the economy but not the rents appropriated by corrupt governments
(more likely to occur in developing countries). These voters optimally demand more
public goods and lower taxes during a boom period, to induce a procyclical bias in
fiscal policy which is consistent in more corrupt democracies. The role of remittance
inflows are viewed as a potential solution to the procyclicality bias in fiscal policy, as
remittance inflows could help alleviate the dependency on lower taxes and more public
goods demanded by the public because of the extra disposable income available to satisfy
their basic needs.
3.2.1 Moment Conditions for GMM Estimator
The moment conditions of the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimator are
derived for Equation 1 and Equation 2:
Gi,t =
2∑
k=1
bkGi,t−k + β1Ri,t + C
′Xi,t + β2R ∗ΔYi,t + εi,t, (3)
where Gi,tis the fiscal policy indicator in country i in year t. The main concept is to find
the explanatory variables which are correlated with the chosen instrumental variables,
but not with the random error term. The technique of first differencing Equation (3) is
used to eliminate the country specific effect to obtain the following regression:
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ΔGi,t =
2∑
k=1
bkΔGi,t−k + β1Ri,t + C
′ΔXi,t + β2R ∗ΔYi,t + Δεi,t, (4)
where ΔGi,t = Gi,t − Gi,t−1.Under the assumption that the error term is free from
serial correlation, Arellano and Bond (1991) note that the values of G confirm that the
instruments are valid for the lagged dependent variable ΔGi,t−1. It is assumed that
C ′Xi,t (control variables) is weakly exogenous, resulting in C ′Xi,t to be uncorrelated
with future values of the error term.
The GMM dynamic first difference estimator is represented by the following linear
moment conditions,
E [Gi,t−sΔεi,t] = 0 for s ≥ 2, t = 3, ......., T (5)
E [C ′Xi,t−sΔεi,t] = 0 for s ≥ 2, t = 3, ......., T (6)
In simulation studies it is found that the GMM estimators are subject to large finite
sample bias and poor precision. The explanation for this is that when the explanatory
variables are persistent over time, the resulting regression (in differences) is less reliable
as the lagged levels of these explanatory variables are weak instruments. Both Arellano
and Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998) find a way to increase the precision of
the estimates by combining the original regression in levels and the differences regression.
3.3 Data
The main variables under consideration for the empirical analysis are obtained from the
International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics (IMF IFS) database
(obtained from the Thomson Reuters DataStream software), the World Bank database,
the Migration Policy Institute (MPI) and through the individual country government
statistics databases.
63
Fifty one developing countries under consideration for this panel data research which
have been selected according to data availability and a fair representation of the selected
regions across the world. In order for there to be consistency when testing the cyclicality
of fiscal policy, there needs to be at least two or three cycles in each country. Thus
the rule for country inclusion requires a minimum of 20 years of data. In general,
the inclusion for a larger cut-off point is greatly beneficial for the robustness of the
results because countries with only limited number of observations just add noise to the
estimates. Additionally, smaller countries are prone to large shocks which makes them
difficult to compare with countries that are larger in the dataset.
Figure 3.2 provides a visual representation of the selected developing countries
highlighted in red in the research.
3.3.1 Data Descriptions and Measurements
The control variables included in this study which could affect the key baseline results
are given below and described8:
a) Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP) - (FDI)
Refers to the net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest
operating for an enterprise other than that of the investor. It comprises the
reinvestment of earnings, the sum of equity capital, short term capital as shown in the
balance of payments, and other long-term capital. The variable shows the net inflows
in the reporting economy from foreign investors divided by GDP.
b) Net official development assistance and official aid received (current
US$) - (NODA)
Net official development assistance consists of disbursements of loans made on
concessional terms (net of repayments of principal) and grants by official agencies. It
also includes loans which have a grant element of at least 25 percent. Net official aid
refers to aid flows from donor countries to recipient countries.
8A greater set of control variables is included in Chapter 5. This includes the world oil price (CROIL) which helps to
control those countries that are oil exporters.
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c) Net barter terms of trade index (2000 = 100) - (NBTT)
Calculated as the percentage ratio of export value indexes to import value indexes,
measured relative to the base year 2000. It can be also interpreted as the amount of
import goods that can be purchased per unit of export goods.
d) Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %)
Measured by the annual growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator which shows the rate
of change in the general price level in the economy as a whole.
e) Real GDP per capita (current US$)
GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population.
f) Polity Democracy variable- (Polity)
The latest version (Polity IV score) contains coded annual information regarding the
level of democracy for independent states which have a total population greater than
500,000 and covers the period 1800-2014. The index is computed on the evaluation of
how the state’s elections are viewed in terms of openness and competitiveness, the nature
of political participation in general, and the extent of checks on executive authority. For
each country and year a score is computed which ranges from -10 to 10, with -10 to -6
symbolising ‘autocracies’, -5 to 5 corresponding to ‘anocracies’, and 6 to 10 representing
‘democracies’.
g) Population, ages 15-64 (% of total)
Based on the de facto definition of population and is defined of the percentage of the
total population that is in the age group of 15-64.
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Figure 3.2: Selected countries in the study
The data collected for the empirical analysis needs to be defined to understand the key
variables of interest. Firstly, the data collected on remittances (Workers’ remittances
and compensation, total received as % of GDP) is from the IMF’s definition of
remittances which includes three broad categories: workers’ remittances which refer to
cash or in kind from migrants to their households in the countries of origin,
compensation of employees which denote the salaries, wages, and other remuneration,
in cash transfer payments, paid to individuals who work in another country to which
they legally reside in, and lastly migrant transfers which are applicable to migrants
who transfer financial assets who legally reside in another country for more than a
year. While the categories described by the IMF are well defined, there still remains
some limitations in that there may be an underestimation of remittance flows because
they fail to capture informal remittance transfers, including when migrants carry cash
or goods when they return home. This study will use a representative variable used by
the IMF to make the analysis more consistent and reliable to infer the results from.
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3.4 Descriptive Statistics
The dataset is divided into the regions and (Full dataset, Asia, Latin America, Africa,
MENA and Europe) are described by analysing the descriptive statistics in Table 3.1.
The full dataset sample is split into five regions to analyse if the results differ between
these regions. The descriptive statistics tables for the regional sub-samples are reported
in Appendix A (Tables A.1-A.5).
The descriptive statistics for each sample reported in this section represent the datasets
on which the panel data estimations will be performed on.
3.4.1 Full sample
Table 3.1 consists of the full 51 countries up to 1275 observations. Remittances
represent 4.16% of GDP from 1990-2014 whilst Figure 3.3 displays how the average
level of remittance inflows (% of GDP) for the 51 developing countries under
consideration evolve throughout the study’s time period. Figure 3.3 reinforces the
continual upward trend of remittances during the past 25 years, however remittances
into these countries suffered a sharp drop during the recent 2008 global financial crisis
but the upward trend has re-emerged as many countries have recovered from their
recessions. Before proceeding with regression analysis, it is useful to review the
cross-country correlations with the main variables of interest. The cross-country
correlations between remittance inflows and real GDP are given in Figure 3.4 which
represents a bar chart graphic which reveals some interesting points for the different
regions in the dataset. In general, there are more countries in the dataset with a
positive relationship between remittance inflows and real GDP whilst the European
and the Asian countries have positive correlations and the MENA countries have
negative correlations. The correlation analysis provides some stimulus to the
regression analysis in the upcoming subsection. This is because a positive correlation
between remittance inflows and real GDP is viewed as a two-way causality
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relationship. This indicates that an increase in real GDP causes an increase in
remittances which is contrary to the motivating need to remit from migrant workers to
developing countries that suffer from economic hardship. The positive correlation
between these two variables could also indicate that an increase in remittance inflows
induces a positive effect on real GDP figures which is more of a plausible explanation.
This is due to the extra resources from overseas countries that could help alleviate
poverty and contribute to a more productive workforce. Figure 3.5 provides an
overview of the cross-country correlations between remittance inflows and government
consumption expenditure variables. In general there is an even spread between
positive and negative correlations across the whole dataset but it is interesting to note
that a large degree of the European countries have negative correlations. This could
indicate that either remittance inflows decrease when the government decides to spend
more or remittance inflows increase when the government operates contractionary
policies designed to control potential debt problems. Figure 3.6 illustrates the
relationship between government consumption expenditure and real GDP which can
indicate if a country operates a procyclical, countercyclical or acyclical fiscal policies.
Visually, Figure 3.6 reveals that there is an even spread between positive and negative
correlations between the variables but many Latin American countries have positive
correlations (procyclical) which indicates there are still major issues within the region.
Lastly, Figure 3.79 reveals a scatter plot showing the relationship between Government
consumption expenditure and Remittance inflows for the full dataset. From the plot,
it appears there is not a statistically strong linear relationship but one which confirms
that there is a weak positive relationship between the two variables.
9The data point shown in red gives the average value for the full dataset.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics: Full Dataset
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Year 1275 2002 7.21 1990 2014
Country 1275 26 14.73 1 51
Output Gap 1236 0.0004 0.02 -0.12 0.11
Remittances (% of GDP) 1099 4.16 6.61 0.00013 49.59
Government consumption expenditure (% of GDP) 1204 14.48 5.40 2.98 76.22
Tax Revenue (% of GDP) 660 15.26 9.00 0.09 65.90
Polity Democracy 1315 2.93 6.29 -10 10
Net Barter terms of trade index 1006 109.67 31.57 43.88 262.09
Net official development assistance 1079 3.01 4.34 -0.69 30.22
and official aid received (NODA)
Population ages 15-64 (%) 1251 61.49 6.51 45.71 76.36
Real GDP per capita (ln) 1216 7.67 1.16 5.29 10.49
Remittances x Outputgap 1097 0.002 0.13 -1.10 1.30
Foreign Direct Investment 1169 3.29 4.75 -20.21 50.97
Figure 3.3: Remittances as percent of GDP, Full dataset, 1990-2014
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Figure 3.4: Cross country correlations between Remittance inflows and Real GDP, 1990-2014
Figure 3.5: Cross country correlations between Remittance inflows and Government consumption 
expenditure, 1990-2014
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Figure 3.6: Cross country correlations between Government consumption expenditure and Real GDP, 
1990-2014
Figure 3.7: Bivariate relationship between Government Consumption expenditure and Remittances, 
1990-2014
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3.4.2 Asia
The countries included in the dataset comprise of countries from both South Asia and
Central Asia (in Table A.1). The dependency of remittances of the two regions in
Asia differ in terms of how many countries they rely on to fund the remittance inflows.
Central Asia is heavily reliant on the economic activity in Russia, a major remittance
source country which has recently suffered economically and resulted in migrant job
losses. Moreover, the depreciation of the ruble has compounded the impact on migrant
workers by reducing their real incomes and hence the value of remittances in US dollar
terms. South Asia typically has been a net exporter of millions of migrants to other
parts of the world most notably the UK, US and Canada. Improving economic prospects
in the migrants destination countries will continue to support flows to the region. The
growth in remittances in the South Asian region has been forecasted by the World
Bank (2018) to pick up to $126 billion in 2016 and $132 billion in 2017 as countries
like Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh continue to depend heavily on these
flows. What we can observe from the data on remittances in this dataset is that it forms
a large percentage of total GDP in the region (5.97 % of GDP) which indicates that
remittance inflows are large compared to the output of the country.
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3.4.3 Latin America
The Latin American region depends on remittance inflows but differs in respect to
the country source of these flows. While most Mexican and Latin American migrants
go to the United States, for many South American countries, Europe continues to be
their preferred destination. Countries such as Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay
consist of migrants emigrating to Europe to countries such as Spain, where language
seems to play an important role. Moreover, the recent economic crisis in Spain has
had a significant impact on the migrants income predominantly from South American
countries. Remittances still form a large percentage of total GDP in the region (2.03% of
GDP) as is evident in Table A.2. More notably the Polity Democracy variable displays
a larger value (6.32) as a result of many ‘young’ democracies emerging in the region
during the past two decades which could encourage greater government oversight on
the economy. The working population (Pop ages 15-64 (%) = 62.28%) also represents
a good ratio for the working age population which could be linked to the number of
migrants in the region.
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3.4.4 Africa
The Africa dataset includes countries from the Sub-Saharan African region and it should
be noted that Nigeria alone accounts for almost two-thirds of total remittance inflows.
However, stagnation of remittance inflows to Nigeria has partly been offset by strong
growth in South Africa, Uganda and Kenya. The growth of remittance flows to the
region is expected to recover in 2016 and 2017 to 3.4 and 3.8 percent respectively as
countries like Nigeria will be able to support domestic economic activity which should
alleviate credit problems within the country. Table A.3 reveals that remittance flows
are on average 2.09 % of GDP which is expected to increase over the coming five to ten
years.
3.4.5 Europe
The European dataset for this study has the greatest data coverage consisting
predominantly of the Eastern European region of countries. The demographic and
economic challenges faced by many countries in this region are the main drivers of
migration in the region. As the data shows in Table A.4 the working age population at
67.62% is sufficient but is forecast to decline in all Central European countries with
the exception of Turkey because of the exodus of workers to countries like the U.K..
Remittances are stable in the region at 4.05% of GDP and as expected the Polity
Democracy variable (7.64) shows that the Europe dataset comprises of governments
which operate democratically.
3.4.6 MENA
Most notably in the MENA dataset (in Table A.5), it is evident to note that Remittance
inflows (as % of GDP) consists of the greatest value with a mean value of 7.34% of
GDP. This result is not surprising as the recent Migration and Development report
(World Bank, 2018) confirms that forced migration and internally displaced populations,
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particularly in the MENA region have been rising and are still rising to contribute to
an increasing number of worldwide refugees (for e.g. the recent Syrian refugee crisis).
However, the outlook for remittances is negative in the MENA region over the coming
years. The region continues to be dominated by the continued low oil prices and the
conflicts in the region contributing to internal displacement and forced migration across
borders.
3.5 Empirical Results
The empirical analysis undertaken for this chapter is aimed to test if there is a
relationship between remittance inflows and the cyclicality of fiscal policy. The results
imply that remittances contribute to procyclical fiscal policy in the full sample, Asia,
Latin America, Europe, and MENA regions. However, the results for the Africa
dataset reveal that remittances have a countercyclical effect on fiscal policy in the
region. By splitting the sample of countries of the full datasets into different regions
and performing separate panel data regressions we can see that there is a degree of
variation and heterogeneity between all of the regions.
Table 3.2 outlines the empirical results obtained from the full sample dataset, whilst
Tables 3.3 - 3.7 report the empirical results for the Asia, Latin America, Africa, Europe
and MENA region datasets.
75
3.5.1 Full sample
Table 3.2: Baseline estimates of the GMM and FE regressions (Full sample)
DV (Government final consumption expenditure) FE (1) S-GMM (2) D-GMM (3)
Government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP) (-1) 0.676 0.831 0.636
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Remittances (% of GDP) 0.017 -0.001 0.147
(0.301) (0.965) (0.098)*
Output Gap 0.905 3.666 -4.817
(0.724) (0.424) (0.056)*
Polity Democracy index -0.017 0.057 0.046
(0.310) (0.131) (0.599)
Remittances x Outputgap -1.162 -2.290 0.076
(0.006)*** (0.422) (0.087)*
Foreign Direct Investment 0.014 0.041 -0.045
(0.246) (0.140) (0.382)
Observations 885 885 834
Countries 51 51 51
Hausman test statistic: p-value 0.000
Hansen’s over identification test: p-value 1.000 0.303
Number of instruments 88 45
DV (Tax Revenue) FE (1) S-GMM (2) D-GMM (3)
Tax Revenue (% of GDP) (-1) 0.676 0.904 0.805
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Remittances (% of GDP) 0.104 -0.050 -0.071
(0.040)** (0.270) (0.124)
Output Gap 4.392 6.467 0.555
(0.429) (0.593) (0.065)*
Polity Democracy index 0.048 -0.035 -0.124
(0.186) (0.306) (0.161)
Remittances x Outputgap 1.066 -1.627 -2.270
(0.189) (0.635) (0.098)*
Foreign Direct Investment 0.073 0.094 0.196
(0.004)*** (0.270) (0.049)**
Observations 497 498 446
Countries 51 51 51
Hausman test statistic: p-value 0.000
Hansen’s over identification test: p-value 1.000 0.361
Number of instruments 86 44
Notes: All equations are estimated with the use of panel data estimators. The Difference GMM
and S-GMM and D-GMM regressions include the Net official development assistance and official aid
received (NODA), Net Barter terms of trade index, and the rate of inflation variables as the exogenous
instrumental variables. The endogenous GMM instruments include the lagged values of Government
final consumption expenditure and Real GDP per capita (Ln) variables. Robust standard errors are
used which are based on Windmeijer’s finite-sample correction for a two-step covariance matrix. P
values are reported in parentheses. The Hausman test tests the null hypothesis that the coefficients
estimated by the efficient random effects estimator are the same as the ones estimated by the
consistent fixed effects estimator.*Significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%.
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Tables 3.2 - 3.7 represent the econometric results of Equation 1 and Equation 2.10 In
the first column of Table 3.2 the Fixed Effects (FE) model is computed with the same
variables as with the two other regression methods (System GMM and Difference
GMM) regressions). The variables of primary interest concern the dependent variable
(Government final consumption expenditure (GFCons) and Taxation revenue),
Remittances variable and the Remittance x Output gap (RY) interaction variable.
Column 1 consists of either the fixed effects or the random effects models which are
chosen according to the Hausman specification test (Hausman, 1978). If the Hausman
test does indicate a significant difference (p<0.05)11, the random effects estimator is a
‘biased’ estimator, and therefore the fixed effects estimator is to be preferred over the
random effects estimator. The FE estimation for Table 3.2 (full dataset) displays a
key result which confirms that there is a significant effect of the first lag of GFCons
and RY variables on the dependent variable. The RY interaction variable in the FE
estimation confirms that remittance inflows do significantly affect the cyclicality of
fiscal policy in that they contribute to a countercyclical fiscal policy.
Column 2 and Column 3 utilise a different panel data estimation by using the System
GMM (SGMM) and the Difference GMM (DGMM) estimation techniques. These
dynamic panel data models12 are specifically designed for dynamic ‘small-T, large-N’
panels that may contain fixed effects and separate from those fixed effects
idiosyncratic errors that are heteroskedastic and correlated within but not across
individuals. The coefficient estimates obtained for the SGMM model (Column 2) differ
quite substantially from the DGMM model (Column 3) as the SGMM model shows
that remittances contribute to a countercyclical fiscal policy (-2.290, RY variable) once
we take into consideration the impact of remittances from a procyclical fiscal policy
(3.666, Output Gap variable).13 However, the RY variable for the DGMM model is
statistically significant whilst confirming that remittances worsen the cyclicality of
10The econometric software package used for the analysis is the Stata 12 (SE) version. The format of the reported
results in tables 3.2- 3.7 include estimations for both of the chosen dependent variables
11The Hausman test statistic (p-values) are reported in tables 3.2 - 3.7.
12Roodman (2009) xtabond2 command version of the SGMM and DGMM is employed rather Arellano-Bond’s (1991)
estimator which is the xtabond command.
13Both the SGMM and the DGMM are valid regression outputs since the value of Hansen’s over identification test
(p-value, accept H0) confirms that the restrictions in place are valid under the null hypothesis. There is no evidence for
autocorrelation under the H0 with the use of Arellano-Bond’s test for autocorrelation in first-differenced errors.
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fiscal policy (from an Output Gap coefficient value of -4.817 to an RY coefficient value
of 0.076) to cause fiscal policy to be procyclical.
Comparatively, by focusing on the alternative dependent variable as taxation revenue
in Table 3.2 we can see that the RY interaction variable is negative and statistically
significant (-2.270) for the DGMM model which implies that remittance inflows have
a negative impact on taxation receipts during a potential boom period. This result
provides a small insight into the effects of remittances in the labour market. Hence,
there is a possibility that an increase in remittance flows has a negative impact on the
households labour supply. Several studies have investigated this result (Funkhouser,
2006; Amuedo-Dorantes, 2006; Hanson, 2007) and found that remittances received by
an household have an overall negative impact on the number of labour hours supplied
by men and women aged between 16-65. Furthermore, Justino and Shemyakina (2012)
go further in finding this effect of remittances on the labour market by concluding that
the effect is stronger for men than for women in post-conflict Tajikistan.14 This is
an intriguing result in itself as previous studies have shown that female labour supply
is typically more responsive to changes in remittance inflows compared to men. The
authors explain this finding by stating that men were more likely to migrate to post-
conflict Tajikistan where they may expect to migrate in the near future.
14Tajikistan is included in country sample as part of the Asia region.
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3.5.2 Asia
Table 3.3: Baseline estimates of the GMM and FE regressions (Asia sample)
DV (Government final consumption expenditure) FE (1) S-GMM (2) D-GMM (3)
Government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP) (-1) 0.665 0.733 0.440
(0.000)*** (0.043)** (0.073)*
Remittances (% of GDP) -0.056 -0.040 0.129
(0.006)*** (0.812) (0.040)**
Output Gap -6.338 3.511 -5.836
(0.171) (0.097)* (0.049)**
Polity Democracy index 0.005 -0.060 0.074
(0.780) (0.939) (0.620)
Remittances x Outputgap 0.295 -2.010 -2.694
(0.640) (0.892) (0.080)*
Foreign Direct Investment 0.037 0.039 0.045
(0.024)** (0.967) (0.053)*
Observations 197 204 187
Countries 10 10 10
Hausman test statistic: p-value 0.000
Hansen’s over identification test: p-value 1.000 1.000
Number of instruments 86 45
DV (Tax Revenue) RE (1) S-GMM (2) D-GMM (3)
Tax Revenue (% of GDP) (-1) 0.859 0.879 -0.304
(0.000)*** (0.021)** (0.076)*
Remittances (% of GDP) -0.040 -0.220 -1.352
(0.511) (0.173) (0.079)*
Output Gap 6.675 -4.945 4.879
(0.316) (0.823) (0.193)
Polity Democracy index 0.036 0.221 -0.229
(0.016)** (0.404) (0.129)
Remittances x Outputgap 0.417 1.130 -4.902
(0.773) (0.429) (0.094)*
Foreign Direct Investment -0.075 0.266 1.704
(0.180) (0.661) (0.187)
Observations 127 127 117
Countries 10 10 10
Hausman test statistic: p-value 0.4741
Hansen’s over identification test: p-value 1.000 1.000
Number of instruments 86 44
Notes: All equations are estimated with the use of panel data estimators. The Difference GMM
and S-GMM and D-GMM regressions include the Net official development assistance and official aid
received (NODA), Net Barter terms of trade index, and the rate of inflation variables as the exogenous
instrumental variables. The endogenous GMM instruments include the lagged values of Government
final consumption expenditure and Real GDP per capita (Ln) variables. Robust standard errors are
used which are based on Windmeijer’s finite-sample correction for a two-step covariance matrix. P
values are reported in parentheses. The Hausman test tests the null hypothesis that the coefficients
estimated by the efficient random effects estimator are the same as the ones estimated by the
consistent fixed effects estimator.*Significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%.
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Table 3.3 displays the panel data regression results for Asia which confirm that the effect
of remittances on fiscal cyclicality is only statistically significant for the DGMM model.
The RY interaction variable has a coefficient value of -2.694 compared to the output
gap coefficient which has a coefficient of -5.836, confirming that remittance inflows
dampen the countercyclical fiscal policy thereby having a procyclical effect on fiscal
policy. This provides a potentially interesting result which signifies that an increase
in remittance inflows contributes to a greater procyclical fiscal policy where the extra
resources from the remittance inflows enhances fiscal expenditures whilst the country is
in a potential boom period which implies that there is a moral hazard problem regarding
the government’s decision making processes.
By observing the alternative dependent variable (Taxation revenue) in Table 3.3 we
can see that the procyclical effect is stronger as the RY variable has a statistically
significant coefficient value for the DGMM of -4.902 in comparison to the output gap
value of 4.879, which strongly asserts that remittances have a demotivating factor on
labour supply or the pre-effect cause of an increase in remittances is from the lack of
job opportunities in the home country which results in workers to migrate to other
countries. Rodriguez (2000), provides further motivation to strengthen this argument
by investigating women migrant workers in the Philippines who are leaving the country
in order to search for work in the developed world, whereby the combination of increased
women’s participation in the workforce and the lack of family friendly labour policies
in the Philippines has seen the labour force diminish subsequently.
80
3.5.3 Latin America
Table 3.4: Baseline estimates of the GMM and FE regressions (Latin America sample)
DV (Government final consumption expenditure) FE (1) S-GMM (2) D-GMM (3)
Government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP) (-1) 0.688 0.730 1.054
(0.000)*** (0.070)* (0.073)*
Remittances (% of GDP) 0.128 -0.139 0.452
(0.035)** (0.742) (0.041)**
Output Gap 5.326 -4.892 2.991
(0.144) (0.903) (0.062)*
Polity Democracy index -0.009 0.182 -0.050
(0.845) (0.791) (0.923)
Remittances x Outputgap -0.907 4.460 2.633
(0.481) (0.819) (0.094)*
Foreign Direct Investment -0.014 0.159 -0.436
(0.759) (0.580) (0.053)*
Observations 230 230 220
Countries 10 10 10
Hausman test statistic: p-value 0.0001
Hansen’s over identification test: p-value 1.000 1.000
Number of instruments 88 45
DV (Tax Revenue) FE (1) S-GMM (2) D-GMM (3)
Tax Revenue (% of GDP) (-1) 0.665 0.903 0.546
(0.000)*** (0.007)*** (0.365)
Remittances (% of GDP) 0.150 0.024 -0.118
(0.398) (0.072)* (0.885)*
Output Gap -3.236 -5.229 -0.699
(0.582) (0.620) (0.093)*
Polity Democracy index 0.043 -0.241 -0.027
(0.555) (0.753) (0.954)
Remittances x Outputgap 1.164 6.476 0.113
(0.510) (0.649) (0.987)
Foreign Direct Investment 0.085 0.008 -0.015
(0.252) (0.972) (0.089)*
Observations 106 106 95
Countries 10 10 10
Hausman test statistic: p-value 0.000
Hansen’s over identification test: p-value 1.000 1.000
Number of instruments 88 43
Notes: All equations are estimated with the use of panel data estimators. The Difference GMM
and S-GMM and D-GMM regressions include the Net official development assistance and official aid
received (NODA), Net Barter terms of trade index, and the rate of inflation variables as the exogenous
instrumental variables. The endogenous GMM instruments include the lagged values of Government
final consumption expenditure and Real GDP per capita (Ln) variables. Robust standard errors are
used which are based on Windmeijer’s finite-sample correction for a two-step covariance matrix. P
values are reported in parentheses. The Hausman test tests the null hypothesis that the coefficients
estimated by the efficient random effects estimator are the same as the ones estimated by the
consistent fixed effects estimator.*Significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%.
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The results obtained for the Latin America sample further reinforce that remittances
contribute to a procyclical fiscal policy on the basis of the significant RY coefficient
(2.633) and the Remittances coefficient (0.452) given in Table 3.4 (DGMM model).
The results for the alternative dependent variable (Taxation revenue) suggest that
remittances contribute to a countercyclical fiscal policy but the key coefficients are
insignificant in the sample to conclude any relationship. Furthermore, Jackman (2014)
studies the impact of remittances on unemployment for a sample of 18 Latin American
and Caribbean countries which signifies that when the remittance-to-GDP ratio is low
(below 3.25% of GDP), remittances have a positive and significant impact on
unemployment, however as they increase, remittances have a negative impact on
unemployment. Indeed, this could be due to the possible under utilisation of
remittances at low levels. This is plausible when remittance are low if a large portion
of remittances are used to cover the expenses for the receiving household. However, as
the magnitude increases, and goes beyond the day-to-day needs of the household, the
investment effect of remittances dominates to cause a negative relationship between
unemployment and remittances.
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3.5.4 Africa
Table 3.5: Baseline estimates of the GMM and FE regressions (Africa sample)
DV (Government final consumption expenditure) FE (1) S-GMM (2) D-GMM (3)
Government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP) (-1) 0.665 0.590 0.506
(0.000)*** (0.548) (0.029)**
Remittances (% of GDP) 0.110 -0.577 -0.178
(0.134) (0.401) (0.094)*
Output Gap 10.253 -3.804 -8.656
(0.328) (0.974) (0.061)*
Polity Democracy index -0.124 0.226 0.180
(0.010)** (0.236) (0.828)
Remittances x Outputgap -4.881 10.745 -2.126
(0.140) (0.199) (0.087)*
Foreign Direct Investment 0.103 0.070 0.513
(0.195) (0.958) (0.614)
Observations 190 190 181
Countries 9 9 9
Hausman test statistic: p-value 0.0008
Hansen’s over identification test: p-value 1.000 1.000
Number of instruments 124 45
DV (Tax Revenue) FE (1) S-GMM (2) D-GMM (3)
Tax Revenue (% of GDP) (-1) 0.480 -0.075 0.263
(0.000)*** (0.908) (0.071)*
Remittances (% of GDP) 0.354 0.603 0.456
(0.010)** (0.192) (0.089)*
Output Gap 16.677 5.073 4.942
(0.196) (0.039)** (0.059)*
Polity Democracy index -0.030 -0.064 -0.018
(0.628) (0.737) (0.923)
Remittances x Outputgap -2.298 -4.753 -1.292
(0.519) (0.330) (0.549)
Foreign Direct Investment -0.252 0.254 -0.0006
(0.030)** (0.671) (0.999)
Observations 89 89 78
Countries 9 9 9
Hausman test statistic: p-value 0.0016
Hansen’s over identification test: p-value 1.000 1.000
Number of instruments 70 39
Notes: All equations are estimated with the use of panel data estimators. The Difference GMM
and S-GMM and D-GMM regressions include the Net official development assistance and official aid
received (NODA), Net Barter terms of trade index, and the rate of inflation variables as the exogenous
instrumental variables. The endogenous GMM instruments include the lagged values of Government
final consumption expenditure and Real GDP per capita (Ln) variables. Robust standard errors are
used which are based on Windmeijer’s finite-sample correction for a two-step covariance matrix. P
values are reported in parentheses. The Hausman test tests the null hypothesis that the coefficients
estimated by the efficient random effects estimator are the same as the ones estimated by the
consistent fixed effects estimator.*Significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%.
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The Africa sample provides some key results which differ from the other regions in the
dataset. The results shown in Table 3.5 conclude that the Government consumption
expenditure regression reveals that remittances contribute to a countercyclical fiscal
policy whilst the alternative dependent variable (Taxation revenue) is statistically
insignificant. The RY coefficient for the DGMM regression (Government consumption
expenditure) has a negative and statistically significant coefficient (-2.126) further
reinforced with a negative and statistically significant remittances coefficient (-0.178).
These results indicate that in the African region, remittances contribute to a
countercyclical fiscal policy. The landscape of migration within the African region is a
complicated process where overseas emigration, especially Sub-Saharan Africa, is less
pronounced compared to other developing regions. Furthermore, cultural, historical
and linguistic bonds between African nations and their former colonies have produced
strong flow of skilled and unskilled workers between them. These factors reinforce that
migration does have benefits which come in the form of remittances which enable
greater opportunities for the recipient households to emerge out of poverty.
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3.5.5 Europe
Table 3.6: Baseline estimates of the GMM and FE regressions (Europe sample)
DV (Government final consumption expenditure) FE (1) S-GMM (2) D-GMM (3)
Government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP) (-1) 0.509 0.874 0.651
(0.000)*** (0.013)** (0.030)**
Remittances (% of GDP) -0.027 0.126 0.203
(0.582) (0.764) (0.049)**
Output Gap -7.092 -5.688 -1.251
(0.181) (0.105) (0.033)**
Polity Democracy index 0.036 -0.047 -0.431
(0.873) (0.962) (0.067)*
Remittances x Outputgap -0.564 -1.217 0.372
(0.445) (0.070)* (0.091)*
Foreign Direct Investment 0.006 0.029 0.015
(0.717) (0.666) (0.706)
Observations 143 143 130
Countries 13 13 13
Hausman test statistic: p-value 0.0428
Hansen’s over identification test: p-value 1.000 1.000
Number of instruments 67 37
DV (Tax Revenue) RE (1) S-GMM (2) D-GMM (3)
Tax Revenue (% of GDP) (-1) 0.876 0.903 0.766
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Remittances (% of GDP) 0.026 0.040 0.159
(0.818) (0.733) (0.003)***
Output Gap -2.182 4.284 -3.132
(0.205) (0.078)* (0.076)*
Polity Democracy index 0.906 0.487 0.376
(0.191) (0.415) (0.719)
Remittances x Outputgap 2.562 -0.185 -2.391
(2.888) (0.109) (0.028)**
Foreign Direct Investment 0.063 0.031 0.010
(0.216) (0.711) (0.261)
Observations 100 101 89
Countries 13 13 13
Hausman test statistic: p-value 0.2161
Hansen’s over identification test: p-value 1.000 1.000
Number of instruments 72 37
Notes: All equations are estimated with the use of panel data estimators. The Difference GMM
and S-GMM and D-GMM regressions include the Net official development assistance and official aid
received (NODA), Net Barter terms of trade index, and the rate of inflation variables as the exogenous
instrumental variables. The endogenous GMM instruments include the lagged values of Government
final consumption expenditure and Real GDP per capita (Ln) variables. Robust standard errors are
used which are based on Windmeijer’s finite-sample correction for a two-step covariance matrix. P
values are reported in parentheses. The Hausman test tests the null hypothesis that the coefficients
estimated by the efficient random effects estimator are the same as the ones estimated by the
consistent fixed effects estimator.*Significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%.
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The European results confirm that remittances contribute to a procyclical fiscal
policy. Firstly, the Europe dataset confirms this result is statistically significant for
both dependent variables (RY coefficients of 0.372 and -2.391). Stratan et al. (2013)
focus their labour market analysis on Moldova and conclude that remittances have a
stronger impact on part-time workers (1% increase of remittances implies a 0.17%
increase in the part-time workers to employed population ratio) compared to full-time
workers (1% increase in remittances causes an increase in the unemployment rate by
0.03%). However, the authors note that the long term effects on the labour market
could be directly influenced by the improvements in human capital because of the
reduced constraints of financing children’s education and thus positively influencing
the development of human capital particularly in Moldova’s concentrated rural areas.
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3.5.6 MENA
Table 3.7: Baseline estimates of the GMM and FE regressions (MENA sample)
DV (Government final consumption expenditure) FE (1) S-GMM (2) D-GMM (3)
Government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP) (-1) 0.690 0.325 0.574
(0.001)*** (0.740) (0.015)**
Remittances (% of GDP) 0.015 0.351 0.236
(0.767) (0.582) (0.056)*
Output Gap -9.539 -6.642 -7.232
(0.441) (0.102) (0.098)*
Polity Democracy index 0.008 1.435 0.412
(0.939) (0.324) (0.919)
Remittances x Outputgap -0.744 7.924 5.377
(0.465) (0.580) (0.040)**
Foreign Direct Investment -0.032 -0.476 -0.479
(0.441) (0.441) (0.162)
Observations 125 114 116
Countries 9 9 9
Hausman test statistic: p-value 0.0151
Hansen’s over identification test: p-value 1.000 1.000
Number of instruments 113 63
DV (Tax Revenue)
Tax Revenue (% of GDP) (-1) 0.311 3.554 0.313
(0.005)*** (0.698) (0.198)
Remittances (% of GDP) -0.017 -1.449 0.503
(0.847) (0.711) (0.097)*
Output Gap 3.508 12.079 3.481
(0.204) (0.794) (0.077)*
Polity Democracy index 0.140 -1.822 1.135
(0.448) (0.806) (0.540)
Remittances x Outputgap -0.059 -5.957 -10.911
(0.973) (0.717) (0.849)
Foreign Direct Investment 0.185 -3.080 -0.005
(0.009)*** (0.662) (0.986)
Observations 75 75 67
Countries 9 9 9
Hausman test statistic: p-value 0.0009
Hansen’s over identification test: p-value 1.000 1.000
Number of instruments 82 50
Notes: All equations are estimated with the use of panel data estimators. The Difference GMM
and S-GMM and D-GMM regressions include the Net official development assistance and official aid
received (NODA), Net Barter terms of trade index, and the rate of inflation variables as the exogenous
instrumental variables. The endogenous GMM instruments include the lagged values of Government
final consumption expenditure and Real GDP per capita (Ln) variables. Robust standard errors are
used which are based on Windmeijer’s finite-sample correction for a two-step covariance matrix. P
values are reported in parentheses. The Hausman test tests the null hypothesis that the coefficients
estimated by the efficient random effects estimator are the same as the ones estimated by the
consistent fixed effects estimator.*Significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%.
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The MENA results presented in Table 3.7 give similar results to the other regions.
The government consumption expenditure dependent variable regression has an RY
coefficient of 5.377 whilst the taxation revenue dependent variable has an RY coefficient
of -10.911. Moreover, these results concur with all the regions in the exception of Africa
in that remittances reinforce fiscal policy to be procyclical. International migration
and remittances have been particularly dominant in the Middle East and North Africa.
The surge in migration in this region was caused by the oil price rises in the late
1970s, whilst economies of the Persian Gulf boomed, migrants from Lebanon, Jordan
and Egypt began seeking high pay jobs in countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq and
Kuwait. During the same period workers from Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria began
seeking labour-intensive jobs in Western Europe. Van Dalen et al. (2005) show in
an empirical study for Egypt, Turkey and Morocco that remittance inflows motivates
emigrants in their home country to emigrate. This causes a trigger-effect to stimulate a
negative impact on the labour force disposal for potential economic development. The
authors view this phenomenon to largely be prevalent concerning remittance inflows
into Morocco. The results obtained in this study for the MENA dataset corroborate
these previous findings mentioned which seem to be influenced to a larger extent by the
North African countries.
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3.6 Conclusion
Recent literature has highlighted the importance of remittances on several
macroeconomic variables, most notably economic growth, poverty, investment and
consumption. However, this study focuses primarily on the potential for remittances
to influence government expenditures across the business cycle.
The chapter focuses on a large panel dataset that comprises a variety of developing
countries across a range of different regions across the world. The analysis is
conducted by employing fixed effects, system and difference GMM analysis to
conclude that remittance inflows have a direct impact on the business cycle for the 51
chosen developing countries. More specifically, the full dataset reveals that
remittances are a factor in causing fiscal policy to be procyclical over the business
cycle. However, the analysis found the direct opposite result whilst focusing on the
African dataset but not for the other regional datasets. This finding obtained in this
study has the potential for several policy implications in the current macroeconomic
context. The growing importance of developing country governments worldwide to
realise the effective channel to foster development through remittances is centred
around the potential for labour markets to fully achieve the benefits of these flows. As
mentioned earlier, previous studies have identified that remittances negatively impact
the labour force which can inhibit these countries to develop through additional
economic resources. Henceforth, the government is inclined to spend more than the
norm in order to ensure that the long term effects are not permanent. It is imperative
for these countries to acknowledge that whilst remittances are potentially useful
during an economic downturn, they can be wasteful during a potential boom period
where they may not be needed to such a degree since the economy is performing well.
This chapter provides the macroeconomic analysis of fiscal cyclicality in developing
economies but with the focus on the influence of remittance inflows. Importantly, it
should be acknowledged that specific flows such as remittances are not restricted to
only microeconomic implications but can include macroeconomic implications from
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the analysis conducted in this study. Moreover, the impact of this chapter on the
existing literature is to provide an alternative focus on the cyclicality of fiscal policy
by examining how remittances affect the working population and the government.
This chapter builds on the existing framework provided by Alesina et al. (2008) and
goes further by examining how remittances can affect fiscal policy over the business
cycle. The main direction of this chapter focuses on providing robust results through
the use of two dependent variables: government consumption expenditure and
taxation revenue and focuses on the Remittance-Output gap interaction variable to
seek any effects on the fiscal cycle. Moreover, the result of the chapter corroborates
previous studies in that fiscal policy in developing countries is procyclical. It also adds
to the existing literature by analysing the impact of remittances on fiscal related
decisions and household decisions. This result can be interpreted in two different ways
which are of use for further research. Firstly, remittances directly impact the business
cycle by altering the labour supply decisions of migrant households to result in an
inefficient workforce that is reliant on benefits and other payments by the government.
The alternative view is, the magnitude of the procyclicality could be enhanced by
political motives which have not been captured in this chapter. Furthermore, by
introducing the perspective of voters in the model we can model the impact of
manipulating voters prior to elections which could open room for corruption, resource
diversion and therefore greater procyclicality in fiscal policy.
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Chapter 4
Remittances and Financial Development in Developing
Economies: A Cross-Regional Analysis
4.1 Introduction
The growing importance of remittances for development and poverty alleviation, has
seen an increase in literature on the economic and developmental impact of remittance
inflows. In particular for small countries where the remittances to GDP ratio is high
and exceeds 30% (e.g. Moldova and Tajikistan, (World Bank, 2018)) it is important to
understand the expanding nature of financial services in these countries whilst ensuring
that development and poverty reduction strategies are high priority on each country’s
policies (Loayza and Rancière, 2006; Mishkin, 2007). Despite the increasing importance
of remittances in international capital flows across the world, the relationship between
remittances in developing economies has received relatively little attention. This is in
contrast with studies that have placed emphasis in explaining the relationship between
economic growth and other sources of foreign capital, such as capital flows and foreign
direct investment (Alfaro et al., 2004).
There is a pool of literature which focuses on the relationship between financial
development and economic growth. The earliest theoretical arguments in support of
the role of financial development supporting economic growth are found in the work of
Bagehot (1873), and Hicks (1969). Hicks (1969) noted that financial intermediaries are
important for innovation and development. He examined the historical role played by
the financial system in sparking industrialisation in England through the mobilisation
of capital for “immense works”. This chapter will build on the foundations embedded
in the financial development and economic growth literature whilst introducing the
potential effects of remittances within this relationship.
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Remittance inflows to recipient countries are often seen as a stable and sustainable
way to ease credit constraints in developing countries. The relationship between
remittances and financial development is intriguing and the relatively small and recent
literature on remittances and financial development can be categorised under two
main topics. The first is a set of studies which explore the relationship between
remittances and financial development whilst examining the impact of remittances on
economic growth (Nyamongo et al., 2012; Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 2009). The other
set of studies explore the relationship between financial development and remittances,
with an emphasis on exploring the effects of financial deepening and financial widening
(Aggarwal et al., 2011). For instance, Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009) find that
remittances boost growth in countries with less developed financial systems by
providing an alternative way to finance investment and help overcome liquidity
constraints. The substitutability hypothesis found the study by Giuliano and
Ruiz-Arranz (2009) is supported by other studies which focus on Latin American and
Caribbean countries by Ramirez and Sharma (2013); and for a larger set of studies by
Gapen et al. (2009). The extent to which remittances can influence financial
development is a priori unclear. The notion that remittances can improve financial
development in developing countries is derived from the concept that remittances pass
through financial institutions. This influences the way recipient households demand
and gain other financial services, which they may not have had access to otherwise
(Orozco and Fedewa, 2005). Orozco and Fedewa (2005) find that the provision of
remittance transfer services enables unbanked recipients or recipients with limited
financial intermediation to establish credit histories, to take advantage of health and
educational savings plans, among other investments.
This chapter is related to the burgeoning body of research between remittances and
broad financial development. The purpose of this chapter is to contribute to the
discussion on clarifying the relation between remittances and financial development.
The existing literature is limited in exploring the relationship between remittances and
economic growth. Not much has been done on the role of remittance inflows in
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enhancing financial development to support economic growth across a dynamic panel
dataset. This will be achieved by proposing a framework which addresses the impact
of remittances on the breadth and depth of the financial sector. Furthermore, it will
determine whether financial development strengthens the effects of remittances on
economic growth or simply a substitute to remittances by enabling transfer recipients
to spend remittances in a way which negatively impacts economic growth in the
recipient country.
Aiming to capture country and regional differences this chapter employs panel data
techniques (Difference GMM (D-GMM) estimation) across regional datasets of Africa,
Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Asia, Latin America, Europe. Furthermore,
this chapter provides practical contributions to the existing literature on remittances
in developing countries by using a method which is able to disaggregate the data for
regional comparisons. This chapter will examine if the effects of remittances on economic
growth are more significant in one area compared to another depending on the level of
financial development.
The chapter is organised as follows, Section 4.2 provides an overview of the literature
between remittances and financial development; Section 4.3 outlines the empirical
methodology and data with a detailed construction of a financial development index;
Section 4.4 presents the empirical results, while Section 4.5 concludes and presents
some areas of further research.
4.2 Literature Review
Intuitively remittances are beneficial to households as they are a source of insurance
and serve a function to increase households willingness to engage in credit markets. For
instance, Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2011), examine the importance of remittances on the
banking sector in Mexico by using municipality level data on the fraction of households
receiving remittances and measures on the banking depth and breadth for the country.
The results suggest that remittances are a significant factor in greater banking breadth
(or outreach) and depth, increasing the number of branches and accounts per capita and
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the amount of deposits to GDP. Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2011) define banking breadth as
the percentage of households in a given municipality opening a bank account in Mexico,
and the average balance in the accounts which influence bank depth is determined by
households’ demand for banking services. The importance of the study highlights how
remittances create a positive impact on the share of credit volume to GDP. Gupta
et al. (2009), argue that remittances improve financial development in Sub-Saharan
African countries by easing the immediate budget constraints of recipient households,
and provide opportunity for small savers to gain a greater share in the formal financial
sector. Moreover, remittances can help in increasing investments and developing small
enterprises. Woodruff and Zenteno (2007) show that higher migration is associated with
higher capital output ratios and larger investments among micro-enterprises in Mexico.
Studies such as Richter (2008) further reinforce the positive effects of remittances on
credit demand by showing that remittances at the household level exert a positive
effect on credit demand. The authors investigate the potential effects of the receipts of
remittances and household participation in credit markets. They find that remittances
may provide households with insurance and a greater willingness to engage in credit
contracts. However, they find that the direct effect of remittances might reduce credit
demand through the reduction of liquidity constraints at the household level.
The importance of analysing the channels through which migration and remittances
affect credit markets is crucial to understanding how gaining access to credit markets
for households could affect their decision making and gives us an idea on the efficiency
of the financial sector. The two main strands of literature analyse this issue by
focusing on whether the relationship between remittances and credit markets should
be classified as either complements or substitutes. The extant literature, however,
suggests that the empirical evidence of a relationship between remittances and credit
markets is ambiguous. Anzoategui et al. (2014) use household level survey data for
El-Salvador to examine whether remittances affect household’s use of credit and
savings instruments from formal financial institutions. The study reveals that
remittances through the promotion of deposit accounts, have a positive impact on
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financial inclusion. The results are robust to the endogeneity of remittances by
including unobserved household characteristics with the use of instrumental variables
analysis. However, the study reveals that remittances do not have a significant effect
on credit from formal financial institutions.
Nyamongo et al. (2012) find that, when remittances are received through formal
channels, they positively impact the growth of the financial sector. Moreover, this is
more likely to be the case when the recipients of such funds open accounts with
commercial banks which could lead to greater financial development given the wider
knowledge and information acquired by the customers. Aggarwal et al. (2011), find
that remittances are positively associated with bank deposits and credit. Furthermore,
they show that where there is a higher level of financial development, remittances have
a lower marginal effect on economic growth. This is because financial development is
known to be associated with producing information about allocating capital and
possible investments; the monitoring of firms and corporate governance;
diversification, trading and management of risk; pooling and mobilisation of savings;
and relaxing the exchange of goods and services. These financial functions are a
contributing factor on savings and investment decisions, technological innovations and
ultimately are contributing factors for economic growth (Brown, 1994; Misati, 2007).
The existing literature also focuses on the link between remittances and credit markets
as substitutes as both credit suppliers and migrants can both play an insurance role
and can be considered as substitutes. In this scenario, we would expect the
relationship between remittances and credit markets to be negative. Moreover,
Fafchamps and Lund (2003) show that gifts and informal loans with similar
characteristics to remittances are highly correlated with consumption smoothing but
not able to efficiently share risk at the village level. Furthermore, Amuedo-Dorantes
and Pozo (2004) emphasise while remittances enhance foreign exchange flows, the
exchange rate appreciation may erode international competitiveness for those
countries which depend on the tradable sector. At the macroeconomic level, the
impact of remittances occurs through the multiplier effect as households engage in the
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consumption of goods and services; investment in human capital, which results in an
improvement in labour productivity and investment in gross capital formation.
Furthermore, the multiplier effect is stimulated by the increase in the amount of
financial capital, which can be used by both recipient and non-recipient households.
Despite the positive impact of remittances in developing economies, they cannot
ensure long term economic growth or solve structural economic problems due to
systemic problems including unstable political climates and economic policies, in
addition to corruption which is a prominent feature in developing economies (Orozco,
2007). Lundahl (1985) and Kirwan (1986) examine the developmental impact of
remittance inflows. Kirwan (1986) use welfare analysis of the effects of emigration on
the source country whose output consists of non-traded goods. The study examines
the welfare effect of emigration which depends on the magnitude of remittances. They
find that remittances merely maintain source-country nominal income at its
pre-emigration level.
Some studies have attempted to identify the impact of remittances on economic
growth whether they be positive or negative (Lucas and Stark, 1985; Chami et al.,
2008; Nyamongo et al., 2012; Zouheir and Sghaier, 2014). Zouheir and Sghaier (2014)
show that in the North African region, the two variables are complements with
continuing financial deepening strengthening the positive impact of remittances on
growth, rather than mitigating it. The model used by Chami et al. (2008) shows that
altruistically motivated remittances are there to compensate their recipients in the
case of bad economic outcomes, but also create incentives which lead to moral hazard
problems. Subsequently, the moral hazard problems created by remittances can be
strong enough to negatively affect economic growth. The authors show that
remittances differ greatly from private capital flows at least in terms of their
motivation and their effects. Therefore, recent findings in the empirical literature show
ambiguous results for the relationship between remittances and economic growth.
Moreover, the existing literature shows there is no conclusive answer about the impact
of remittances on economic growth which could be due to the contrasting findings on
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the multiple channels through which remittances can affect economic growth. The
impact of remittances on key macroeconomic variables depends on a country’s
socioeconomic conditions and the channels through which they feed through to the
economy. Furthermore, it is important to find out the factors which influence or affect
this process so that countries in the developing world are able to fully realise the
benefits of these flows. Special attention is given to the financial development of the
country which is able to isolate the effects of remittance inflows on economic growth
(Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 2009).
4.3 Methodology and Data
There are several challenges in measuring the impact of remittances on financial
development. Most importantly, there has been no consensus in the extant literature
on an adequate measure of financial development. (Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 2009)
use four different measures: loan to GDP ratio, credit to GDP ratio, deposit to GDP
ratio, and M2 to GDP ratio to provide a broad variety of measures based on financial
sector development. The measures covered here refer only to the size of the financial
sector, whereby other studies such as Bettin and Zazzaro (2012) employ a different
approach to measure financial development by focusing on bank inefficiency. However,
due to data availability, long run trends are difficult the extrapolate from the analysis
because the sample is limited from 1991 to 2005. For these reasons, in this study, a
financial development index is constructed which is able to capture more features of
the financial sector and in the process, provide a clearer analysis of the effects of
remittances on economic growth. Moreover, this section outlines the non-linear
Difference GMM model (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) along
with detailed explanations of the chosen explanatory (including the
remittances-finance interaction term) and control variables. The model employed in
this chapter aims to assist in explaining the interaction between remittances and a
country’s economic growth which is currently lacking in the field of remittances, and
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to analyse how remittances and the development of the financial system in a country
could influence economic growth.
4.3.1 Financial Development Index
This section outlines how the composite measure of financial development is
constructed with the use of various variables from several existing measures. With the
passage of time, financial sectors have developed and diversified across the globe and
these financial systems have become multifaceted. Moreover, the diversity present in
financial systems across countries implies that it is important to focus on a measure of
financial development which consists of multiple indicators. The extensive empirical
work undertaken and recent studies focus on financial depth indicators from a
financial development dataset developed by Beck et al. (2000) and the International
Financial Statistics of the International Monetary Fund. Sahay et al. (2015) construct
a financial development index considers both financial markets and financial
institutions. For practical and policy formulation purposes, this chapter supports the
view that an index that attempts to incorporate aspects of both financial markets and
institutions should be preferred. Therefore, I adapt Sahay et al. (2015) approach by
modifying the construction of their financial index by including the size of the
financial system, financial institutional efficiency, and financial institutional depth
which, arguably, makes it more comprehensive. Furthermore, more recently created
financial development indices in the literature include Svirydzenka (2016) who creates
an index by using a standard three-step approach found in the literature by reducing
multidimensional data into one summary index. Dekle and Pundit (2015) use a similar
approach to combine three sub-indices into one index through the process of
normalisation. However, Dekle and Pundit (2015) limit their index to 23 Asian
economies mainly to compare the South Asian economies to the stronger economies in
the eastern region namely, Hong Kong, China, the Republic of Korea, and Singapore.
Before proceeding with the construction of the financial development index it is
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important to compare other studies which have constructed different measures of the
financial development index. Studies including Menyah et al. (2014) have examined
the relationship between financial development and economic growth for 21 African
countries. The authors acknowledge that it is difficult to use a single variable to
capture the extent of financial development. The multi-dimensional aspect of financial
development leads to interrelations between the financial indicators and results in
higher correlations between them. They develop a financial development index based
on four different financial development indicators: log of M2 to GDP, log of liquid
liabilities to GDP, log of total domestic credit to private sector to GDP. Moreover,
they note, that within the African region these indicators will accurately capture the
developments in the financial sector. Within the same context, Dorucci et al. (2009)
construct composite indices to measure domestic financial development in 26 emerging
economies, using mature economies as benchmark for comparative analysis. Dorucci
et al. (2009) create a domestic financial development index (DFD) based on three
main criteria. Namely these include: (1) Institutional dimension, (2) Market
dimension (size and access to finance), and (3) Market dimension (performance). The
authors note that the variables included in each category are broad in nature, i.e. they
capture phenomena that go beyond financial development per se which could be
viewed as a drawback for the measure to accurately capture the key characteristics of
financial development. The bulk of literature on financial development focuses on
variables measuring the size of financial markets, taken as proxies for the overall
degree of financial development in the country. Beck et al. (2000) are among the
authors who have provided the most notable and important contributions in this field
of research. They develop a new database on financial development for a large panel of
countries, with a time span going back to 1960. Rajan and Zingales (2003) focus on
different influences on financial development by concentrating on the politics of
financial development in the twentieth century. While they focus primarily on the
influence of interest groups in affecting the progress and speed of financial
development, they also employ different measures such as the equity market
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capitalisation over GDP, security issues over GDP, and the number of listed companies
per million of population.
4.3.2 Construction of the Financial Development Index
The financial development index indicator based on the dynamic single factor model
by Stock and Watson (1991) is used as the financial development index variable for
the model outlined in Section 4.3.3. Kaufmann et al. (2008) utilise similar methods by
estimating various dimensions of governance in 212 countries over the period of 1996-
2007. The authors emphasize the importance of the constructed aggregate indicators
for cross-country and over time comparisons of governance. In this study, we add to
the existing literature by giving an insight to the differences of financial development
across countries. The financial development index is computed as follows:
fdi,t = α + β1f i,t + ξi,t (7)
fi,t = λf i,t−1 + vi,t (8)
where fdi,t denotes a n× 1 vector of the index of financial development for country i in
period t that is hypothesized to move contemporaneously with overall economic
conditions. fi,t is a n × k vector consisting of measures derived from the financial
development category variables 15 (k=7 if all seven measures are available for the
country), α is the constant term which models disturbance, ξi,t is the idiosyncratic
error. fdi,t consists of two stochastic components: the common unobserved scalar time
series variable, fi,t, and an n-dimensional component which represents idiosyncratic
movements in the measurement error and the series, ξi,t.
Equation (7) is referred to as the ‘measurement equation’ and Equation (8) is known as
the ‘state equation’. In this chapter both equations are jointly estimated by Maximum
Likelihood Estimation (MLE) and the Kalman Filter16. Equation (8) is a specification
15Financial development variables are obtained from section 4.3.1
16The Kalman Filter and MLE specifications are described in greater detail in Appendix B
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which is based on capturing persistence in the development of the index. Furthermore,
the specification of the model accounts for random effects which is embedded in both
error terms, ξi,t and vi,t.
The financial development index constructed overcomes the critique raised by Gapen
et al. (2009) and Bettin and Zazzaro (2012), who state that most studies only focus on
the measures of the size of the economy thereby ignoring its efficiency. Such a measure
can combine these aspects of the financial sector. We argue that the proposed financial
index is therefore able to provide a better overall representation of the financial sector
by being able to include key features such as both size and efficiency.
4.3.3 Empirical Methodology and Data
This section focuses on the effects of remittances on financial sector development and
economic growth in the recipient countries with the use of a fixed effects (FE) or
random effects (RE) model, and a non-linear Difference GMM model (Arellano and
Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). The advantage of this approach is that the
econometric specification can include endogenous variables by controlling the
endogeneity of the lagged dependent variable of real GDP per capita. Country fixed
effects or random effects are included, so that the regression estimates also reflect
within-country variation.17 This chapter will focus on cross regional analysis which
splits the countries up into five regions: Africa, MENA, Asia, Latin America, and
Europe so that further analysis can be provided with consistency in relation to the
previous chapter. The proposed model is presented in equations (9) and (10):
yi,t = α + ϕyi,t−1 + β1ri,t + β2fdi,t + β3ri,tfdi,t + βz′i,t + εi,t (9)
εi,t = µi + vi,t (10)
17The use of the fixed effects or random effects model are determined according to the Hausman test.
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where i denotes the country and t a generic year, yi,t is the growth rate of real GDP per
capita, ri,t denotes the share of remittance inflows in GDP for the receiving country, fdi,t
is the financial development index variable (from Section 3.2), z′i,t is a transpose vector of
basic control variables which could have an impact on the average real GDP per capita,
and εi,t is a disturbance term which comprises of two orthogonal components: µi is a
country specific effect, and vi,t is an idiosyncratic shock. The coefficient β3 represents
the coefficient of the interaction term (between financial development and remittances),
which allows for a non-linear impact of remittances on economic growth, depending on
the level of financial development in the recipient country. This is particularly important
because the consideration of the interaction can potentially distinguish how remittances
can affect economic growth according to the analysis of the subgroup countries.
The inclusion of the interaction term in equation (9) between remittances and
financial development is used to overcome issues regarding endogeneity. Theoretically,
it is possible for the efficiency of financial markets and the magnitude of remittances
to increase with higher growth rates. However, an overstatement of the effects of these
two variables is likely with respect to their interaction on growth. The interaction
term (ri,tfdi,t) is incorporated to represent the role of remittances on economic growth
whilst including the financial transmission mechanism. The inclusion is motivated by
the fact that the extant literature is unclear on whether these two variables are
complements (complementarity hypothesis) or substitutes (substitutability
hypothesis). Proponents of the former (the complementarity hypothesis) base their
argument on how remittances and financial development support one another
(Aggarwal et al., 2011). On the one hand, the complementarity hypothesis stipulates
that a higher degree of financial development enables migrants to send money home
faster, cheaper and with more ease and safety. Henceforth the interests of financial
institutions in remittance receiving countries is engaged with greater competition than
before, along with institutional reforms with a view towards channelling remittances
towards productive investment projects. On the other hand, the substitutability
hypothesis is based on the condition that remittances inhibit the progress of financial
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development in emigration countries, by allowing people to invest in high return
projects despite credit difficulties (Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 2009).
Before proceeding with the empirical analysis, it is important to note that the
difference GMM system is used to allow for endogenous regressors whilst correcting for
the endogeneity of the lagged dependent variable. The variables of most interest in the
model are the financial development measure and the remittances-finance interaction
term. The estimation methods follow the same format employed by Arellano and
Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998). The
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) is the estimation method used in this study
because it can control for the unobserved country-specific effects as well as the bias
caused by the lagged dependent variables. More specifically, this chapter uses
estimations done using five variations of the model: The first uses the financial
development index variable for the FE or RE estimations. The second and third
variations use the S-GMM and D-GMM methods and the financial development index
variable. This is followed by the other two variations which include the bank deposits
to GDP ratio and the interest rate spread estimated by D-GMM. The bank deposits
to GDP ratio is used as it is the broadest measure of the financial sector, excluding
the M3 to GDP ratio. The interest rate spread is included as a measure to cover the
cost efficiency component of financial development.
The D-GMM estimator uses a technique known as first differencing to eliminate the
problem of endogeneity. In addition to eliminating the time invariant country fixed
effects, first differencing also constructs instruments for the endogenous regressors, i.e.
the lagged dependent variable yi,t−1 in equation (3). Furthermore, these instruments
are used to estimate α. The transformation commonly used for the D-GMM is the first
difference transformation. Equation (5) shows the basic representation of a D-GMM
regression. Applying the relevant transform to equations (9) and (10) gives equation
(11):
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Δyi,t = αΔyi,t−1 + ∆x
′
i,t + Δεi,t (11)
where Δyi,t−1 denotes the lagged dependent variable, and Δx
′
i,t represents the
explanatory variables listed in equation (9).
The dataset includes fifty-one developing countries chosen according to the previous
chapter and is selected according to data availability and regional representation. The
data sources on the creation of this index are primarily derived from the World Bank’s
World Development Indicators (WDI) database and the International Monetary Fund’s
International Financial Statistics database (IMF IFS) to form the financial indicator
(Cihak et al., 2012):
1. The size of the financial system- the size of the financial system is often referred
to as the financial sector when it is relative to the size of financial markets
(a) Liquid liabilities to GDP ratio (%) - defined as M3 to GDP ratio, and is
predominantly used when the deposits to GDP ratio data is unavailable. The
advantage of this measure is that the data is readily available but is subject to
inaccuracy because the measure includes M2 which could result in the variable
measuring the ability to provide transaction services rather than offering an
insight into the level of financial depth Khan and Senhadji (2000)
(b) Bank deposits to GDP ratio (%) - deposits in banks and other financial
institutions as a share of GDP
2. Financial institutional efficiency- the ability of the financial sector to provide high
quality products and services at the lowest possible cost
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(a) Deposit interest rate (%) - refers to the rate paid by commercial (or similar)
banks for time, demand, or saving deposits
(b) Bank capital to total assets ratio (%) - is the ratio of bank capital and reserves
to total assets
(c) Interest rate spread (%) - the difference between the lending and deposit
interest rate
3. Financial institutional depth- a more comprehensive measure compared to 1. This
measure shows the size of the financial sector relative to the economy. Furthermore,
it is the size of banks, financial institutions, financial markets in a country, collated
together and compared to a measure of economic output.
(a) Domestic credit to private sector to GDP ratio (%) - domestic loans to the
private sector. By definition this indicator is the least exhaustive and more
of a limited proxy of financial depth but is widely available for developing
countries.
(b) Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to
GDP ratio (%) - private credit by deposit money banks and other financial
institutions to GDP
The control variables employed in this chapter are included to reflect the different levels
of real GDP.
• Net official development assistance and official aid received (current
US$) - (NODA)
Net official development assistance consists of disbursements of loans made on
concessional terms (net of repayments of principal) and grants by official agencies. It
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also includes loans which have a grant element of at least 25 percent. Net official aid
refers to aid flows from donor countries to recipient countries. Official aid received into
developing economies has seen a general consensus on its positive effects on economic
growth. A vast majority of these studies find positive effects on economic growth in
the short and long run. In the context of recent literature, it is found that the
estimated effect of aid on economic growth can be explained by the increase in
consumer demand, explained by the increase in the value added in services (Magesan,
2015). Therefore, to account for the potential differences in aid for each country this
study includes the NODA as a control variable.
• Net barter terms of trade index (2000 = 100) - (NBTT)
Calculated as the percentage ratio of export value indexes to import value indexes,
measured relative to the base year 2000. It can be also interpreted as the amount of
import goods that can be purchased per unit of export goods. The measure reflects the
competitive strength and position of a country or a specific industry in the international
market. Furthermore, it measures the relationship between prices a country receives for
its exports and the prices it pays for its imports. The measure is included in the
specification because it enables this study to account for a potential improvement in
the terms of trade which leads to an increase in export revenue and therefore a rise
in a country’s real GDP. A deterioration in the the terms of trade likewise induces a
contraction in real GDP.
• Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %)
Measured by the annual growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator which shows the
rate of change in the general price level in the economy as a whole. Given that
inflation measures the degree of uncertainty about the future market environment, it
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is expected to have a negative relationship with economic growth. Moreover, firms
within an uncertain environment are less likely to make long term commitments in the
presence of high price variability (Caporale et al., 2009). Within a panel data
framework, it is important to account for the variability in inflation across the dataset
and within the regions. Inflation has been shown to reduce economic activity in many
countries by the process of creating inefficiencies that lead to the misallocation of
resources and a general decline in macroeconomic performance. The long-run
relationship between economic growth and inflation does not imply causality. This is
based on the theory that sustained growth caused by rising aggregate demand can
lead to acceleration in inflation as the economy utilises the scarce resources.
Furthermore, Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009) use inflation within their model
specification to control for Real GDP growth.
• Real effective exchange rate (2010=100)
Real effective exchange rate is the nominal effective exchange rate (a measure of the
value of a currency against a weighted average of several foreign currencies) divided by
a price deflator or index of costs. In a market-based economy, household, producer, and
government choices about resource allocation are influenced by relative prices, including
the real exchange rate, real wages, real interest rates, and other prices in the economy.
Relative prices also largely reflect these agents’ choices. Thus, relative prices convey
vital information about the interaction of economic agents in an economy and with
the rest of the world. An increase in the real exchange rate is associated with exports
becoming more expensive whilst imports become cheaper; therefore, an increase will
result in a loss in trade competitiveness. There is a relatively large body of literature
which suggests there is a correlation between real GDP growth and the real exchange
rate. On the assumption that countries will have higher productivity levels in the traded
goods sector, there is an incentive to maintain the relative price of the traded goods
high enough to make it possible for the shift of resources in to the sector for production.
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This is common with the literature on developing economies as Rodrik (2008) finds
that growth acceleration occurs, on average, after ten years of a steady increase in the
undervaluation of the currency.
• Population, ages 15-64 (% of total)
Based on the de facto definition of population and is defined of the percentage of the
total population that is in the age group of 15-64. This variable provides the model
with true validity regarding countries that have greater populations compared to other
developing countries and are more likely to have higher levels of real GDP. Within
growth models it is important for economists to take into consideration the impact of
fundamental demographic processes on economic growth. Dyson (2010) claims that
mortality decline aids economic growth which therefore leads to an increase in the
standards of living. In addition to mortality decline, Dyson (2010) has identified
fertility, population growth, age-structural change, and urbanisation as demographic
factors which could affect economic growth.
4.4 Empirical Analysis
4.4.1 Financial Development Index Results
The index of financial development is estimated for the 51-country sample on an annual
basis over the time period 1990 to 2015.
Table C.1 in Appendix C provides a ranking of financial development, based on the mean
of the index for each country. The results show the financial development index as the
primary index of the study with various results across all countries in the dataset. The
rank measures listed in Table C.1 are organised as follows: Rank 1 refers to the rankings
of the financial development index, Fin. dev. is the value of the financial development
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index, Rank 2 refers to rankings based on the Bank deposits to GDP ratio variable, and
Rank 3 is the rankings based on the interest rate spread variable. Additionally, Figures
D.1 to D.5 in Appendix D illustrate the variable results among the regional datasets.
The best performing region in the dataset as measured by the financial development
index ranking (Rank 1) is the MENA region. Countries including Lebanon (1), Jordan
(4), Kuwait (6), Egypt (7), and Algeria (8) feature in the top 10.18 Within the MENA
region, countries like Lebanon and Kuwait have benefited from significant capital inflows
from the gulf region because of the high oil prices in the region. Furthermore, Lebanon’s
economy is service-oriented with the focus mostly on the financial services, trade and
tourism sectors. Figures C.1 to C.5 provide an overview of the results in terms of
the regional datasets. Moreover, the graphs illustrate the potential differences among
each of the three indicators. Among the European countries: Malta (2), Slovakia (10),
Slovenia (11) and Hungary (15) feature among the top 20, while the leaders in Asia
are Thailand (3), India (19) and Indonesia (22). The leaders in Latin American sample
consist of Panama (5), Chile (12), Brazil (14), and Honduras (16). The MENA region
consists of countries which dominate the top 20 in the index consisting of Lebanon (1),
Jordan (4), Kuwait (6), Egypt (7), and Algeria (8). As for the African countries, South
Africa (9) features high up the index but the majority of the African countries are lower
down the rankings including Kenya (25), Cameroon (29), Cote d’Ivoire (41), Nigeria
(44), Senegal (46), Uganda (47), and Ghana (48). The results from the three rankings
indicate that the financial development index and the Bank deposits to GDP ratio index
measure provides similar results compared to the interest rate spread index.
18The discussion here reports the result based on the financial development index estimated and the ranking of the
financial development index (Rank 1).
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4.4.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics: Full Sample
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Log of real GDP per capita 1236 0.0004 0.02 -0.12 1319
Remittances inflows to GDP ratio 1099 4.16 6.61 0.00013 49.59
Population ages 15-64 (% of total population) 1321 61.71 6.55 45.71 76.90
Real effective exchange rate (2010=100) 557 95.52 26.53 34.53 319.76
Net official development assistance and official aid 1265 3.12 4.24 -0.68 30.22
received (NODA) (% of GNI)
Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %) 1319 35.36 236.67 -26.81 6261.24
Net Barter terms of trade index 1218 111.07 34.11 43.88 290.90
Private credit by deposit money banks to GDP (%) 1078 31.56 25.36 1.08 165.86
Financial development index 842 1.60 1.18 0.19 8.59
Liquid liabilities to GDP (%) 1194 45.33 34.83 6.06 252.72
Bank deposits to GDP (%) 1217 37.67 31.98 1.84 245.43
Deposit interest rate (%) 1127 33.40 348.77 0.13 9394.29
Bank capital to assets ratio (%) 594 10.45 4.37 1.49 73.95
Interest rate spread (%) 979 11.85 79.52 -72.40 2334.96
Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) 1250 36.85 30.43 0.19 166.50
Table 4.1 provides the summary statistics of the variables of interest for the 51 countries
which includes 1326 observations. The mean value of remittance inflows to GDP ratio
through the sample of the study (from 1990-2015) is 4.16% of GDP; whilst there is
considerable variation in the ratio of remittances to GDP across countries, ranging from
less than 1% of GDP (Chile) to 50% for Tajikistan in 2013. The financial development
proxies also vary considerably: Bank deposits to GDP ratio is, on average, 38% of
GDP but with great variation across countries and time periods. From a low of 2%
(Tajikistan) to a high of 245% (Lebanon). Liquidity is, on average, 45% of GDP in
the sample, with a low of 6% (Tajikistan) and a high of 253% (Lebanon). Finally, the
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financial development index ranges from 1.18 (Turkey) to 8.59 (Lebanon). Through
the examination of the descriptive statistics it is evident to see Lebanon performs very
well with the variables discussed which sees the country ranked first on the constructed
financial development index. However, we should be careful of interpreting the Lebanon
results because data availability for the early portion of the dataset is limited. Figures
D.6 to D.12 in Appendix D illustrate the normal distribution (Kernel density function
fitted) of the financial development index. The MENA and the European sample show
that there are some countries with higher financial development in contrast with the
other samples. The full, Asia, Latin America and African samples consist of countries
with lower financial development and the subsequent results will be more significant
to countries with lower levels of financial development. Figure D.12 shows a different
perspective to analyse the investment potential of remittance inflows by focusing on the
cyclicality of these flows in relation to real GDP. If these flows are profit driven they
should be positively related with real GDP, or procyclical. If they are compensatory
in nature (i.e. remittances are sent home for altruistic reasons) they should be related
negatively related with the recipient country GDP or countercyclical. Figure D.12 shows
the correlations of the cyclical components of real GDP and remittance inflows for fifty-
one developing countries. It is clear from the figure that remittances are procyclical for
the majority of countries in the dataset to differing degrees. Consequently, this could
in turn suggest the positive relationship between remittances and economic growth is
influenced by migrants who generally send more money home when there are greater
investment opportunities.
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4.4.3 Full Sample
Table 4.2: Baseline estimates of the Difference GMM regressions (Full sample)
Model FE S-GMM D-GMM
DV (growth of Real GDP per
capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Growth of real GDP per capita
(-1)
0.931*** 0.896*** 0.859*** 0.124*** 0.877***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log of remittances inflows (% of
GDP)
0.0009 -0.019 0.018*** 0.027** 0.021*
(0.572) (0.223) (0.000) (0.029) (0.068)
Financial development index -0.010 -0.120* -0.149* - -
(0.333) (0.074) (0.079) - -
Bank deposits to GDP ratio - - - -0.330*** -
- - - (0.001) -
Interest rate spread - - - - -0.071**
- - - - (0.048)
Remittances-finance interaction
term
0.0008 0.011 0.012*** 0.015** -0.0006*
(0.401) (0.223) (0.001) (0.036) (0.086)
Foreign Direct Investment 0.00004 0.0008* 0.0002*** 0.009*** 0.00003
(0.443) (0.057) (0.000) (0.000) (0.343)
Inflation 0.000001 -0.0000003 -0.00003*** -0.001** 0.0006**
(0.913) (0.879) (0.003) (0.011) (0.015)
Real exchange rate -0.0002 -0.00003 -0.0003* -0.0006** -0.0002***
(0.146) (0.953) (0.065) (0.046) (0.006)
Population 0.003* 0.018* -0.003 -0.004 -0.007**
(0.067) (0.059) (0.175) (0.192) (0.011)
Net barter terms of trade index 0.0002*** 0.0002 0.0006*** 0.0007*** 0.0006***
(0.001) (0.306) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
NODA -0.001 -0.007 -0.003* 0.005 0.002
(0.512) (0.557) (0.083) (0.805) (0.555)
Observations 311 311 613 950 720
Countries 51 51 51 51 51
Hausman test statistic: p-value 0.030
Hansen’s overidentification test:
p-value
0.739 0.142 0.073 0.057
Number of instruments 99 28 27 27
Notes: All equations are estimated with the use of panel data estimators. Column 1 represents the fixed
effects model as determined by the Hausman test. The S-GMM and D-GMM regressions includes the
Net official development assistance and official aid received (NODA), Net barter terms of trade index,
population, real exchange rate, inflation and foreign direct investment variables as the exogenous
instrumental variables. The endogenous GMM instrument includes the lagged value of Real GDP per
capita (Ln). Robust standard errors are used which are based on Windmeijer’s finite-sample correction
for a two-step covariance matrix. P values are reported in parentheses. *Significant at 10%,
**significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%.
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Tables 4.2 to 4.7 consist of the GMM regressions for the full dataset and the regional
datasets which include three different proxies of financial development. Column (1)
represents the financial development index measure which is either estimated using the
fixed effects or random effects model. Column (2) represents the S-GMM regression and
uses the financial development index as a measure of financial development. Similarly,
the financial development index is used as a variable for Column (3) for the D-GMM
regression.19 Models (2) and (3) in Tables 4.2 to 4.7 refer to the financial development
index, constructed in the way described in Section 4.3.2, while models (4) and (5) use
bank deposits to GDP ratio and the interest rate spread (%).
The S-GMM model (Model (2)) provides similar results to the D-GMM model, however
the remittances-finance interaction term is statistically insignificant. It is evident to
see that impact of remittance inflows on economic growth is practically nil when the
variable is added as an explanatory variable for all four measures. Table 4.2 displays the
full estimation results20 and we can see the change between the financial development
measure in column (3) and the remittances finance interaction term will go to a positive
value from -0.149 to 0.012 (remittances finance interaction term). Columns (4) and (5)
reinforce the result with a coefficient values of 0.015 and -0.0006 retrospectively. This
result suggests that there is a positive impact of remittance inflows on economic growth
for those countries in the developing world which are less financially developed. In
countries with limited capabilities along with certain market imperfections, remittances
are not used for financial investment and are more likely to be spent on non-growth
activities such as consumption by households.
19The D-GMM estimator is preffered to the S-GMM estimator in Chapters 4 and 5 due to weak instrument problem
of the S-GMM estimator in dynamic panel data models as explained by Bun and Windmeijer (2010).
20This section will focus on analysing the results of the constructed financial development index measure.
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4.4.4 Regional Results
4.4.4 (a) Europe
Table 4.3: Baseline estimates of the Difference GMM regressions (Europe)
Model FE S-GMM D-GMM
DV (growth of Real GDP per
capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Growth of real GDP per capita
(-1)
0.905*** 0.873*** 0.963*** 0.899*** 0.962***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log of remittances inflows (% of
GDP)
0.020*** -0.162 -0.015 -0.003 -0.002
(0.002) (0.341) (0.207) (0.997) (0.965)
Financial development index 0.004 0.0003 -0.003 - -
(0.761) (0.812) (0.976) - -
Bank deposits to GDP ratio - - - -0.006 -
- - - (0.992) -
Interest rate spread - - - - -0.010
- - - - (0.823)
Remittances-finance interaction
term
0.0002 0.104 0.012 0.0003 0.001
(0.829) (0.102) (0.886) (0.999) (0.966)
Foreign Direct Investment 0.00006 0.009*** 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002
(0.273) (0.000) (0.899) (0.958) (0.870)
Inflation 0.0009 -0.011*** 0.0004* -0.0008 -0.001
(0.275) (0.002) (0.052) (0.962) (0.595)
Real exchange rate -0.002** -0.013 -0.0002 -0.001 -0.002
(0.016) (0.296) (0.976) (0.474) (0.271)
Population 0.016*** 0.098** -0.002 0.005 0.009**
(0.002) (0.045) (0.998) (0.630) (0.047)
Net barter terms of trade index 0.0002 0.037*** 0.003 -0.0004 -0.0001
(0.696) (0.000) (0.943) (0.983) (0.961)
NODA 0.003 -0.055** -0.024 0.001 0.004
(0.449) (0.039) (0.865) (0.969) (0.333)
Observations 111 111 107 126 108
Countries 13 13 13 13 13
Hausman test statistic: p-value 0.000
Hansen’s overidentification test:
p-value
1.000 0.811 0.801 0.983
Number of instruments 38 27 27 27
Notes: All equations are estimated with the use of panel data estimators. Column 1 represents the fixed
effects model as determined by the Hausman test. The S-GMM and D-GMM regressions includes the
Net official development assistance and official aid received (NODA), Net barter terms of trade index,
population, real exchange rate, inflation and foreign direct investment variables as the exogenous
instrumental variables. The endogenous GMM instrument includes the lagged value of Real GDP per
capita (Ln). Robust standard errors are used which are based on Windmeijer’s finite-sample correction
for a two-step covariance matrix. P values are reported in parentheses. *Significant at 10%,
**significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%.
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The methodology chosen for the simulations for the remaining regional results has been
corrected for instrumental biasedness. Roodman (2009) xtabond2 command version of
the D-GMM is only valid for the full sample estimation and therefore it is not correct
to use this method for the remaining regional simulations. This is due to the number
of groups (number of countries) in the panel data regression being relatively small to
the number of instruments within the specification of the model. The Stata routine,
xtbcfe, is used to overcome this problem. The routine performs an iterative bootstrap-
based bias correction for the fixed effects (FE) estimator and the D-GMM estimator in
dynamic panels as proposed by De Vos et al. (2015).
Within the European sample it is evident to see from Table 4.3, remittances have a
positive but an insignificant impact on economic growth. This is confirmed as the
remittances finance interaction term is a positive value (0.012) as opposed to the
financial development index measure which is a negative value (-0.003). Specifications
(4) and (5) provide similar results and show that there is no significant effect of
remittances on economic growth within this region. The positive impact of
remittances on economic growth for the countries in the European sample could
entirely be due to a statistical outcome but this is not true. The methodology chosen
includes an interaction term within the dynamic panel linear regression model which is
able to impose a monotonic linear structure of dependence between remittance inflows
and real GDP per capita levels. Moreover, the positive effects of remittances for
economic growth are diminishing with increasing levels of financial development with
the use of this methodology. As this study is aimed at finding policy implications for
countries with lower rather than higher values of financial development it will enable a
fairer comparison of the results between each region.
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4.4.4 (b) Asia
Table 4.4: Baseline estimates of the Difference GMM regressions (Asia)
Model FE S-GMM D-GMM
DV (growth of Real GDP per
capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Growth of real GDP per capita
(-1)
0.453** 0.320* 0.407** 0.495 0.719*
(0.040) (0.089) (0.045) (0.177) (0.078)
Log of remittances inflows (% of
GDP)
0.158** 0.0003 0.014* -0.050 0.156**
(0.030) (0.181) (0.068) (0.234) (0.019)
Financial development index 0.873** 0.0007 0.144* - -
(0.032) (0.340) (0.097) - -
Bank deposits to GDP ratio - - - -0.747* -
- - - (0.065) -
Interest rate spread - - - - -0.302*
- - - - (0.078)
Remittances-finance interaction
term
-0.088** 0.101* 0.011 0.017 -0.032*
(0.029) (0.078) (0.888) (0.290) (0.091)
Foreign Direct Investment -0.022** 0.0001 0.006 0.002** -0.040
(0.037) (0.205) (0.183) (0.044) (0.054)
Inflation -0.007* 0.0005* -0.003 -0.0009 0.001
(0.058) (0.067) (0.477) (0.185) (0.755)
Real exchange rate 0.004** 0.008 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001
(0.031) (0.458) (0.532) (0.429) (0.727)
Population 0.009 0.0003** 0.023 0.065 -0.008
(0.103) (0.040) (0.504) (0.137) (0.876)
Net barter terms of trade index -0.004** -0.0003 0.003 0.002 0.002
(0.032) (0.102) (0.697) (0.394) (0.358)
NODA 0.109** 0.208** 0.008 -0.092 -0.034
(0.037) (0.039) (0.961) (0.117) (0.343)
Observations 85 106 106 195 132
Countries 10 10 10 10 10
Hausman test statistic: p-value 0.003
Hansen’s overidentification test:
p-value
1.000 0.891 0.912 0.915
Number of instruments 38 28 27 27
Notes: All equations are estimated with the use of panel data estimators. Column 1 represents the fixed
effects model as determined by the Hausman test. The S-GMM and D-GMM regressions includes the
Net official development assistance and official aid received (NODA), Net barter terms of trade index,
population, real exchange rate, inflation and foreign direct investment variables as the exogenous
instrumental variables. The endogenous GMM instrument includes the lagged value of Real GDP per
capita (Ln). Robust standard errors are used which are based on Windmeijer’s finite-sample correction
for a two-step covariance matrix. P values are reported in parentheses. *Significant at 10%,
**significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%.
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The Asian sample shown in Table 4.4 shows results which shows a weak relationship
between remittance inflows, financial development, and real GDP per capita. It is
evident to see there is only a small positive impact on economic growth as the
remittances finance interaction term is a small positive and insignificant value (0.011)
as opposed to the financial development index measure which is also a positive and
significant value (0.144). These results could suggest that remittances have a
negligible effect on economic growth within Asian countries. Furthermore, it is
important to focus on the control variables which have a greater impact on economic
growth. The five control variables (inflation, population, NODA, FDI, Real exchange
rate, Net barter terms of trade index) have no effect on economic growth whereas for
specification (4) it is evident to conclude that FDI has a small positive impact on
economic growth. The results suggest that within the Asian sample, the negligible
effects of remittances on real GDP per capita could be as a consequence of the monies
received in these countries not being reinvested into the financial market by the sender
but the funds are sent to their family, who utilise these funds in different ways.
Furthermore, this could suggest that these remittances are not being fully used in the
most productive way to contribute to economic prosperity.
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4.4.4 (c) Latin America
Table 4.5: Baseline estimates of the Difference GMM regressions (Latin America)
Model RE S-GMM D-GMM
DV (growth of Real GDP per
capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Growth of real GDP per capita
(-1)
0.947*** 0.713* 0.999*** 0.996*** 0.902***
(0.000) (0.067) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log of remittances inflows (% of
GDP)
0.001 0.0002 0.009* 0.066** -0.030
(0.926) (0.813) (0.085) (0.046) (0.876)
Financial development index 0.003 -0.421* 0.007** - -
(0.715) (0.093) (0.049) - -
Bank deposits to GDP ratio - - - 0.018** -
- - - (0.011) -
Interest rate spread - - - - -0.015
- - - - (0.387)
Remittances-finance interaction
term
-0.008 -0.003 0.011* 0.025* 0.007
(0.640) (0.172) (0.091) (0.063) (0.890)
Foreign Direct Investment 0.003 0.045** 0.003 0.004* 0.007*
(0.122) (0.011) (0.510) (0.071) (0.071)
Inflation 0.000004 0.0002*** -0.000006 0.00001 -0.0003
(0.674) (0.000) (0.999) (0.974) (0.618)
Real exchange rate -0.0002 -0.004*** -0.00005 -0.0002 -0.0006
(0.351) (0.000) (0.966) (0.871) (0.386)
Population 0.0002 0.153* -0.001 0.003 -0.004
(0.892) (0.091) (0.194) (0.989) (0.916)
Net barter terms of trade index 0.0003*** -0.0008* 0.0001 0.0002** 0.00001
(0.001) (0.093) (0.833) (0.017) (0.959)
NODA -0.032*** 0.00003 -0.043 -0.056 -0.020
(0.007) (0.781) (0.380) (0.725) (0.440)
Observations 129 129 126 143 128
Countries 10 10 10 10 10
Hausman test statistic: p-value 0.450
Hansen’s overidentification test:
p-value
0.913 0.628 0.901 0.871
Number of instruments 38 27 27 27
Notes: All equations are estimated with the use of panel data estimators. Column 1 represents the random
effects model as determined by the Hausman test. The S-GMM and D-GMM regressions includes the
Net official development assistance and official aid received (NODA), Net barter terms of trade index,
population, real exchange rate, inflation and foreign direct investment variables as the exogenous
instrumental variables. The endogenous GMM instrument includes the lagged value of Real GDP per
capita (Ln). Robust standard errors are used which are based on Windmeijer’s finite-sample correction
for a two-step covariance matrix. P values are reported in parentheses. *Significant at 10%,
**significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%.
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The Latin American results represented in Table 4.5 show that remittances complement
the financial system within the Latin American countries and have a positive impact on
economic output. It is important to note that the coefficients of interest on the random
effects estimator are insignificant so regressions (3) and (4) provide the most significant
and reliable results. The Latin American and the Caribbean region consists of countries
which are characterised by many challenges such as low bank credit to private sector and
domestic equity market liquidity which is underdeveloped by international standards.
Moreover, issues such as the expansion of bank credit has been biased in favour of
consumption rather than production and the provision of long term finance, whether
it be to firms, infrastructure, or households. These issues still remain problematic over
several decades within the region. The result in columns in (4) further reinforce the
results explained in column (3).
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4.4.4 (d) MENA
Table 4.6: Baseline estimates of the Difference GMM regressions (MENA)
Model FE S-GMM D-GMM
DV (growth of Real GDP per
capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Growth of real GDP per capita
(-1)
0.725*** 0.650* 0.519** 0.942* 0.121
(0.000) (0.058) (0.018) (0.073) (0.142)
Log of remittances inflows (% of
GDP)
-0.001 -0.00001 0.318* 0.282 0.095
(0.990) (0.911) (0.082) (0.238) (0.440)
Financial development index -0.018 0.00002 -0.190* - -
(0.604) (0.102) (0.098) - -
Bank deposits to GDP ratio - - - 0.362 -
- - - (0.326) -
Interest rate spread - - - - 0.502
- - - - (0.178)
Remittances-finance interaction
term
0.004 0.002* 0.034* -0.016 -0.052
(0.931) (0.053) (0.091) (0.322) (0.182)
Foreign Direct Investment -0.006 -0.0002 0.011* -0.042 -0.010
(0.531) (0.181) (0.098) (0.274) (0.708)
Inflation 0.00002 0.0001 0.003 0.008 0.004
(0.954) (0.104) (0.861) (0.238) (0.112)
Real exchange rate -0.0005 -0.0006 0.049** 0.070 0.128
(0.640) (0.102) (0.040) (0.810) (0.109)
Population 0.009* 0.0001** 0.031 0.0002 0.091
(0.098) (0.045) (0.738) (0.993) (0.135)
Net barter terms of trade index 0.0001 0.0002 -0.003 -0.007* -0.006
(0.447) (0.232) (0.750) (0.070) (0.153)
NODA 0.043 0.003 0.061 -0.001 -0.022
(0.179) (0.238) (0.773) (0.461) (0.746)
Observations 178 105 105 150 124
Countries 9 9 9 9 9
Hausman test statistic: p-value 0.009
Hansen’s overidentification test:
p-value
0.489 0.532 0.193 0.721
Number of instruments 38 27 28 27
Notes: All equations are estimated with the use of panel data estimators. Column 1 represents the fixed
effects model as determined by the Hausman test. The S-GMM and D-GMM regressions includes the
Net official development assistance and official aid received (NODA), Net barter terms of trade index,
population, real exchange rate, inflation and foreign direct investment variables as the exogenous
instrumental variables. The endogenous GMM instrument includes the lagged value of Real GDP per
capita (Ln). Robust standard errors are used which are based on Windmeijer’s finite-sample correction
for a two-step covariance matrix. P values are reported in parentheses. *Significant at 10%,
**significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%.
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The MENA regional results follow a similar format to the Latin American region for
the financial development index variable as remittances have a positive and significant
impact on economic growth (0.034) which indicates these inflows could further enhance
the development of the financial sector within the region. Columns (4) and (5) provide
opposing and insignificant results whilst some key control variables including FDI and
the Real exchange rate are also positive and significant. The financial development
channel can provide an important role in the region for the foreseeable future among
some uncertainty within the region. Remittances in this region are found to play a
crucial role through their interaction with credit as it promotes growth by substituting
credit, thus improving the allocation of capital and therefore accelerating economic
growth.
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4.4.4 (e) Africa
Table 4.7: Baseline estimates of the Difference GMM regressions (Africa)
Model RE S-GMM D-GMM
DV (growth of Real GDP per
capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Growth of real GDP per capita
(-1)
0.879*** 0.671* 0.619*** 0.962*** 0.473*
(0.000) (0.078) (0.000) (0.000) (0.066)
Log of remittances inflows (% of
GDP)
0.004 0.005 0.008* -0.008 -0.011
(0.838) (0.109) (0.098) (0.701) (0.475)
Financial development index 0.104 0.003 0.0001* - -
(0.241) (0.601) (0.063) - -
Bank deposits to GDP ratio - - - -0.038 -
- - - (0.760) -
Interest rate spread - - - - -0.063
- - - - (0.371)
Remittances-finance interaction
term
-0.007 0.002 0.020*** 0.0006 0.005*
(0.315) (0.201) (0.008) (0.316) (0.078)
Foreign Direct Investment -0.00001 -0.00004** 0.005** -0.0008 0.010
(0.998) (0.034) (0.045) (0.193) (0.328)
Inflation -0.0003 0.00001 0.00001 0.0007 0.00005
(0.304) (0.811) (0.981) (0.328) (0.105)
Real exchange rate -0.0001 0.027*** 0.003* -0.0008*** 0.00004
(0.474) (0.000) (0.064) (0.008) (0.180)
Population 0.032* 0.047* -0.002 -0.032 -0.083*
(0.080) (0.081) (0.954) (0.382) (0.093)
Net barter terms of trade index 0.0005 0.028*** 0.001 -0.002 0.0004*
(0.243) (0.000) (0.748) (0.294) (0.078)
NODA 0.003 0.0001 -0.009** -0.017 -0.007
(0.451) (0.391) (0.025) (0.227) (0.872)
Observations 123 58 89 188 158
Countries 9 9 9 9 9
Hausman test statistic: p-value 1.000
Hansen’s overidentification test:
p-value
1.000 0.788 0.835 0.078
Number of instruments 41 27 28 27
Notes: All equations are estimated with the use of panel data estimators. Column 1 represents the random
effects model as determined by the Hausman test. The S-GMM and D-GMM regressions includes the
Net official development assistance and official aid received (NODA), Net barter terms of trade index,
population, real exchange rate, inflation and foreign direct investment variables as the exogenous
instrumental variables. The endogenous GMM instrument includes the lagged value of Real GDP per
capita (Ln). Robust standard errors are used which are based on Windmeijer’s finite-sample correction
for a two-step covariance matrix. P values are reported in parentheses. *Significant at 10%,
**significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%.
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The African region provides similar results (in Table 4.7) to the Latin American and
MENA regions. Furthermore, the impact of remittances on economic growth is positive
but it is not significant for specifications (4) and (5). The results for the African
region show the robustness of the results with respect to significance of the financial
development index variable. The construction of the index provides different aspects of
the financial sector to be captured in Africa. The influx of remittance inflows into the
region has benefited the region as the region has led the world in innovative financial
services based on mobile telephony, especially in East Africa. The fast spread of systems
such as M-Pesa, M-Shwari, and M-Kopa in Kenya has helped in reducing transaction
costs whilst personal transactions have become more efficient even in the absence of
traditional financial infrastructure.
4.4.5 Remittances, Financial Development and Economic Growth
This section aims to shed further light on the relationship between remittances, financial
development and economic growth. Furthermore, by focusing on the long-term effects
of remittances on economic growth this study can provide analysis on the monotonic
linear structure of dependence of the impact of remittance inflows on GDP per capita
levels. The coefficient on remittance inflows (β1) in equation (9) refers to its influence on
GDP per capita for countries with financial development equivalent to 0. However, this
value fails to include information about the relationship between remittances, finance
and output. To fully infer the effects of this relationship, β3, the coefficient on the
interaction term between the measures of financial development and remittances needs
to be considered, since:
∂yi,t
∂ri,t
= β1 + β3fdi,t = βi,t (12)
Equation (12) represents the relationship between remittances and the growth rate of
real GDP per capita for the varying levels of financial development. βi,t can be
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interpreted as follows: given the level of financial development in the country, if
remittance inflows increase in country i at time t increase by a factor of 1%; the
growth rate of real GDP per capita will change by a factor of βi,t%. Table 4.8 displays
the results for βi,t for all regions which consist of three different measures: financial
development index (1), bank deposits to GDP (2) and the interest rate spread (3).
The results show that for the full sample, given a 10% increase in remittance inflows
for a country with average financial development (for each measure used) would lead
to an increase in real GDP per capita over one year by 0.3%. The Asia, Latin America
and African samples shows a similar outcome for measure (1) but not for measures (2)
and (3). Similarly, for the other regions the inference depends on the financial
development measure used. The positive marginal effect of remittance inflows on
economic output given the level of financial development can be explained by binding
liquidity constraints within these countries. The majority of the countries in the
sample used in this chapter are those of which have low financial development so the
financial sector is not well developed, resulting in the supply of loans for productive
activities being restricted and hence insufficient. Therefore, the provision of transfers
from abroad could be a route through which these countries can overcome these issues.
The results represented in Table 4.8 represent mixed results given that on the other
end of the financial development distribution (e.g. in South Africa, and Indonesia),
moral hazard problems can occur, as Chami et al. (2008) noted. If the majority of
remittances are spent on consumption and labour supply is lower, there will be lower
long-term effects on economic growth. This could be a possible explanation for the
negative impact of remittances on real GDP per capita (for measures (2) and (3)) and
for those countries with higher financial development. The results for measures (2)
and (3) are variable and large in magnitude, signifying that there is less reliability in
measuring the effects of remittances on economic growth with these measures of
financial development.
124
Table 4.8: The estimated effects of remittance inflows on GDP per capita for different levels of financial 
development
Region (1) (βi,t)*
Financial
development
index
(2) (βi,t)*
Bank
deposits to
GDP ratio
(3) (βi,t)*
Interest rate
spread
Full 0.0364** 0.0774* 0.0199
(0.045) (0.091) (0.103)
Europe 0.0049*** -0.0019*** -0.0001
(0.006) (0.001) (0.203)
Asia 0.0305* 0.00565** 0.103
(0.067) (0.030) (0.128)
Latin America 0.0235 0.1481 -0.0154*
(0.107) (0.118) (0.082)
MENA 0.3972 0.2224 0.0231**
(0.391) (0.229) (0.043)
Africa 0.0251** -0.0062 -0.0005
(0.032) (0.511) (0.324)
Notes: βi,t is calculated from the mean value of the financial
development measure. P values are reported in parentheses.
*Significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%
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4.5 Conclusion
What is the impact of remittances on economic growth? How does the level of
financial development in these developing countries influence the relationship between
remittances and economic growth? Is there evidence that remittances have enhancing
or diminishing effects on economic growth? To shed some light on these questions, this
chapter analyses these key issues within the developing world. The economic growth
and remittances relationship is a relatively new topic within the literature. It arose
over the past two decades, as remittance inflows have reached their highest levels with
governments in developing countries paying further attention to realise their full
benefits. However, there is no consensus in the literature which examines the impact
of remittance inflows on financial development with the use of cross-country panel
data analysis and a financial development index. The analysis focused on the effects of
remittances on financial sector development and economic growth in developing
countries with the use of a non-linear D-GMM model (Arellano and Bover, 1995;
Blundell and Bond, 1998). Moreover, with the use of 51 country panel dataset over
1990-2015 the study aims to bridge the gap in the existing literature in remittances
and financial development. This study adds to the existing literature through the
creation of a financial development index variable which brings together several
existing measures of financial development.
The analysis split up into six datasets which shows mixed results and additionally
measures the long run impact of remittances on economic growth in Section 4.4.5.
Europe and Asian regions show that remittances and financial sector development are
not complementary with each other as they hinder economic growth in these regions.
However, the full dataset, Latin America, MENA and Africa show that remittances
promote economic growth with countries that are less financially developed. Table 4.9
reinforces the result for the full sample as remittances are shown to have a positive
impact on economic growth in the long term. All findings control for the endogeneity
of remittances and real GDP with the use of the fixed effects (or random effects) and
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D-GMM regressions which aim to reduce bias in the results.
The main lessons to take from the study from countries in these regions to fully
understand and invest in developing their financial systems to fully realise the benefits
of remittances and higher economic growth. Future research needs to focus on not
only increasing remittances across the board by reducing transfer costs as suggested
by policymakers, but also to understand why remittances do not seem to boost
economic growth in countries with well-functioning financial markets.
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Chapter 5
Remittances and Monetary Policy in Developing Economies
5.1 Introduction
Recent years have marked the increasing role of emigrant remittances across the
developing world. Thus, issues central to developing countries include the role of
development finance and remittances within communities. It is not surprising to see
that remittances have engaged the attention of policy makers, global development
institutions and researchers worldwide. Given the shortage of external financing,
remittances are welcomed as a way of promoting investment and to stimulate
economic growth. Furthermore, remittances provide an avenue to finance imports as
they are an alternative form of foreign exchange which could relax balance of
payments restraints. A large fraction of remittance inflows is spent on
consumption(Orozco and Fedewa, 2005), but this can come at cost by increasing the
price of non-tradables in the receiving country thereby producing inflationary
pressures in the economy.
Research has documented that increases in the level of remittance inflows could
precipitate an increase in the real exchange rate of the recipient economy, adversely
affecting export competitiveness and, therefore causing a trade deficit (Corden and
Neary, 1982). Remittances have a wide array of potential effects on the recipient
economy. Most notably they contribute to financial development, affect economic
growth and business cycles, and could lead to a Dutch Disease phenomenon, among
other microeconomic and macroeconomic consequences. Interest in examining the role
of remittances in economic growth has dominated the literature in recent times.
However, the importance of remittances as a source of development finance has
enhanced the interest of the relationship between remittances, the exchange rate and
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other monetary policy variables. From a macroeconomic perspective, remittance
inflows have the potential to induce economic growth by enhancing aggregate demand
in the economy. However, some studies have reported there to be a mixed relationship
between remittances and key macroeconomic variables like the real exchange rate.
Along these lines of thought, the issues faced by receiving countries of remittances
could conflict on several policy objectives, namely export competitiveness, inflation,
external financing, among others. The primary concerns for governments in developing
countries concerns the ability of central banks to perform their functions correctly as
they lack independence in their operations. Hence, the objectives of monetary policy
for central banks are not clearly defined. The priorities for governments in developing
countries vary as some may opt to target output growth during periods of a slowdown
by increasing liquidity in order to increase credit expansion. Conversely, other
developing countries could be concerned by the adoption of higher government
spending and will focus on other policies where central banks may resort to
establishing nominal anchors that form a specific design to monetary policy. Some
developing countries may decide in pegging the exchange rate as an option but may
decide against this option if they suffer from high inflation. Therefore, targeting
inflation may provide a more robust and sustainable measure for the design of
monetary policy.
Indeed, the evidence is growing for the importance of the monetary policy
transmission mechanism in developing countries. Furthermore, according to the
literature the presence of remittance inflows among households pose challenges to
macroeconomic policymaking. This is through upward pressures on the real exchange
rate, therefore contributing to the weakening of institutions involved in fiscal policy
whilst affecting long term economic growth. The monetary policy angle has been
explored in the remittances literature, but these have relied on certain restrictive
assumptions that fail to apply to most countries. Chami et al. (2008) use a DSGE
framework to derive an optimal monetary policy rule for a recipient economy. They
find that remittances not only cause a more volatile business cycle, but they also
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increase output and labour market risk. Therefore, the optimal policy deviates from
the Friedman rule, emphasising the need for independent government policy
instruments. The question of whether remittances are beneficial to an economy is
subject to various other factors. One that is increasingly mentioned in the literature is
a Dutch Disease effect, which requires that the traded goods sector of a remittances
receiving economy be the primary source of enhancing other sectors’ productive
capacity. Consequently, a Dutch Disease effect will arise with the influx of remittances
causing the economy’s real exchange rate to appreciate. This chapter will focus on the
relationship between remittances and the nominal exchange rate and provide
developing economies with a perspective to analyse how remittances affect the
exchange rate in the short and long term.
This chapter seeks to guide further insight into the relationship between the
effectiveness of monetary policy and to understand how monetary policy responds to
remittance inflows. Moreover, this chapter contributes to the existing literature in the
study of remittances by using modelling techniques which account for differences in
monetary policy across regions and countries thereby, improving current
macroeconomic policies within developing countries. First, the use of panel vector
autoregression (PVAR) analysis provides analysis into the dynamics of monetary
policy and remittances. This is achieved whilst accounting for the country specific
effects through the panel dataset. Secondly, the use of impulse response analysis
enables this study to capture the impact of shocks from each system variable.
Furthermore, the effects of remittance volatility on real GDP and the monetary policy
rate are captured using PVAR analysis.
5.2 Literature Review
The reasons why migrant workers send money back home has been extensively
researched with respect to the microeconomics literature on remittances. However,
residents of labour-exporting countries have received flows of remittances which are
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greater than other capital inflows, making them important to research at the macro
level. The impact of remittances on monetary policy has eluded policymakers and the
attention of empirical researchers, which has caused a lack of focus on the relationship
between monetary policy and remittances (Vacaflores, 2012). Heilmann (2006) states
that the inflows of remittances can generate inflationary pressures, whilst
simultaneously increasing the internal demand for imported goods. Narayan et al.
(2011) confirm this effect for a set of 54 developing countries for the period 1995-2004,
showing that remittances can generate inflationary pressures which are accentuated in
the long-run. Furthermore, they find that improvements in democracy and the
involvement of the military in politics can reduce inflation rates, current account
deficits and the U.S interest rate.
The use of PVAR analysis has risen in recent years over the advantages over other
models including DSGE models. These DSGE models by construction impose a lot of
restrictions, not always in line with the statistical properties of the data. Thus, the
policy strategies deduced from the analysis are hardwired in the assumptions of the
model and must be considered as a benchmark rather than the real-world policy
constraints faced by policymakers worldwide. In the literature, Gnimassoun and
Mignon (2016), apply a panel VAR model to a set of 22 countries over the 1980-2011
period to analyse three key macroeconomic imbalances, namely current account
discrepancies (external imbalances), output gaps (internal imbalances), and exchange
rate misalignments. The analysis finds that macroeconomic imbalances strongly
interact through a causal relationship. Specifically, the study uses PVAR analysis to
examine a positive shock on the output gap which leads to a positive response of
exchange-rate misalignments and a significant and negative response of the
current-account gap. The use of PVAR analysis in macroeconomics is not limited to
literature focusing on key macroeconomic variables. Imai et al. (2014) examine the
effects of remittances on the growth rate of GDP per capita using annual panel data
for a set of 24 Asian or Pacific countries. The study finds that while remittance
inflows have been beneficial to economic growth, they are also source of output shocks.
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Studies on remittances have grown over the past decade with the increased interest on
monetary flows. A small strand of literature focuses on the link between remittances and
monetary policy. According to the model proposed by Vacaflores (2012), higher levels of
remittance inflows alter the effectiveness of monetary policy. A decline in the nominal
interest rate leads to an increase in investment following a monetary injection because
of the wealth effect. Furthermore, the liquidity effect is accentuated by the higher
levels of remittances which originates from the monetary shock, increasing capital and
investment, and enabling households to increase leisure time. This is known as the
negative labour effect and is consistent output decreasing over time.
The divergent views proposed in the literature show that the linkage between
remittance inflows, the exchange rate and monetary policy remain inconclusive and is
currently expanding. Adenutsi and Ahortor (2008) examine the underlying monetary
factors which could affect the changing levels of remittances by examining key
monetary aggregates including the interest rate, exchange rate, and the domestic price
level. The authors base the theoretical framework on a modified variable price
Mundell-Fleming model. The use of a Vector Autoregression (VAR) applied to a
quarterly dataset covering the period of 1983(4) to 2005(4). The authors produce a
long-run model which reveals that the exchange rate, and the interest rate positively
impact remittances while the domestic price level negatively impacts remittances. The
confusion surrounding this result in relevance to the existing literature is exacerbated
by the proposition by Ruiz and Vargas-Silva (2010, p174) who stipulate that
remittances are small relative to the size of the country’s GDP and will not have an
impact on monetary policy: “If these flows are not large and/or not significant given
the total size of the economy, then their impact on variables such as inflation,
exchange rates and output will be minimal”. However, this argument could be
perceived to be false when analysing countries such as Ghana, in which they
constitute up to only 0.4% of GDP and Mexico where the results are insignificant as
they add up to 2.0% of GDP?
This chapter adds to the recent debate on the intermediary function of financial
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development in the link between private capital flows and economic growth (see,
Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 2009). The literature shows the interaction between
remittances and the financial market and shows how remittances can be a substitute
for financial markets in economic growth when capital markets are on the downfall.
5.3 Methodology and Data
5.3.1 PVAR Model
This chapter uses the panel vector autoregressive (PVAR) models that avoid most of
the restrictive assumptions introduced by the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) models which are unsuitable for the use in developing countries (Senbeta,
2011). The advantages of the PVAR follow on from those included in vector
autoregressive (VAR) models. Namely, these include the advantage of treating all
variables as endogenous, but there is also flexibility in including exogenous variables
which is applied to the regional sub samples. Thus, PVARs solve the problem of
endogeneity which is considered to be the main obstacle in panel data econometric
analysis. Furthermore, PVARs enable the analysis to include the impact of
innovations among variables to produce dynamic solutions, which is not possible with
the use of ordinary least squares (OLS) and other standard regression models.
The PVAR model is a mix of the conventional VAR model in which all variables are
treated as endogenous a priori. Additionally, the PVAR model captures the unobserved
individual heterogeneous effects as represented in the baseline model in equation (13):
yi,t = D0i(t) + ϕyi,t−1 +
p∑
k=1
αi,tyi,t−k +DilX i,t + µi,t (13)
where yi,t is a vector of k endogenous variables for each country. D0i(t) captures all the
deterministic components of the model (including constants and the seasonal dummies
specific to each country), yi,t−k refers to the lagged endogenous variables, and µi,t is
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a k × 1 vector of the random error term. Exogeneity has been included in the model
and is reflected by Xi,t which is an M × 1 vector of exogenous variables common to all
countries i.
In this chapter yi,t is represented by the following vector of a three variable panel VAR:
yi,t=
 LNREMi,tMPi,t
RGDPCGi,t
 (14)
where RGDPCGi,t represents the real GDP per capita growth variable,MPi,t21 refers to
the subsets of different monetary policy indicators which denotes the nominal exchange
rate as the main measure of the monetary policy rate and this measure refers to the
exchange rate determined by national authorities and is calculated as an annual average
relative to monthly averages (local currency relative to the U.S dollar). Furthermore,
two alternative measures of the monetary policy rate include the central bank policy
rate and the broad money supply. LNREMi,t is the measure of remittance inflows into
the recipient country (Personal remittances received as a ratio of GDP).
Implementing the Panel VAR procedure requires imposing the same underlying
structures for each cross-sectional unit (country). This chapter follows Abrigo and
Love (2016) who use the generalised method of moments (GMM) framework to
estimate panel VAR models. The three most notable characteristics of the PVAR
model include its ability to include lag of all endogenous variables of unit i (country)
also known as ‘dynamic interdependencies’. Secondly, the error terms µi,t are
correlated across i are also known as ‘static interdependences’. Thirdly, the slope
coefficient and the intercept, and the variance of the shocks may be unit specific which
is known as the ‘cross sectional heterogeneity’ feature. These prominent features help
distinguish panel VARs (PVARs) typically used in macroeconomic and financial
analyses from those used in microeconomic studies. This includes studies such as
Vidangos (2009) where interdependencies are typically ignored and sectoral
homogeneity is assumed. Vidangos (2009) examines the variation in individual labour
21MPi,t refers to the monetary policy rate indicators
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income over time and the subsequent effects on income, the wage rate, hours of
unemployment, and hours of work. What is also apparent within macroeconomic
PVARs is that it enables studies to distinguish between dynamic interdependencies
and cross sectional homogeneity.
5.3.2 Empirical Specification
Based on equation (13), this chapter further investigates into the existing relationship
by including remittance volatility. Remittance volatility is specified as a function of the
lags of endogenous variables whilst controlling for the country and time specific effects.
As an example the PVAR structure for row 1 in equation (14) is represented in the
following format:
LNREMi,t =
p∑
j=1
λ1MPi,t−j+
p∑
j=1
λ2LNREMi,t−j+
p∑
j=1
λ3RGDPCGi,t−j+Xi,t+fi+dt+ξi,t
(15)
where LNREMi,t denotes remittance inflows for country i at time t, MPi,t−j is the lag
of monetary policy rate variables for country i at time t, RGDPCGi,t−j is the lag of the
growth rate of real GDP per capita, Xi,t denotes the exogenous variables in the system,
fi represents the country specific fixed effects, dt denotes the time dummies, and ξi,t is
the random error term.
Furthermore, the PVAR structures for the monetary policy rate and the growth rate of
real GDP per capita is given in equation (16) and equation (17):
MPi,t =
p∑
j=1
λ1LNREMi,t−j+
p∑
j=1
λ2MPi,t−j+
p∑
j=1
λ3RGDPCGi,t−j+Xi,t+fi+dt+ξi,t
(16)
RGDPCGi,t =
p∑
j=1
λ1LNREMi,t−j+
p∑
j=1
λ2RGDPCGi,t−j+
p∑
j=1
λ3MP i,t−j+Xi,t+fi+dt+ξi,t
(17)
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Additionally the volatility of remittances is modelled using a PVAR structure in
equation (18):
σnLNREMi,t =
p∑
j=1
λ1MPi,t−j+
p∑
j=1
λ2σnLNREMi,t−j+
p∑
j=1
λ3RGDPCGi,t−j+Xi,t+fi+dt+ξi,t
(18)
where σnLNREMi,t denotes the volatility of remittance inflows for country i at time t.
5.3.3 Identification of the PVAR Cholesky Decomposition Ordering
Impulse response function analysis describes the reaction of one variable to innovations
to another variable whilst holding all other shocks equal to zero. However, since the
variance covariance matrix of the error terms is unlikely to be diagonal, we have to
decompose the residuals in a way to make them orthogonal allowing the PVAR to isolate
the shocks. Conventionally, this chapter chooses to adopt the Cholesky decomposition
of the variance-covariance matrix of residuals which enables the system to adopt a
particular ordering between the residuals of any two elements to the variable that comes
first in the ordering. The identifying assumption is that the variable that comes earlier
in the ordering is able to affect the following variables contemporaneously, while those
that come later affect the previous variables with a lag. Therefore, the variables that
come earlier in the system are those which are more exogenous and the ones that appear
later are more endogenous. The three variable PVAR vector described in equation (14)
has been ordered in such a way to fit the Choleski ordering for greater scope of analysis.
The specification in equation (14) shows that the LNREMi,t and MPi,t and feature
earlier in the PVAR vector and therefore the shocks of these two variables have an
effect on the contemporaneous value of RGDPCGi,t. The ordering of the PVAR vector
has been setup in such a way to show that remittance inflows and the monetary policy
rate have an effect on the growth rate of real GDP per capita with a lag.
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The identifying assumption in the Cholesky decomposition of the variance-covariance
matrix of residuals posits that the beginning variable contemporaneously affects the
following variables whilst the variables which occur later in the order impact the
former with a lag. Thus, a variable x which appears before variable y is said to be
weakly exogenous with respect to y. The benchmark case will consider the ordering of
LNREMi,t, MPi,t, RGDPCGi,t. This contemporaneous causal order runs from
remittances to the nominal exchange rate and to the growth rate of real GDP per
capita. This ordering permits the growth rate of real GDP per capita to react
contemporaneously to remittance shocks. The PVAR results will report two cases, the
first will include remittances first followed by the monetary policy rate variable and
then by the growth rate of real GDP per capita. The reasoning behind placing
remittances first assumes that the variable contemporaneously affect all variables
whilst the other two variables (MPi,t, RGDPCGi,t) affect remittances with a lag. The
underlying order is motivated by the fact that remittances are largely driven by
external factors which include the output of the migrants host countries (Elbadawi
and Rocha, 1992). Furthermore, remittances precede the monetary policy rate
variable implies that in the case of exchange rates migrants do not respond and adjust
their remitting patterns prior to contemporaneous movements of the exchange rate,
which may be explained by the fact the migrant is in a different time zone as the
recipient country. Therefore, a time delay exists in the decision to remit for the
migrant to adjust quickly enough to the exchange rate. The second ordering will place
the monetary policy rate followed by remittances and the growth rate of real GDP per
capita. This ordering will place greater emphasis on the monetary policy rate variable
to influence the decision of the migrant to remit. Given that the second PVAR
Cholesky ordering is less realistic, the first ordering as remittance inflows as the first
variable will be the baseline case for the analysis.
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5.3.4 Panel Unit Root Tests
The PVAR model used in this chapter requires all series to be stationary when
estimating the PVAR. In this way, the estimation results will provide reliable short
and long run results. Therefore, before proceeding on to the PVAR estimation results
it is necessary to undertake panel unit root tests. Panel unit root testing emerges from
the same principles of time series unit root testing. However, the major difference
between the two is that we have to consider the asymptotic behaviour of the
time-series dimension T and the cross-sectional dimension N . For this chapter, the
results will be reported for the Fisher-type tests which includes the Augmented Dickey
Fuller (ADF) and the Phillips-Perron (PP) tests. These tests conduct unit-root tests
for each panel individually, and then combine the p-values from these tests to produce
an overall test. However, these tests suffer from low power as we accept the null
hypothesis too often. In order to avoid this problem this chapter uses panel data unit
root tests developed by Levin et al. (2002); Im et al. (2003); Hadri et al. (2010).
Individual unit root tests have limited power. The power of a test is determined by the
probability of rejecting the null when it is false and the null hypothesis is a unit root.
5.3.4 (a) Fisher-type tests
This sub-section and the following sub-section will provide the methodology of the ADF
and the PP unit root tests with the appropriate assumptions included. The following
hypotheses apply to both tests:
Ho : Series contains a unit root
H1 : Series does not contain a unit root
The hypotheses above is consistent with the lag order p is permitted to vary across
individuals.
The procedure of the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) works as follows:
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First, we run the ADF test for each cross-section on the equation:
∆yi,t = αyi,t−1 +
pi∑
L=1
∂iLt∆yi,t−L + αmidmt + µi,t (19)
In the second step we run two auxiliary regressions:
1. ∆yi,t on ∆yi,t−L and dmt to obtain residuals µˆi,t and
2. yi,t−1on ∆yi,t−L and dmt to get residuals vˆi,t−1.
The third step involves standardising the residuals through the process of transformation
e˜i,t =
eˆi,t
σˆε,i
(20)
v˜i,t−1 =
vˆi,t
σˆε,i
(21)
where σˆε,i represent the standard error from ADF regression. Lastly, the pooled OLS
regression is run on the assumption that ρ = 0.
eˆi,t = ρvˆi,t−1 + ε˜i,t (22)
The main difference between the Phillips-Perron test and the augmented Dickey-Fuller
test statistics concern the robustness of the statistics in relation to serial correlation.
The PP statistics have been made robust to serial correlation using the Newey and West
(1987) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix estimator.
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5.3.4 (b) Levin, Lin and Chu test
The Levin et al. (2002) test assumes that there is a common unit root process so that
pi is identical across cross-sections. The test employs a null hypothesis of a unit root
and similarly to the Breitung (2000) test it employs the basic ADF specification as
in equation (19). We assume that a common condition holds in that α = ρ − 1, but
allow the lag order for difference terms to vary across cross-section according to ρi. The
method described in the LLC test requires that we derive estimates from α from proxies
of ∆yi,t and yi,t that are free of deterministic and autocorrelation components.
For a given set of lag orders, two additional sets of regressions estimated, by regressing
∆yi,t and yi,t−1 on the lag terms ∆yi,t−j (for j = 1, ....., pi) and the exogenous variables
Xi,t. The estimated coefficient from both sets of regressions are denoted (∂ˆ, dˆ) and (∂˙,d˙),
respectively.
5.3.4 (c) Breitung test
The Breitung unit root test (2000) although similar in construction to the LLC test
it differs in two distinct ways. Firstly, the autoregressive portion of the equation is
the only portion used when constructing the standardised proxies. Secondly, these
proxies are transformed and detrended. Most importantly, the LLC test is based on t
statistics that are adjusted to reflect that under the null hypothesis, the t-statistics have
a nonzero mean because of the inclusion of panel-specific means or trends. The Breitung
(2000) test requires the transformation of the data before computing the regressions so
standard t-statistics can be used. Additionally, the test assumes that all panels have
a common autoregressive parameter and only the autoregressive component is removed
when constructing the standardised proxies. The test proposes an alternative set of
procedures to the LLC test that uses unbiased estimators rather than bias-corrected
errors.
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5.3.4 (d) Im, Pesaran and Shin test
The Im et al. (2003) is considered preferable to the LLC and Breitung tests over the
assumption that it can overcome all panels to have the same value for pi. The IPS test
relaxes this assumption of a common p and allows for each panel to have its own unique
pi. The IPS test begins by specifying a separate ADF regression for each cross-section
as in equation (19) where the null hypothesis may be written as:
Ho : αi = 0, for all i (23)
while the alternative hypothesis is given by:
yi,t=

αi = 0
αi < 0
for i=1,2,...,N1
for i=N+1,N+2,.....,N
5.3.5 Data
Table 5.1: List of Variables
Variable Notation Description Source
Remittances LNREM Personal remittances received as a ratio of GDP WDI
Financial development FD Financial development index*
Monetary policy rate LNNEE Nominal exchange rate (per US$, period average) WDI
Monetary policy rate LNCBPR Central bank policy rate WDI
Monetary policy rate LNBM Broad money supply as a ratio of GDP WDI
Economic business cycles RGDPCG Growth rate of real GDP per capita WDI
Exchange rate LNNEE Nominal exchange rate (per US$, period average) IMF IFS
Remittances volatility σnLNREM Standard deviation of remittances WDI
World oil price CROIL Crude oil, Brent (World price, nominal $) GEMC
U.S. real GDP per capita USRG Growth rate of US real GDP per capita WDI
Note: *Financial development index is obtained from author’s estimates as reported in Chapter 2 of this thesis, WDI
denotes the World Development Indicators, GEMC represents the Global Economic Monitor Commodities , IMF IFS
denotes the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics database.
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All variables listed in Table 5.1 show the definitions and sources of the variables used for
the PVAR analysis. The dataset follows the same format in the previous two chapters of
the thesis by using fifty-one developing countries selected according to data availability
and regional representation. The creation of the financial development index is given
in Chapter 4 of this thesis along with comparisons to literature who use alternative
financial development indices. The monetary policy rate is used as the main measure
of monetary policy and three different measures are used to give greater data coverage
of this variable across the developing world. The variable is used as it reflects the
reactions of the monetary authorities to domestic and international economic conditions.
Furthermore, the variables of remittances are derived through two measures including
LNREM, and σnLNREM . The method of taking standard deviations follows the
same method employed by Bugamelli and Paternò (2011). The money supply is used
as an exogenous variable and is given by the log of broad money supply as a ratio of
GDP.
The baseline PVAR model includes up to three endogenous variables. The reasoning for
the inclusion and description of these variables among the literature is described below:
5.3.5.1 Growth rate of Real GDP per capita
Refers to the annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita based on constant local
currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2010 U.S. dollars. GDP per capita is gross
domestic product divided by midyear population. It is calculated without including
the deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of
natural resources.
5.3.5.2 Monetary policy rate (various measures)
Finding a precise and evaluative measure in monetary policy is among the most difficult
of pursuits in the economic literature. Conventional monetary policy suggests us to
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believe that central banks can adjust short-term funding rates by regulating reserve
requirement ratios and engaging in open market operations as their main tools of using
monetary policy. However, this is not quite true since the recent 2008 global financial
crisis forced central banks to use unconventional monetary policy tools.
Within the literature various measures of monetary policy have been used including
sizes of monetary aggregates such as M1 or M2 are used to measure liquidity. The M1
currency encompasses currency held by the public and demand deposits with banks.
Furthermore, the M2 measure of money supply includes M1 plus time and savings
deposits with banks that require prior notice to deposit withdrawals. The broad money
measure used in this chapter is M3 which includes M1 and M2 plus various money
market instruments, such as certificates of deposit issued by banks, banks deposits
denominated in foreign currency, and deposits with financial institutions other than
banks.
The relationship between income and money is not stable as Friedman and Kuttner
(1992) show that the relationship between money and income is not close and is
unreliable. Merely, the analysis from Friedman and Kuttner (1992) presents evidence
to confirm that in the United States there is no supporting relationship to either real
or nominal income, or to prices, and the inclusion of M1 and other monetary
aggregates corroborates these findings. Other measures including non borrowed
reserves (NBRs), which measure the difference between a bank’s total reserves and
borrowed reserves, have been introduced because it is easier to control than either M1
or M2. However, empirical evidence from Bernanke and Mihov (1998) suggest that
there is no statistically significant empirical evidence except that US monetary policy
was correctly measured by the NBRs except for the period of 1979 to 1982. In
addition to this measure other variables have been used as monetary policy indicators
including the central bank or interbank rates. The effectiveness of the central bank
rates is debated in the literature. Laurent (1988) recognised that short-term interest
rates are of influence of the central bank as by their manipulative power of the interest
rate. On the other hand, the short-term rates may affect many monetary aggregates
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but there is no reason to suggest why interest rates should directly affect economic
growth. The primary obstacle to seek a reliable measure of the monetary policy rate is
the problem of the interdependence of monetary aggregates and the real economy
bridged by the financial sector. In this situation monetary policy decisions are
endogenous. Furthermore, this problem contributes to the difficulty in designing
monetary policy, especially when seeking targets that fulfill financial stability and
price stability.
In order to overcome the problems discussed in the literature this chapter will
incorporate three different measures of the monetary policy rate. Firstly, the nominal
exchange rate is used and represents to the exchange rate determined in a legally
sanctioned exchange market. It is calculated as an annual average based on monthly
averages and is relative to the U.S. dollar. It is also simply viewed as the price of the
foreign currency in units of the home currency and is useful when analysing the
differences between exchange rates in developing economies. The importance of this
measure is applicable to when a country assesses it’s trading capabilities current trade
situation. The nominal exchange rate can also be used to measure the equilibrium
value of a country’s currency, identify changes in the international price and cost
competition, analyse the underlying trade flows of a country, and allocate incentives
between non-tradable and tradable sectors.
Secondly, the central bank policy rate is used and represents the rate that is used by the
central bank to implement or signal its monetary policy stance. It is most commonly
used by central bank policy making committees. The underlying financial instrument
varies from country to country as in some countries the rate refers to the discount
rate whilst in others it is a repurchase agreement rate. Thirdly, the broad money
supply measure is used which comprises of the sum of currency outside banks including
demand deposits other than those of central government. This measure includes the
time, savings, and foreign currency deposits of resident sectors other than of the central
government, bank and traveler’s checks, and other certain securities such as commercial
and deposit paper.
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5.3.5.3 Personal remittances received as a ratio of GDP
The definition used for the remittances variable is obtained from World bank
estimates based on the IMF balance of payments data, and World Bank and OECD
GDP estimates. The definition used in this chapter comprises of personal transfers
and compensation of employees. Personal transfer consist of all current transfer made
or received by resident households to non resident households. Personal transfers are
defined as transfers from resident individuals to non resident individuals. Moreover,
compensation of employees refers to the income of seasonal, border and other
short-term workers who are resident in a country where they are non residents or
where they are residents employed by nonresident entities. While the categories of
remittances remain well defined by the IMF, it is important to note that the reliability
of remittance data is limited. At a global level, the discrepancy between the receipts
of remittances exceed their payments and this is increasing over time (IMF, 2009).
Furthermore, this is more prevalent in developing countries where the greater
differences in the costs of sending remittances as compared to the informal channels
like carrying cash across borders. In essence the true data from remittances should
reflect their altruistic properties which could possibly lower economic growth. This is
possible through the appreciation of the real exchange rate and resource allocation
from tradable to non-tradable goods also known as the ‘Dutch Disease’ effect.
However, remittances could generate long term economic growth as a result of these
monies being spent on investment, education or other sources.
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5.4 Empirical Analysis
5.4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 5.2. This analysis will focus on discussing
the median as it is less susceptible to distortions from outliers as the mean statistic is.
Most notably, we can see that the median inflation (GDP deflator, annual %) is quite
low (6.77) compared to its mean value (31.61) possibly due to missing observations
and occurrences of deflation in some developing countries including Syria in 2016. The
measure of the interest rate spread has a high mean value (11.32) which signifies the high
costs of borrowing funds in developing countries. Remittance inflows as a percentage of
GDP have a median value of 1.96 which tells us the increasing significance of remittances
as a source of development finance in developing economies. When channeled correctly
these inflows could facilitate greater economic development by increasing the median
value of the growth rate of real GDP per capita above 4.34%. Furthermore, it is evident
to see that the Central Bank policy rate and the real interest rate (monetary policy
rate) remain at high levels of 1.87 and 5.92 respectively. This confirms that banks and
central banks in the developing world will keep interest rates high to cover the cost of
lending funds.
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Table 5.2: Descriptive Statistics: Full Sample
Variable Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Growth rate of real GDP per capita 1306 2.35 2.67 4.70 -30.32 35.72
Personal remittances, received (% of GDP) 1204 4.34 1.96 6.48 0.001 49.29
Remittances inflows to GDP ratio (LN) 1204 0.36 0.67 1.83 -6.72 3.90
Human Development Index 1231 0.64 0.66 0.13 0.30 0.89
Nominal exchange rate (per US$, period averag) (LN) 1258 2.97 3.05 3.05 -10.43 9.99
Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %) 1310 31.61 6.77 230.39 -27.21 6261.24
Net Barter terms of trade index 1093 112 101.83 34.53 43.88 290.90
Financial development index 842 41.53 33.14 30.65 5.02 223.29
Real interest rate (%) 1069 7.22 5.92 11.78 -70.43 93.94
Central Bank policy rate (%) (LN) 388 1.99 1.87 0.83 -0.69 5.21
Interest rate spread (%) 1035 11.32 5.51 77.35 -72.40 2334.96
Broad money (% of GDP) (LN) 1183 3.68 3.66 0.61 1.91 5.63
Crude oil, Brendt (World price, nominal $) 1377 47.66 28.85 33.24 12.72 111.97
U.S. interest rate (%) 1377 3.88 3.54 1.96 1.16 7.19
Growth rate of U.S. real GDP per capita 1377 1.39 1.61 1.55 -3.62 3.49
5.4.2 Panel Unit Root Results
Within time series or panel data it is important to explore the order of variable
integration. The status of stationarity can help in fitting the correct model and
estimate the correct coefficients. There are advantages in using panel data-based unit
root tests over individual time series unit root tests. First, they have more statistical
power than their univariate counterparts. Within a panel setting, the Augmented
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) is more suited in identifying stationarity with more panels.
Secondly, panel unit roots allow for country specific effects (fixed effects) as well as
time variations in the parameters across panels. Furthermore, several other panel unit
root tests are reported including the Phillips-Perron (PP), Levin, Lin and Chu (LLC),
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Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS) and Breitung (BR) tests. The results from Table 5.3 are
consistent with the ADF, PP, LLC and IPS tests show that apart, from the level of
Remittance inflows, the world crude oil price, and the log of real GDP per capita, all
variables are integrated of order I(0). Therefore, the log of remittance inflows and the
growth rate of real GDP per capita are used for the panel VAR estimations. The
world crude oil price is used as exogenous variable and has been transformed to an
I(0) variable through the first difference process. The Breitung test reveals that the
majority of variables except FDI, Broad money supply, Inflation, real GDP per capita
growth rate, US interest rate, and the US GDP growth rate are insignificant and not
I(0).
Table 5.3: Panel unit root tests
REM LNREM LNNEE LNBM
Level
ADF 105.600 144.785(**) 351.622(***) 90.855
PP 109.843 199.108(***) 344.123(***) 114.332(**)
LLC -3.543(***) -4.801(***) 120.394(***) -2.752(***)
IPS -1.151 -2.914(**) -1.803(**) 1.119
BR -0.120 1.224 0.905 0.618(***)
LNCBPR INF USRG CROIL
Level
ADF 56.448 299.976(***) 275.442(***) 18.238
PP 69.511(***) 460.745(***) 346.912(***) 18.238
LLC -4.093 (***) -56.670(***) -5.143(***) 11.411
IPS -0.293(***) -22.353(***) -10.201(***) 6.502
BR -1.22(***) -6.403(***) -17.237(***) 10.114
Notes: Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and the Phillips Perron (PP)
statistics reported are based on the chi-square statistic. The Levin, Lin and
Chu (LLC) test reports a standard t-statistic, the Im, Pesaran and Shin
reports the W-statistic and the Breitung (BR) test reports the t-statistic.
For all unit root tests the null hypothesis confirms the presence of a unit
root against the alternative which states that there is no unit root. All variables
are described in Table 1. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** shows
significance at the 5% level, and * denotes significance at the 10% level.
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5.4.3 Variance Decomposition Analysis
The use of variance decompositions of remittances, the monetary policy rate and real
GDP per capita growth enables the separation of an endogenous variable into the
component shocks of the PVAR. Thus, variance decompositions provide information
about the relative importance of each random innovation in the PVAR and how it can
affect the variables in the system. Before examining the impulse response functions it
is important to analyse the variance decompositions of LNREM, LNNEE and
RGDPCG. The variance decompositon tables for the full sample and the regional
samples are reported in Appendix E. Tables E.1 to E.3 in Appendix E report the
variance decompositions for the full sample whilst Tables E.4 to E.1822 report the
regional variance decompositions. Table E.1 reports the results using the first
Cholesky ordering system (LNREM, LNNEE, RGDPCG) whilst Tables E.2 to E.3 use
the second Cholesky ordering system (LNNEE, LNREM, RGDPCG). What we
observe from the results in Table E.1 that remittance inflows explain greater variation
in the nominal exchange rate in comparison to real GDP per capita. In the short run,
that is at a one year horizon time period, a shock to the nominal exchange rate
(LNNEE) accounts for 98.928 percent variation in the fluctuation in LNNEE (own
shock). Furthermore, a shock to remittance inflows causes a 1.072 percentage
fluctuation in the nominal exchange rate. However, the shock to remittances inflows
has a diminishing effect on the nominal exchange rate in the long term as the growth
of real GDP per capita has a larger impact on the nominal exchange rate over the long
term.
Table E.1 reports the variance decompositions of the growth rate of real GDP per capita
which shows in the short term (one year horizon), a shock to the nominal exchange
rate causes a 2.244 percentage fluctuation in the growth rate of Real GDP per capita.
However, this effect is diminishing over the long term as in the fourth year period we
see that a shock to remittance inflows cause a 2.362 percentage fluctuation. Table E.2
22Tables E.1 to E.18 report point estimates with the standard errors represented in parentheses. The standard errors
are calculated using 100 Monte Carlo repetitions
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displays the variance decompositions of remittance inflows which is completely explained
by the variable itself in the short term. However, the medium to long term effects show
that the nominal exchange rate and the growth rate of real GDP per capita have a
greater effect compared to the short term. Table E.2 shows that a shock to remittance
inflows has a smaller impact on the nominal exchange rate in comparison with Table E.1.
This is due to placement of remittance inflows in the second position of the Cholesky
ordering system.
There is evidence that the results from the regional variance decompositions differ from
the full sample. Most notably, the variance decompositions in the Asian for LNNEE
show the variance in the real GDP per capita growth variable is influenced greatly by
a shock in the nominal exchange rate.
5.4.4 Panel VAR IRF Analysis
The analysis section is structured according to the full dataset of countries, the period
after the financial crisis for the full dataset, Europe, Africa, Middle East and North
Africa (MENA), Latin America, and Asian samples. The data samples cover the same
annual time period from 1990-2016 except for the post financial crisis dataset which
covers the period from 2007-2016. This section presents the corresponding impulse
response functions with the various models for each region. The impulse response
functions and the panel VAR models are computed using the Eviews software. The
impulse response function (IRF) analysis enables this chapter to analyse the impact of
shocks to the models identified in Section 5.3.3. This chapter uses the Cholesky ordering
of endogenous variables as specified in equation (14). The reasoning behind this order
follows that remittances is selected first on the basis that it has an immediate impact on
the other two variables (nominal exchange rate and Real GDP per capita growth rate)
in the PVAR system. The following variable in the system (nominal exchange rate) has
the second greatest impact on the other two variables in the PVAR system (Remittances
and the growth rate of Real GDP per capita). For purposes of this study the scenario of
a one unit positive shock to the nominal exchange rate (monetary policy rate variable)
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is used which is the same as a nominal depreciation in the domestic currency and is
therefore viewed as an expansionary monetary policy scenario. Similarly included are
the robustness check scenarios which include the broad money supply and the Central
Bank policy rate. A one unit positive shock in the broad money supply is termed an
expansionary monetary policy and conversely a one unit positive shock in the Central
Bank policy rate resonates as a contractionary monetary policy.
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5.4.4.1 Full sample IRF
Model 1: Endogenous variables: LNREM, LNNEE, RGDPCG
Figure 5.1: Shocks to the nominal exchange rate - Model 1 (Full sample)
Figure 5.2: Shocks to remittance inflows - Model 1 (Full sample)
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Model 2: Endogenous variables: LNREM, LNBM, RGDPCG
Figure 5.3: Shocks to the broad money supply - Model 2 (Full sample)
Figure 5.4: Shocks to remittance inflows - Model 2 (Full sample)
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Model 3: Endogenous variables: LNREM, LNCBPR, RGDPCG
Figure 5.5: Shocks to the central bank policy rate - Model 3 (Full sample)
Figure 5.6: Shocks to remittance inflows - Model 3 (Full sample)
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Model 1: Endogenous variables: LNREM, LNNEE, RGDPCG
Figure 5.7: Shocks to the nominal exchange rate (Accumulated responses) - Model 1 (Full sample)
Figure 5.8: Shocks to remittance inflows (Accumulated responses) - Model 1 (Full sample)
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Model 4: Endogenous variables: SDREM, LNNEE, RGDPCG
Figure 5.9: Shocks to the nominal exchange rate - Model 4 (Full sample)
Figure 5.10: Shocks to the volatility of remittance inflows - Model 4 (Full sample)
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5.4.4.2 Regional results
5.4.4.2 (a) Asia
Model 1: Endogenous variables: LNREM, LNNEE, RGDPCG 
Exogenous variables: CROIL
Figure 5.11: Shocks to the nominal exchange rate - Model 1 (Asia sample)
Figure 5.12: Shocks to remittance inflows - Model 1 (Asia sample)
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Model 2: Endogenous variables: LNREM, LNBM, RGDPCG
Figure 5.13: Shocks to the broad money supply - Model 2 (Asia sample)
Figure 5.14: Shocks to remittance inflows - Model 2 (Asia sample)
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Model 3: Endogenous variables: LNREM, LNCBPR, RGDPCG
Figure 5.15: Shocks to the central bank policy rate - Model 3 (Asia sample)
Figure 5.16: Shocks to remittance inflows - Model 3 (Asia sample)
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Model 1: Endogenous variables: LNREM, LNNEE, RGDPCG
Figure 5.17: Shocks to the nominal exchange rate (Accumulated responses) - Model 1 (Asia sample)
Figure 5.18: Shocks to remittance inflows (Accumulated responses) - Model 1 (Asia sample)
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Model 4: Endogenous variables: SDREM, LNNEE, RGDPCG
Figure 5.19: Shocks to the nominal exchange rate - Model 4 (Asia sample)
Figure 5.20: Shocks to the volatility of remittance inflows - Model 4 (Asia sample)
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5.4.4.2 (b) Europe
Model 1: Endogenous variables: LNREM, LNNEE, RGDPCG
Figure 5.21: Shocks to the nominal exchange rate - Model 1 (Europe sample)
Figure 5.22: Shocks to remittance inflows - Model 1 (Europe sample)
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Model 2: Endogenous variables: LNREM, LNBM, RGDPCG
Figure 5.23: Shocks to the broad money supply - Model 2 (Europe sample)
Figure 5.24: Shocks to remittance inflows - Model 2 (Europe sample)
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Model 3: Endogenous variables: LNREM, LNCBPR, RGDPCG
Figure 5.25: Shocks to the central bank policy rate - Model 3 (Europe sample)
Figure 5.26: Shocks to remittance inflows- Model 3 (Europe sample)
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Model 1: Endogenous variables: LNREM, LNNEE, RGDPCG
Figure 5.27: Shocks to the nominal exchange rate (Accumulated responses) - Model 1 (Europe sample)
Figure 5.28: Shocks to remittance inflows (Accumulated responses) - Model 1 (Europe sample)
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Model 4: Endogenous variables: SDREM, LNNEE, RGDPCG
Figure 5.29: Shocks to the nominal exchange rate - Model 4 (Europe sample)
Figure 5.30: Shocks to the volatility of remittance inflows - Model 4 (Europe sample)
166
5.4.4.2 (c) Africa
Model 1: Endogenous variables: LNREM, LNNEE, RGDPCG 
Exogenous variables: CROIL
Figure 5.31: Shocks to the nominal exchange rate - Model 1 (Africa sample)
Figure 5.32: Shocks to remittance inflows - Model 1 (Africa sample) 
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Model 2: Endogenous variables: LNREM, LNBM, RGDPCG
Figure 5.33: Shocks to the broad money supply - Model 2 (Africa sample)
Figure 5.34: Shocks to remittance inflows - Model 2 (Africa sample)
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Model 3: Endogenous variables: LNREM, LNCBPR, RGDPCG
Figure 5.35: Shocks to the central bank policy rate - Model 3 (Africa sample)
Figure 5.36: Shocks to remittance inflows - Model 3 (Africa sample)
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Model 1: Endogenous variables: LNREM, LNNEE, RGDPCG
Figure 5.37: Shocks to the nominal exchange rate (Accumulated responses) - Model 1 (Africa sample)
Figure 5.38: Shocks to remittance inflows (Accumulated responses) - Model 1 (Africa sample)
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Model 4: Endogenous variables: SDREM, NEE, RGDPCG
Figure 5.39: Shocks to the nominal exchange rate - Model 4 (Africa sample)
Figure 5.40: Shocks to the volatility of remittance inflows - Model 4 (Africa sample)
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5.4.4.2 (d) MENA
Model 1: Endogenous variables: LNREM, LNNEE, RGDPCG 
Exogenous variables: FD
Figure 5.41: Shocks to the nominal exchange rate - Model 1 (MENA sample)
Figure 5.42: Shocks to remittance inflows - Model 1 (MENA sample)
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Model 2: Endogenous variables: LNREM, LNBM, RGDPCG
Figure 5.43: Shocks to the broad money supply - Model 2 (MENA sample)
Figure 5.44: Shocks to remittance inflows - Model 2 (MENA sample)
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Model 3: Endogenous variables: LNREM, LNCBPR, RGDPCG
Figure 5.45: Shocks to the central bank policy rate - Model 3 (MENA sample)
Figure 5.46: Shocks to remittance inflows - Model 3 (MENA sample)
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Model 1: Endogenous variables: LNREM, LNNEE, RGDPCG
Figure 5.47: Shocks to the nominal exchange rate (Accumulated responses) - Model 1 (MENA sample)
Figure 5.48: Shocks to remittance inflows (Accumulated responses) - Model 1 (MENA sample)
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Model 4: Endogenous variables: SDREM, LNNEE, RGDPCG
Figure 5.49: Shocks to the nominal exchange rate - Model 4 (MENA sample)
Figure 5.50: Shocks to the volatility of remittance inflows - Model 4 (MENA sample)
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5.4.4.2 (e) Latin America
Model 1: Endogenous variables: LNREM, LNNEE, RGDPCG 
Exogenous variables: USRG
Figure 5.51: Shocks to the nominal exchange rate - Model 1 (Latin America sample)
Figure 5.52: Shocks to remittance inflows - Model 1 (Latin America sample)
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Model 2: Endogenous variables: LNREM, LNBM, RGDPCG
Figure 5.53: Shocks to the broad money supply - Model 2 (Latin America sample)
Figure 5.54: Shocks to remittance inflows - Model 2 (Latin America sample)
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Model 3: Endogenous variables: LNREM, LNCBPR, RGDPCG
Figure 5.55: Shocks to the central bank policy rate - Model 3 (Latin America sample)
Figure 5.56: Shocks to remittance inflows - Model 3 (Latin America sample)
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Model 1: Endogenous variables: LNREM, LNNEE, RGDPCG
Figure 5.57: Shocks to the nominal exchange rate (Accumulated responses) - Model 1 (Latin America 
sample)
Figure 5.58: Shocks to remittance inflows (Accumulated responses) - Model 1 (Latin America sample)
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Model 4: Endogenous variables: SDREM, LNNEE, RGDPCG
Figure 5.59: Shocks to remittance inflows - Model 4 (Latin America sample)
Figure 5.60: Shocks to the volatility of remittance inflows - Model 4 (Latin America sample)
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5.4.5 Analysis and Discussion
The empirical analysis consists of results from the full sample and the other regional
samples ranging from Figure 5.1 to Figure 5.60. Each Figure contains four IRF panels
corresponding to alternating variables. Panels (a) and (c) refer to the first Cholesky
ordering system whilst panels (b) and (d) refer to the second Cholesky ordering system
as described in Section 5.3.3.
The full sample and other regional results provide comprehensive graphical analysis from
Figure 5.1 to Figure 5.60 using the same model with exclusively the three endogenous
variables (LNREM, LNNEE, RGDPCG) and the regional results use different exogenous
variables (USRG, CROIL and FD). The PVAR IRF’s cover the shocks of the three
alternative monetary policy rate variables (LNNEE, LNBM and LNCBPR), LNREM
and SDREM (Remittances volatility variable). Panels (a) and (c) in Figure 5.1 show
the Cholesky Impulse Response functions for the full sample for the real GDP per capita
growth rate and remittance inflows variables in response to a one-unit positive shock
to the nominal exchange rate which is a nominal depreciation in the domestic currency.
Similarly, panels (b) and (d) correspond to the same variables but with the use of the
second Cholesky ordering system.
The accumulated response functions are shown from Figures 5.7 and 5.8 to provide the
accumulated impact of the variables over the full-time period. Panels (a) and (b) in
Figure 5.1 provide similar results and show the positive response of the growth of real
GDP per capita to a shock in the nominal exchange rate. These findings imply that
a nominal depreciation in the exchange rate will provide a more competitive economy
in the world whilst remittances will improve over time only if properly anticipated.
If properly anticipated, remittances can serve as automatic stabilisers and be used as
a potential substitute for monetary policy. This result corroborates the findings by
Singer (2010) who argues that in a trilemma policy framework, remittances can act as a
substitute for monetary independence by performing the countercyclical and stabilising
properties whilst allowing economies to implement fixed exchange rate regimes. Panels
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(c) in Figure 5.1 shows there is a small impact on the IRF whilst panel (d) shows a
greater positive impact over the short. However if we focus on Figure 5.7 (panel (d)) the
accumulated impulse response function for remittances displays a positive trend over
time with the standard confidence intervals showing there is more error in the values
as the time period increases. This scenario shows that the nominal depreciation in the
currency could be beneficial for the country in the long run as is evident by focusing on
panels (a) and (b).
Figure 5.2 shows the impulse response functions of a positive shock to remittance inflows
on the nominal exchange rate and the growth rate of real GDP per capita. Firstly, from
observing Figure 5.2 we can see that the nominal exchange rate (panels (c) and (d))
reacts negatively to a positive shock in the short run whilst fluctuating up and down
in the medium to long term. The decrease in the value of the nominal exchange rate
is the equivalent to an appreciation of the exchange rate. The accumulated response
function in Figure 5.8 only partially supports this result with respect to the second
ordering system in panel (d) which could result in the increase in remittance inflows to
cause a Dutch Disease effect. Panels (a) and (b) in Figure 5.2 shows the evolution of
the output of the economy which illustrates that remittances provide a sharp increase
in economic growth whilst the curve continues to increase in the 10 year period.
Figures 5.3 and 5.4 employ Model 2 which uses a different monetary policy rate in the
form of broad money supply. As it is expansionary monetary policy scenario the results
for the PVARs partially corroborate the results for the results of Model 1. However,
If we focus on Figure 5.3 we can see the variable response of RGDPCG to the money
supply (LNBM) is fluctuating with the graph experiencing positive and negative spikes
from period 1 to period 4 and only stabilising after period 6. The results in panels
(c) and (d) reveal that a positive shock to the money supply will lead to a short term
increase in remittance inflows. Figure 5.4 shows the effects on RGDPCG and LNBM
to a positive shock on remittance inflows. Panels (a) and (b) provide similar results to
those in Model 1, whilst we see a rise in money supply in panels (c) and (d) in the short
term but a subsequent balance to normal levels in the medium to long run. This result
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does follow the results obtained through the regional analysis as is evident from Asia
(Figure 5.14), Europe (Figure 5.24), Africa (Figure 5.34), with the exception of MENA
(Figure 5.44) and Latin America (Figure 5.54). The impact of remittance inflows in
these regions is likely to promote the availability of finance to the private sector, increase
deposits and money supply.
Figures 5.5 and 5.6 use Model 3 which uses the Central Bank policy rate as the different
monetary policy rate variable. The one-unit positive shock to the Central Bank policy
rate variable is termed as a contractionary monetary policy simulation. Figure 5.5 shows
there is a negative response of remittances following a positive shock to LNCBPR.
However if we focus on Asia (Figure 5.15), Africa (Figure 5.35) and Latin America
(Figure 5.55) we see that there is a positive response of remittances following a positive
shock to LNCBPR. A higher interest rate policy could be more prevalent in developing
economies who suffer from high inflation. Siegfried and Schiopu (2006) stipulate that a
larger real interest rate differential between foreign and home rates should attract more
remittance inflows as migrants consider borrowing more risky and are more likely to
seek finance via remittances. Figure 5.6 shows that a shock to remittance inflows on
the Central Bank policy rate is positive and this is more pronounced with Asia, MENA
and Latin America.
Model 4 uses the volatility of remittance inflows as alternative endogenous variable
and gathers information from the PVARs in Figures 5.9 and 5.10 regarding the effects
on the volatility of remittance inflows following a shock in the monetary policy rate.
Figure 5.9 shows that the volatility of remittance inflows is stable following a nominal
depreciation of the exchange rate which is a realistic scenario since we expect remittances
to increase when there is a nominal depreciation of the domestic currency. This is in
line with the standard theory of remitting behaviour of households following a nominal
depreciation of the exchange rate. This finding is consistent with the coefficient results
that remittance volatility tends to reduce monetary policy riskiness. The ability of
remittances to dampen macroeconomic risk originates from its low procyclical nature,
increasing stability and size relative to other forms of private capital flows (Craigwell
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et al., 2010). Thus, it can be deduced that remittances expressed in the sending country
currency increases with the depreciation of the currency located in receiving country.
The stable IRF in Figure 5.9 (Panels (c) and (d)) can also be explained by other factors
such as capital flows which are more sensitive to drastic currency changes for a dollarised
economy. Remittances can negate the short-term exchange rate movements which affect
capital flow movements between countries which are pegged to the dollar likewise for the
dataset used in the analysis. South Asian economies primarily are the most responsive
in the developing world to take advantage of depreciating currencies as is evident by the
IRFs in Figure 5.19 Figure 5.20 represents the effects of a positive shock in the volatility
of remittance inflows on the nominal exchange rate in the Asian sample. The IRF shows
that there is a nominal appreciation of the currency in the receiving country in panel
(c) which verifies the evolution of the IRF reported in Figure 5.9 for the full sample.
Given that this trend is observed it can be concluded that an increase in remittance
volatility can put an upward pressure on the domestic nominal exchange rate which
may cause a loss in international competitiveness. Moreover, Figure 5.10 shows the
response function of the growth rate of real GDP per capita that shows an increase
in the volatility of remittance inflows is more positive and significant for panel (a) in
comparison to panel (b).
The PVAR IRF’s for the Asian and African regions uses additional variables to the
baseline specification. The exogenous variable (CROIL) used is the world Brent crude
oil price. The reasoning for the inclusion is based on the selection of countries like
Nigeria who produce around 1.5 million barrels per day as of September 2016.
Therefore, to account for dependencies on the price of crude oil it is important to
reflect these changes in the PVAR model specification. The MENA sample considers
financial development (FD) as an exogenous variable to account for the growing
financial sector within countries like Oman and its neighbouring countries like the
United Arab Emirates where many migrants are located. Model 1, for the Latin
American region uses the growth rate of U.S. real GDP per capita (USRG) as the
exogenous variable in the model. The USRG is applicable in this case because the
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primary destination for migrants in the Latin American region is the United States
which can determine the existing endogenous variables in the model. The results show
variability between regions as Asia, MENA, Africa and Latin America show a small
increase in the level of remittance inflows following a nominal depreciation of the
exchange rate which is line with the current literature.
In order to interpret these results, the mechanisms through which remittances affect
key macroeconomic variables like output and the nominal exchange rate need to be
fully understood. Moreover, the effect of remittances in developing economies should
be analysed through the spending effect. This is explained by the Salter-Swan-Corden-
Dornbusch paradigm which offers insight into the relationship between the price level,
remittances and the real exchange rate in developing economies. The model shows that
an increase in remittances (as in the PVAR IRFs) could cause an appreciation of the real
exchange rate, via rising domestic prices. Lartey et al. (2012) develop a micro-founded
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model which aims to explain the rise in the price
level when remittances increase. They consider a transmission mechanism which follows
that an increase in household income (due to the rise in remittance inflows) results in a
decrease in the labour supply. The effect of a diminishing labour supply is linked with
higher wages in terms of the price of the tradable output. Furthermore, this leads to
higher production costs, resulting into further contraction of the tradable sector. What
we can observe whilst examining the cross regional differences are that Asia, Africa and
Latin America are less affected by changes in the nominal exchange rate. The results
within these regions could be explained by the large amount of altruistic remittances
sent by migrant workers to their home country.
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5.5 Conclusion
Remittance continue to provide a crucial role in the global economy where developing
countries are ever more reliant on these alternative sources as a means for the
development and the eradication of poverty. The implications for macroeconomic
policy are widespread and this chapter aims to shed further light on the interactions of
monetary policy on the level of remittances and economic growth.
This chapter finds a complex web of relationships between remittances, monetary
policy and economic growth. Notably, a depreciation in the domestic currency causes
an increase in the level of remittances for the full dataset and for the other regional
sub samples with the exception of MENA. Furthermore, an increase in remittance
volatility is associated with a stable response of the monetary policy rate and an
increase in the value of remittances is associated with an appreciation of the domestic
currency. Moreover, the African and Latin American results reveal that the presence
of remittances causes the central bank policy rate (LNCBPR) to become downward
biased; in other words, this resonates that an increase in the inflows of remittances
causes reductions in domestic policy rates, thereby reducing financial costs. This
result is significant for governments in the developing world since it is important to
acknowledge that remittances can reduce macroeconomic fluctuations. However, if a
country is too dependent on them there could be loss in international competitiveness
in the long run. These findings imply the positive response of economic growth
following a rise in remittances in the short term which asserts that one of the ways
that developing countries can reduce monetary policy riskiness is to pursue policies
that facilitate greater flow of remittances. Likewise, such policies should be focused on
reducing the costs of sending and receiving remittances. Innovative financial products
like mobile phone based money like M-Pesa in Kenya and other African markets are a
prime example.
The scenario of an expansionary monetary policy is conducted to provide a realistic
simulation of a typical developing country macroeconomic policy. This type of policy
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engineers a positive increase in the level of remittances as is evident from the
accumulated impulse response functions. This result is of interest to policymakers and
relevant to formulating monetary policy for governments in the developing world.
Central banks in both the developing world should factor in the behaviour of
remittances accordingly and may have to think about promoting other sources of
incentives for workers to achieve their policy outcomes. The findings in this chapter
are robust to alternative specifications including the level of financial development
whilst estimating separate PVARs for each regional sub sample. In conclusion, this
chapter offers a different perspective on earlier findings, whilst offering newer insights
into the link between macroeconomic stability and migrant remittances. Furthermore,
this chapter extends the literature on international capital flows and macroeconomic
stability by using a panel vector approach on domestic monetary phenomena.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
This chapter concludes the thesis and presents the author’s final thoughts and
summarises the contributions of the research; the findings of the empirical chapters;
the originality of the work in the literature; the significance of the research and the
key policy implications from the research. The thesis provides an extensive
macroeconomic analysis of remittances in developing economies. A comprehensive
outlook on the macroeconomic effects of remittances is investigated whilst capturing
the impact of financial development in developing economies. Remittances continue to
play a dominant role in developing countries and are increasingly becoming a source of
development finance. Furthermore, the impact of remittances on fiscal policy and
fiscal cyclicality is investigated in part to explain how remittance inflows are a factor
for fiscal policy to be procyclical in these countries. A number of interesting features
of developing markets have been revealed resulting from underdeveloped and
noncompetitive financial systems and low institutional quality.
6.1 Summaries of Empirical Chapters
Chapter 3 addresses how remittances influence the cyclicality of fiscal policy in
developing economies. The analysis from the chapter reveals that remittance inflows
cause fiscal policy to be procyclical for every region including the full sample with the
exception of Africa in the study. Moreover, the purpose of this chapter is to fill the
gap in the literature in providing an alternative focus on how fiscal policy can be
influenced over the fiscal cycle. Chapter 3 focuses on the relationship between
remittance inflows, household decisions and the government.
The proceeding chapter analyses the relationship between remittances and financial
development whilst exploring how these variables could influence economic growth in
developing economies. The research questions addressed shows that in all regions
189
remittances and financial sector development complement each other with the
exception of Europe and Asia. Furthermore, the results are robust to alternative
specifications of the monetary policy variable and show that remittances promote
economic growth with countries that are less financially developed. Moreover, the
results are robust to a long-term specification of remittances on economic growth.
Chapter 5 investigates how the effectiveness of monetary policy influences remittance
inflows in developing economies. The use of PVAR analysis enables this chapter to
focus on the dynamics of monetary policy and remittances. The chapter finds that a
nominal depreciation in the exchange rate has a positive impact on economic growth
for the full sample. Furthermore, the results confirm that there is a positive response
in economic output for the full sample following a rise in remittances in the short-term.
Moreover, the Africa and Latin American regions reveal that the central bank policy
rate is downwardly biased following a potential increase in remittances.
6.2 Contributions and Implications of the Study
This research examines how developing economies can understand the significance of
remittance inflows with the use of empirical models presented in the previous chapters of
this thesis. The purpose of this chapter is to shed light on potential policy implications
for countries that receive significant flows of remittances based on the various models,
facts and empirical evidence presented in the preceding chapters.
The specific findings of the previous chapters are widespread and show the variability
of results depending on each region. However, it should be noted that the results
could be improved with better measurement of the remittances variable. The correct
measurement of the remittances variable is essential when estimating their impact on
macroeconomic policy. Regarding the measure used in this thesis, the variable known
as workers’ remittances in the data source obtained from the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators database is currently the best measure of remittances. The
complexities of remittances as a variable has added to the increasingly difficult task of
policymakers in developing countries. It is clear that remittances from migrant
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workers exert positive benefits to the welfare of households that receive them, and
should be encouraged or at a minimum not discouraged. The primary challenge, in
general terms, is to design policies that promote remittances and increase their
benefits whilst limiting their costs or counterproductive side effects. There are several
ways in which this objective can be achieved to overcome this challenge. First, in
regards to tax policy, remittance inflows should not be taxed directly. In doing so this
limits remittance activity and increases the transaction costs for the migrant worker
whereby the next alternative would be to divert these flows from formal to informal
channels. Furthermore, welfare losses are experienced when net transfers to recipients
are reduced which dampens the ability of remittances to alleviate poverty. On the
other hand, other measures including a consumption based-tax, already prominent in
many developing countries is considered to be the most efficient way for governments
to maximise the benefits of remittances. The benefits of remittance inflows extend to
households whilst accounting for the government to finance its budgetary
expenditures. The added benefit of a consumption tax is related to the fact that these
flows are not exacerbating the labour-leisure trade-off incentives of remittances. This
is why developing countries should move towards consumption based tax system
rather than the labour based system in order to minimise the negative effects on
economic growth and to minimise the distortions to fiscal and monetary policy.
6.3 Limitations of the Study
The contributions, the significance and the relevance of the research has been discussed
in the preceding sections in this chapter. However, a few caveats need to be reviewed
in regard to the whole study.
Firstly, the limited data on remittances has hindered the research in gaining a wider
range of analysis by including more developing countries. Furthermore, it should be
understood that the features of remittances which provide economic benefits are also
potential pitfalls. These aspects of remittances need to be understood and managed
correctly by developing economies. Moreover, the collection of primary data was
191
excluded due to the difficulty in obtaining enough funding for further data on the
patterns of remittance inflows. In the case of all empirical chapters, the data series
spans a long period of time (from 1990-2016), which in all likelihood could have been
influenced by various policy regimes and governments in these developing countries.
Thus, for Chapter 3 the robustness in the results could be improved by subsampling
by using quarterly data. The use of quarterly data is not possible as the data on
remittances is limited but this technique could have provided allowance of country
specific conditions across the time period.
By investigating how remittances influences the relationship between financial
development and economic growth the thesis evaluates several robustness tests in
relation to the methodology. The use of four different regression models including the
fixed effects or random effects model and three different D-GMM models. These
models depend on the financial development variable to allow for more reliable results.
However, the results could be improved by evaluating the effects of the financial crisis
on the results by using structural breaks in the methodology.
Chapter 5 provides a comprehensive understanding of how remittances behave in the
presence of domestic monetary policy shocks along with other macroeconomic shocks.
With the use of impulse response analysis and the Cholesky innovations the study
allows shocks to be generated which can vary according to the ordering of variables.
However, to improve the effectiveness of this technique, cross country analysis needs to
be researched between countries in the same region. This method would provide greater
insight into the differences among these countries.
6.4 Areas for Further Research
The findings obtained in this research lend themselves to branches of further study in
remittances. Remittance inflows provide a continued source of income for many
households in developing economies. Therefore it is of upmost importance for
policymakers in developing countries to continue research of remittances. The findings
192
presented in this research confirm that there is a significant association between
remittance inflows and financial development. In particular there is a long run
relationship between remittances, financial development and economic growth with
the exception of the European and Asian results. This indicates that transaction costs
of sending remittances should be lowered to encourage a larger share of remittances to
flow through formal financial channels.
In future, policies should be designed to established more appropriate channels through
which remittances are received in these countries which will enhance the functioning of
their financial systems. The findings in this thesis, however, do not give insight into all
channels through which remittances can influence the financial sector. Furthermore, this
thesis does not explore other possible characteristics of the financial sector in greater
detail. This includes the institutional aspects through which the financial sector can
limit informal channels and hence transaction costs. The significance of this area of the
financial sector has seen greater interest in recent years. For example, the introduction
of cell phone encryption technology has enabled greater facilitation of low-cost money
transfers between OECD countries, the recipient countries in Africa and the Philippines.
This technology enables the reduction in transaction costs in terms of fees and time for
both money transmission operators such as Western Union and Moneygram and other
banks. Future research should aim to focus on this area in greater detail whilst assessing
the various formal and informal channels of remittances in developing countries whilst
evaluating the progress of financial development. The availability of the quality of
remittances is a key feature in determining the individual characteristics of remittances
and how these flows can lead to economic growth in some regions over other regions.
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Appendices
for the RegionalAppendix A: Descriptive Statistics 
Samples
Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics: Asia Dataset
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Year 250 2002 7.23 1990 2014
Country 250 28.6 16.59 3 50
Output Gap 250 0.005 0.07 -0.25 0.34
Remittances (% of GDP) 220 5.97 8.58 0.098 49.59
Government consumption expenditure (% of GDP) 248 10.17 3.63 4.05 30.12
Tax Revenue (% of GDP) 150 12.20 3.29 0.04 25.56
Polity Democracy 248 1.10 6.17 -7 9
Net Barter terms of trade index 208 99.19 23.39 53.97 198.03
Net official development assistance 235 2.40 2.89 -0.69 16.05
and official aid received (NODA)
Population ages 15-64 (%) 250 62.21 5.22 51.77 72.40
Real GDP per capita (ln) 250 6.76 0.65 5.33 8.15
Remittances x Outputgap 220 0.034 0.31 -0.55 2.18
Foreign Direct Investment 242 3.20 5.72 -2.76 45.15
Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics: Latin America Dataset
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Year 250 2002 7.23 1990 2014
Country 250 19 14.60 2 49
Output Gap 250 0.001 0.04 -0.21 0.23
Remittances (% of GDP) 250 2.03 3.79 0.00013 21.56
Government consumption expenditure (% of GDP) 249 13.0072 3.33 2.98 20.34
Tax Revenue (% of GDP) 119 13.57 3.08 -0.19 22.30
Polity Democracy 250 6.32 4.50 -6 10
Net Barter terms of trade index 240 109.29 33.36 50.98 262.09
Net official development assistance 240 1.01 2.49 -0.60 16.04
and official aid received (NODA)
Population ages 15-64 (%) 250 62.28 3.72 51.14 68.90
Real GDP per capita (ln) 250 8.31 0.53 7.036 9.20
Remittances x Outputgap 250 -0.00075 0.13 -0.48 1.17
Foreign Direct Investment 246 3.44 2.74 -0.78 17.13
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Table A.3: Descriptive Statistics: Africa Dataset
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Year 225 2002 7.23 1990 2014
Country 225 27.44 14.81 7 48
Output Gap 225 0.003 0.03 -0.14 0.17
Remittances (% of GDP) 205 2.09 2.76 0.016 13.043
Government consumption expenditure (% of GDP) 223 13.55 3.62 4.83 20.89
Tax Revenue (% of GDP) 101 14.35 6.05 0.91 27.60
Polity Democracy 225 2.18 5.42 -8 9
Net Barter terms of trade index 216 115.63 31.64 43.88 225.96
Net official development assistance 212 7.41 5.89 0.21 30.22
and official aid received (NODA)
Population ages 15-64 (%) 225 53.42 3.74 47.91 65.45
GDP per capita (ln) 225 6.62 0.80 5.29 8.71
Remittances x Outputgap 205 0.0096 0.091 -0.26 0.61
Foreign Direct Investment 218 2.15 2.012 -2.07 10.83
Table A.4: Descriptive Statistics: Europe Dataset
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Year 325 2002 7.22 1990 2014
Country 325 27.85 10.74 6 47
Output Gap 281 0.001 0.06 -0.26 0.34
Remittances (% of GDP) 240 4.05 6.70 0.058 34.50
Government consumption expenditure (% of GDP) 275 18.70 3.11 10.25 27.84
Tax Revenue (% of GDP) 158 22.06 13.03 8.41 65.90
Polity Democracy 315 7.64 3.62 -7 10
Net Barter terms of trade index 178 100.75 7.12 87.13 136.52
Net official development assistance 203 1.62 2.91 0.003 17.34
and official aid received (NODA)
Population ages 15-64 (%) 301 67.62 2.41 59.20 74.32
Real GDP per capita (ln) 281 8.59 0.85 6.35 9.95
Remittances x Outputgap 238 0.022 0.36 -1.19 2.35
Foreign Direct Investment 266 4.62 6.61 -20.21 50.97
Table A.5: Descriptive Statistics: MENA Dataset
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Year 225 2002 7.23 1990 2014
Country 225 26.78 15.31 1 51
Output Gap 210 -0.001 0.04 -0.29 0.16
Remittances (% of GDP) 184 7.34 7.90 0.0015 26.68
Government consumption expenditure (% of GDP) 209 16.78 7.64 4.84 76.22
Tax Revenue (% of GDP) 135 12.53 9.00 -0.01 45.25
Polity Democracy 225 -4.36 3.78 -10 6
Net Barter terms of trade index 164 125.33 43.85 50.93 252.81
Net official development assistance 189 2.86 3.48 -0.04 24.12
and official aid received (NODA)
Population ages 15-64 (%) 225 59.68 6.97 45.71 76.36
Real GDP per capita (ln) 210 7.89 1.21 6.085 10.49
Remittances x Outputgap 182 -0.067 0.38 -2.31 1.17
Foreign Direct Investment 197 2.65 4.096 -5.11 23.54
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Appendix B: Kalman Filter Weights and MLE
The financial development index has been obtained by applying the Kalman filter to
the panel dataset. The procedure is described in greater detail below and shows the
Kalman Filter weights assigned to the various financial development measures. The
primary purpose of the Kalman filter is to use observable variables of a temporal series
to reconstitute the value of the non-observable variables. The Kalman filter is used
within a state space model as described in Equations (7) and (8). The Kalman Filter
is used for two main purposes. Firstly, to estimate the unobservable state fdi,t as in
Equation (7). Secondly, to evaluate the likelihood function associated with a state space
model as in Equations (7) and (8). The estimation is done using the STATA software:
B.1 Filtering
Equations (7) and (8) are represented in vector form:
xt = Htαt + ξt ξt ∼ N (0, Zt) (24)
αt+1 = Ttαt + Itηt ηt ∼ N (0, Zt) (25)
αt ∼ N (α1, P1) (26)
Innovation term is represented by variable vt in Equation (27):
vt = xt − E (xt|Xt−1) (27)
where αt is a latent state vector, Ht (n × k) and Tt (k × k) are possible time-varying
parameter matrices, and It (k × q; q ≤ k) denotes the identity matrix. The system is
stochastic through the n × 1 vector ξt and the k × 1 vector ηt, which are serially and
mutually uncorrelated with contemporary covariance matrices and zero mean ∑η and∑
ξ, respectively.
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where Xt = {x1, ........, xt}.
vt = xt −Htαt (28)
mt = Cov (αt, vt) = PtH
′
t (29)
Ft = V ar (vt) = HtPtH
′
t + Zt (30)
Kt = TtMtFt = TtPtH
′
tF
−1
t (31)
Lt = Tt −KtHt (32)
αt+1 = Ttαt +Ktvt (33)
Pt+1 = TtPtL
′
t +RtQtR
′
t (34)
For simplicity purposes, the state space model in matrix form is time-invariant in which
the system matrices are constant over time, the Kalman recursion of Pt+1 converges to
a constant matrix P¯ which is the solution to the matrix equation.
P¯ = T P¯T ′ − T P¯H ′F¯−1H ¯PT ′ +RQR′ (35)
where, F¯ = H ¯PH ′ + Z
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B.2 Kalman Filter Weight functions
The conditional variances and means obtained from the filtering estimates are all
weighted sums of x1, ......, xn. In effect, these weights can be regarded as kernel
functions in the field of non-parametric regression. The seven variables which
constitute the financial development index are listed below in order of weight
preference for the Kalman filter weight function.
1. Liquid liabilities to GDP ratio (%)
2. Bank deposits to GDP ratio (%)
3. Interest rate spread (%)
4. Domestic credit to private sector to GDP ratio (%)
5. Deposit interest rate (%)
6. Bank capital to total assets ratio (%)
7. Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to GDP
ratio (%)
The variables listed in above are organised under weight preference in the Kalman filter
matrices. Therefore, the Liquid liabilities to GDP ratio, Bank deposits to GDP ratio and
the Interest rate spread will have a greater impact on the financial development index
in comparison to the later variables (Variables (4) - (7)). The variable weight function
list is selected according to data availability in developing economies. Moreover, these
variables are also selected on the ability of them to encapsulate the characteristics of the
size of the financial system, financial institutional efficiency and financial institutional
depth.
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Appendix C: Financial Development Index
Table C.1: Ranking of countries by financial development and other measures
Country Rank 1 Fin.
dev.
Rank 2 Rank 3
Lebanon 1 4.98 1 26
Malta 2 4.83 2 48
Thailand 3 4.49 3 45
Jordan 4 3.55 4 41
Panama 5 3.06 7 36
Kuwait 6 2.48 5 49
Egypt 7 2.43 6 31
Algeria 8 2.22 22 22
South Africa 9 2.09 8 40
Slovakia 10 2.04 9 32
Slovenia 11 2.01 13 6
Chile 12 1.94 15 37
Philippines 13 1.83 12 38
Brazil 14 1.70 16 2
Hungary 15 1.59 14 42
Honduras 16 1.55 20 13
Bangladesh 17 1.52 18 35
Bulgaria 18 1.48 11 4
India 19 1.46 10 14
Macedonia 20 1.44 26 19
Poland 21 1.43 21 3
Indonesia 22 1.42 17 43
Oman 23 1.28 29 47
Kosovo 24 1.26 28 15
Kenya 25 1.23 24 11
Sri Lanka 26 1.18 27 51
Notes: Fin. dev. refers to the financial development
index value. Rank 1 refers to the rankings of the
financial development index estimated in this study.
Rank 2 refers to rankings based on the Bank deposits
to GDP ratio, and Rank 3 is the rankings based on
the interest rate spread.
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Table C.1 continued
Country Rank 1 Fin. dev. Rank 2 Rank 3
Latvia 27 1.13 30 12
Serbia 28 1.06 34 8
Cameroon 29 1.04 46 7
Lithuania 30 1.01 31 30
Argentina 31 0.98 42 39
Moldova 32 0.97 32 25
Vietnam 33 0.96 50 44
Peru 34 0.96 35 1
Mexico 35 0.89 33 28
Pakistan 36 0.82 25 27
Colombia 37 0.76 37 20
Tanzania 38 0.73 40 9
Ecuador 39 0.72 39 18
Venezuela 40 0.72 38 24
Cote d’Ivoire 41 0.70 41 16
Yemen 42 0.66 44 29
Azerbaijan 43 0.62 48 21
Nigeria 44 0.59 45 23
Turkey 45 0.58 23 34
Senegal 46 0.48 36 16
Uganda 47 0.46 47 10
Ghana 48 0.31 43 33
Tajikistan 49 0.35 51 5
Sudan 50 0.31 49 50
Syria 51 0.31 19 46
Notes: Fin. dev. refers to the financial development
index value. Rank 1 refers to the rankings of the
financial development index estimated in this study.
Rank 2 refers to rankings based on the Bank deposits
to GDP ratio, and Rank 3 is the rankings based on
the interest rate spread.
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Appendix D: Financial Development Index Figures
Figure D.1: Europe rankings by country
Figure D.2: Asia rankings by country
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Figure D.3: Latin America rankings by country
Figure D.4: MENA rankings by country
202
Figure D.5: Africa rankings by country
Figure D.6: Financial development index distribution (Full sample)
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Figure D.7: Financial development index distribution (Europe sample)
Figure D.8: Financial development index distribution (Asia sample)
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Figure D.9: Financial development index distribution (Latin America sample)
Figure D.10: Financial development index distribution (MENA sample)
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Figure D.11: Financial development index distribution (Africa sample)
Figure D.12: Country correlations between remittances and real GDP, 1990-2015 (Full sample)
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Appendix E: Variance decompositions
Table E.1: Variance decompositions of LNNEE and RGDPCG (order 1) - Full sample
Horizon LNNEE RGDPCG LNREM
1 98.928 0 1.072
(0.735) (0) (0.735)
2 99.104 0.005 0.890
(0.753) (0.073) (0.747)
3 99.151 0.011 0.838
(0.866) (0.135) (0.859)
4 99.131 0.017 0.852
(0.974) (0.186) (0.971)
5 99.116 0.068 0.816
(1.041) (0.266) (1.032)
6 99.090 0.127 0.784
(1.113) (0.382) (1.076)
7 99.073 0.172 0.755
(1.176) (0.489) (1.107)
8 99.054 0.222 0.724
(1.237) (0.596) (1.127)
9 99.040 0.269 0.692
(1.298) (0.697) (1.141)
10 99.032 0.309 0.659
(1.353) (0.786) (1.152)
Horizon LNNEE RGDPCG LNREM
1 2.244 97.542 0.214
(0.902) (0.936) (0.343)
2 2.177 96.838 0.985
(0.981) (1.110) (0.557)
3 2.124 96.347 1.529
(0.980) (1.344) (0.908)
4 2.096 95.542 2.362
(1.004) (1.525) (1.108)
5 2.086 95.335 2.579
(1.014) (1.587) (1.179)
6 2.076 95.244 2.679
(1.015) (1.610) (1.213)
7 2.072 95.191 2.737
(1.017) (1.627) (1.235)
8 2.071 95.155 2.775
(1.017) (1.635) (1.247)
9 2.073 95.132 2.796
(1.018) (1.641) (1.255)
10 2.076 95.115 2.809
(1.019) (1.645) (1.260)
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Table E.2: Variance decompositions of LNREM (order 1) and LNNEE (order 2) - Full sample
Horizon LNNEE RGDPCG LNREM
1 0 0 100.000
(0) (0) (0)
2 0.008 0.009 99.983
(0.120) (0.089) (0.151)
3 0.056 0.046 99.898
(0.214) (0.160) (0.278)
4 0.113 0.080 99.807
(0.329) (0.224) (0.407)
5 0.125 0.073 99.803
(0.390) (0.226) (0.466)
6 0.130 0.096 99.774
(0.431) (0.291) (0.549)
7 0.133 0.130 99.738
(0.464) (0.390) (0.649)
8 0.133 0.169 99.698
(0.487) (0.497) (0.753)
9 0.132 0.211 99.657
(0.506) (0.604) (0.856)
10 0.131 0.252 99.618
(0.522) (0.701) (0.953)
Horizon LNNEE RGDPCG LNREM
1 100 0 0
(0) (0) (0)
2 99.973 0.005 0.022
(0.120) (0.074) (0.098)
3 99.962 0.011 0.027
(0.216) (0.148) (0.171)
4 99.962 0.017 0.021
(0.248) (0.190) (0.187)
5 99.906 0.068 0.026
(0.321) (0.268) (0.229)
6 99.842 0.127 0.031
(0.422) (0.376) (0.275)
7 99.791 0.172 0.036
(0.506) (0.464) (0.313)
8 99.734 0.222 0.044
(0.599) (0.560) (0.352)
9 99.678 0.269 0.053
(0.687) (0.649) (0.393)
10 99.627 0.309 0.064
(0.762) (0.722) (0.433)
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Table E.3: Variance decompositions of RGDPCG and LNREM (order 2) - Full sample
Horizon LNNEE RGDPCG LNREM
1 2.365 97.542 0.093
(1.029) (1.048) (0.207)
2 2.178 96.838 0.984
(1.030) (1.202) (0.612)
3 2.114 96.347 1.539
(1.031) (1.391) (0.925)
4 2.057 95.542 2.401
(1.035) (1.579) (1.202)
5 2.034 95.335 2.631
(1.037) (1.647) (1.293)
6 2.024 95.244 2.732
(1.035) (1.673) (1.331)
7 2.020 95.191 2.789
(1.036) (1.690) (1.353)
8 2.020 95.155 2.825
(1.036) (1.701) (1.365)
9 2.024 95.132 2.844
(1.036) (1.706) (1.371)
10 2.030 95.115 2.855
(1.037) (1.709) (1.373)
Horizon LNNEE RGDPCG LNREM
1 1.072 0 98.928
(0.650) (0) (0.650)
2 0.950 0.009 99.041
(0.702) (0.085) (0.714)
3 0.774 0.046 99.180
(0.662) (0.159) (0.709)
4 0.654 0.080 99.266
(0.637) (0.253) (0.746)
5 0.606 0.073 99.322
(0.659) (0.249) (0.781)
6 0.578 0.096 99.326
(0.683) (0.281) (0.826)
7 0.559 0.130 99.312
(0.708) (0.349) (0.885)
8 0.548 0.169 99.283
(0.732) (0.432) (0.952)
9 0.542 0.211 99.247
(0.755) (0.518) (1.022)
10 0.538 0.252 99.210
(0.777) (0.597) (1.091)
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ASIA
Table E.4: Variance decompositions of LNNEE and RGDPCG (order 1) - Asia
Horizon LNNEE RGDPCG LNREM
1 9.568 90.432 0
(3.432) (3.432) (0)
2 10.176 89.516 0.308
(4.083) (4.053) (0.650)
3 10.590 88.837 0.573
(4.707) (4.714) (1.108)
4 10.800 88.429 0.772
(5.180) (5.245) (1.525)
5 10.900 88.178 0.922
(5.605) (5.731) (1.911)
6 10.940 88.023 1.034
(6.017) (6.197) (2.251)
7 10.945 87.927 1.128
(6.424) (6.646) (2.543)
8 10.930 87.871 1.199
(6.825) (7.077) (2.789)
9 10.902 87.841 1.257
(7.217) (7.488) (2.996)
10 10.866 87.830 1.304
(7.597) (7.879) (3.171)
Horizon LNNEE RGDPCG LNREM
1 1.523 0.141 98.337
(1.661) (0.557) (1.718)
2 1.621 0.387 97.992
(1.286) (0.878) (1.602)
3 1.777 0.412 97.810
(1.528) (1.119) (1.889)
4 1.799 0.399 97.802
(1.643) (1.194) (2.015)
5 1.792 0.406 97.801
(1.706) (1.220) (2.076)
6 1.785 0.437 97.778
(1.769) (1.237) (2.129)
7 1.783 0.482 97.735
(1.842) (1.260) (2.195)
8 1.783 0.536 97.682
(1.922) (1.293) (2.273)
9 1.784 0.592 97.624
(2.004) (1.335) (2.360)
10 1.786 0.648 97.566
(2.083) (1.385) (2.450)
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Table E.5: Variance decompositions of LNREM (order 1) and LNNEE (order 2) - Asia
Horizon LNNEE RGDPCG LNREM
1 100 0 0
(0) (0) (0)
2 99.978 0.021 0.001
(0.389) (0.274) (0.271)
3 99.965 0.034 0.001
(0.571) (0.405) (0.431)
4 99.955 0.044 0.001
(0.770) (0.494) (0.640)
5 99.947 0.053 0.001
(1.005) (0.571) (0.885)
6 99.938 0.061 0.001
(1.237) (0.650) (1.122)
7 99.930 0.069 0.001
(1.444) (0.734) (1.328)
8 99.922 0.078 0.001
(1.622) (0.826) (1.499)
9 99.913 0.086 0.001
(1.774) (0.926) (1.637)
10 99.905 0.094 0.001
(1.907) (1.033) (1.749)
Horizon LNNEE RGDPCG LNREM
1 0 100 0
(0) (0) (0)
2 0.022 99.670 0.308
(0.327) (0.674) (0.590)
3 0.050 99.377 0.573
(0.470) (1.245) (1.121)
4 0.065 99.163 0.772
(0.596) (1.833) (1.668)
5 0.072 99.006 0.922
(0.728) (2.376) (2.161)
6 0.074 98.889 1.038
(0.870) (2.848) (2.570)
7 0.073 98.799 1.128
(1.027) (3.253) (2.900)
8 0.071 98.729 1.199
(1.196) (3.602) (3.166)
9 0.069 98.674 1.257
(1.376) (3.908) (3.382)
10 0.066 98.630 1.304
(1.565) (4.179) (3.558)
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Table E.6: Variance decompositions of RGDPCG and LNREM (order 2) - Asia
Horizon LNNEE RGDPCG LNREM
1 1.663 0.001 98.337
(1.692) (0.552) (1.818)
2 1.932 0.075 97.992
(1.246) (0.894) (1.478)
3 2.118 0.072 97.810
(1.532) (0.956) (1.746)
4 2.125 0.074 97.802
(1.660) (0.965) (1.870)
5 2.107 0.092 97.801
(1.700) (0.986) (1.916)
6 2.099 0.123 97.778
(1.718) (1.024) (1.945)
7 2.103 0.162 97.735
(1.740) (1.075) (1.979)
8 2.114 0.204 97.682
(1.772) (1.136) (2.022)
9 2.128 0.248 97.624
(1.813) (1.201) (2.071)
10 2.141 0.293 97.566
(1.858) (1.269) (2.126)
Horizon LNNEE RGDPCG LNREM
1 90.432 9.568 0
(3.162) (3.162) (0)
2 89.830 10.169 0.001
(4) (4.035) (0.288)
3 89.555 10.444 0.001
(4.506) (4.546) (0.433)
4 89.380 10.619 0.001
(4.798) (4.817) (0.643)
5 89.248 10.751 0.001
(5.020) (5.004) (0.884)
6 89.137 10.862 0.001
(5.217) (5.165) (1.111)
7 89.039 10.960 0.001
(5.406) (5.319) (1.307)
8 88.951 11.048 0.001
(5.591) (5.475) (1.469)
9 88.871 11.128 0.001
(5.775) (5.635) (1.601)
10 88.797 11.202 0.001
(5.957) (5.800) (1.706)
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Table E.7: Variance decompositions of LNNEE and RGDPCG (order 1) - Europe
Horizon LNNEE RGDPCG LNREM
1 100 0 0
(0.762) (0.762) (0)
2 99.896 0.002 0.102
(1.130) (1.054) (0.436)
3 99.599 0.007 0.394
(1.524) (1.213) (0.887)
4 99.349 0.013 0.638
(1.932) (1.314) (1.356)
5 99.178 0.017 0.805
(2.287) (1.424) (1.723)
6 99.062 0.019 0.919
(2.583) (1.567) (1.997)
7 98.980 0.020 1.000
(2.838) (1.744) (2.201)
8 98.920 0.020 1.060
(3.070) (1.953) (2.356)
9 98.875 0.020 1.106
(3.290) (2.186) (2.478)
10 98.839 0.019 1.142
(3.505) (2.436) (2.574)
Horizon LNNEE RGDPCG LNREM
1 2.635 0.047 97.318
(1.964) (0.726) (2.108)
2 2.479 0.584 96.937
(2.028) (1.232) (2.418)
3 2.480 0.596 96.924
(2.070) (1.300) (2.485)
4 2.487 0.620 96.893
(2.088) (1.297) (2.500)
5 2.494 0.668 96.838
(2.100) (1.326) (2.530)
6 2.500 0.717 96.783
(2.112) (1.382) (2.575)
7 2.505 0.762 96.733
(2.124) (1.454) (2.630)
8 2.511 0.801 96.689
(2.136) (1.532) (2.689)
9 2.516 0.834 96.650
(2.149) (1.610) (2.749)
10 2.521 0.862 96.617
(2.162) (1.685) (2.808)
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Table E.8: Variance decompositions of LNREM (order 1) and LNNEE (order 2) - Europe
Horizon LNNEE RGDPCG LNREM
1 0 100 0
(0) (0) (0)
2 0.003 99.916 0.081
(0.392) (0.530) (0.406)
3 0.005 99.935 0.060
(0.590) (0.884) (0.621)
4 0.004 99.948 0.048
(0.706) (1.176) (0.878)
5 0.004 99.954 0.042
(0.792) (1.381) (1.068)
6 0.006 99.956 0.038
(0.869) (1.538) (1.202)
7 0.010 99.954 0.036
(0.945) (1.670) (1.303)
8 0.017 99.949 0.034
(1.025) (1.792) (1.382)
9 0.027 99.941 0.032
(1.112) (1.911) (1.443)
10 0.040 99.929 0.031
(1.207) (2.031) (1.493)
Horizon LNNEE RGDPCG LNREM
1 100 0 0
(0) (0) (0)
2 99.896 0.002 0.102
(0.561) (0.365) (0.407)
3 99.599 0.007 0.394
(1.161) (0.587) (0.973)
4 99.349 0.013 0.638
(1.744) (0.743) (1.533)
5 99.179 0.017 0.805
(2.170) (0.889) (1.918)
6 99.063 0.019 0.919
(2.491) (1.047) (2.186)
7 98.981 0.019 1.000
(2.754) (1.224) (2.383)
8 98.921 0.020 1.060
(2.987) (1.421) (2.534)
9 98.875 0.019 1.106
(3.202) (1.636) (2.654)
10 98.839 0.019 1.142
(3.410) (1.866) (2.751)
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Table E.9: Variance decompositions of RGDPCG and LNREM (order 2) - Europe
Horizon LNNEE RGDPCG LNREM
1 2.635 0.047 97.318
(2.521) (0.717) (2.509)
2 2.480 0.584 96.937
(2.518) (1.611) (2.863)
3 2.480 0.596 96.924
(2.532) (1.736) (2.967)
4 2.488 0.619 96.893
(2.533) (1.745) (2.980)
5 2.494 0.668 96.838
(2.529) (1.780) (3)
6 2.500 0.717 96.783
(2.526) (1.821) (3.024)
7 2.505 0.762 96.733
(2.526) (1.866) (3.052)
8 2.511 0.800 96.689
(2.527) (1.911) (3.082)
9 2.516 0.833 96.650
(2.531) (1.954) (3.113)
10 2.522 0.861 96.617
(2.536) (1.995) (3.142)
Horizon LNNEE RGDPCG LNREM
1 0 100 0
(0.722) (0.722) (0)
2 0.003 99.916 0.081
(1.134) (1.221) (0.489)
3 0.005 99.935 0.060
(1.368) (1.471) (0.618)
4 0.004 99.948 0.048
(1.499) (1.652) (0.801)
5 0.004 99.954 0.042
(1.588) (1.801) (0.970)
6 0.006 99.956 0.038
(1.660) (1.923) (1.097)
7 0.010 99.954 0.036
(1.724) (2.023) (1.188)
8 0.017 99.949 0.034
(1.787) (2.110) (1.255)
9 0.027 99.941 0.032
(1.851) (2.189) (1.304)
10 0.040 99.929 0.031
(1.920) (2.265) (1.340)
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Africa
Table E.10: Variance decompositions of LNNEE and RGDPCG (order 1) - Africa
Horizon LNNEE RGDPCG LNREM
1 74.407 25.593 0
(4.696) (4.696) (0)
2 73.143 26.497 0.360
(5.663) (5.747) (0.691)
3 72.810 25.994 1.195
(5.966) (5.987) (1.649)
4 72.441 25.464 2.095
(6.390) (6.202) (2.634)
5 72.163 24.926 2.911
(6.814) (6.380) (3.450)
6 71.955 24.431 3.613
(7.234) (6.567) (4.091)
7 71.817 23.982 4.201
(7.628) (6.764) (4.589)
8 71.733 23.576 4.691
(7.995) (6.972) (4.978)
9 71.692 23.208 5.100
(8.333) (7.187) (5.285)
10 71.683 22.873 5.444
(8.645) (7.405) (5.530)
Horizon LNNEE RGDPCG LNREM
1 0.356 1.540 98.104
(1.166) (2.177) (2.502)
2 0.815 1.545 97.640
(2.006) (2.137) (2.927)
3 0.830 1.584 97.586
(2.086) (2.246) (3.128)
4 0.841 1.581 97.577
(2.156) (2.315) (3.245)
5 0.839 1.581 97.581
(2.183) (2.366) (3.315)
6 0.837 1.579 97.584
(2.206) (2.406) (3.363)
7 0.836 1.578 97.586
(2.230) (2.439) (3.401)
8 0.837 1.577 97.586
(2.258) (2.469) (3.437)
9 0.839 1.577 97.584
(2.291) (2.497) (3.472)
10 0.841 1.577 97.582
(2.329) (2.523) (3.508)
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Table E.11: Variance decompositions of LNREM (order 1) and LNNEE (order 2) - Africa
Horizon LNNEE RGDPCG LNREM
1 0 100 0
(0) (0) (0)
2 1.160 97.924 0.916
(1.227) (1.597) (1.093)
3 1.183 98.063 0.754
(1.336) (1.675) (1.002)
4 1.166 98.125 0.709
(1.445) (1.965) (1.179)
5 1.108 98.232 0.660
(1.510) (2.180) (1.312)
6 1.043 98.326 0.631
(1.576) (2.391) (1.452)
7 0.982 98.406 0.612
(1.651) (2.576) (1.570)
8 0.928 98.470 0.602
(1.743) (2.748) (1.669)
9 0.884 98.517 0.599
(1.856) (2.912) (1.752)
10 0.851 98.547 0.602
(1.992) (3.078) (1.822)
Horizon LNNEE RGDPCG LNREM
1 100 0 0
(0) (0) (0)
2 99.614 0.026 0.360
(0.549) (0.353) (0.444)
3 98.786 0.018 1.195
(1.163) (0.405) (1.108)
4 97.890 0.015 2.095
(1.913) (0.512) (1.866)
5 97.070 0.019 2.911
(2.598) (0.649) (2.557)
6 96.361 0.026 3.613
(3.185) (0.826) (3.146)
7 95.761 0.038 4.201
(3.677) (1.034) (3.633)
8 95.257 0.052 4.691
(4.093) (1.267) (4.035)
9 94.831 0.069 5.100
(4.451) (1.519) (4.367)
10 94.468 0.088 5.444
(4.766) (1.783) (4.643)
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Table E.12: Variance decompositions of RGDPCG and LNREM (order 2) - Africa
Horizon LNNEE RGDPCG LNREM
1 1.305 0.591 98.104
(1.355) (1.289) (1.647)
2 1.845 0.516 97.640
(1.756) (1.336) (1.943)
3 1.895 0.519 97.586
(1.850) (1.356) (2.029)
4 1.910 0.513 97.577
(1.896) (1.392) (2.103)
5 1.907 0.512 97.581
(1.913) (1.413) (2.153)
6 1.904 0.512 97.584
(1.931) (1.437) (2.208)
7 1.902 0.512 97.586
(1.956) (1.460) (2.269)
8 1.902 0.513 97.586
(1.986) (1.486) (2.334)
9 1.903 0.513 97.584
(2.021) (1.513) (2.402)
10 1.905 0.513 97.582
(2.059) (1.541) (2.470)
Horizon LNNEE RGDPCG LNREM
1 25.593 74.407 0
(5.205) (5.205) (0)
2 31.665 67.420 0.916
(5.906) (6.058) (1.192)
3 32.737 66.509 0.754
(6.393) (6.529) (1.213)
4 33.138 66.153 0.709
(6.768) (6.941) (1.476)
5 33.145 66.195 0.660
(7.047) (7.260) (1.696)
6 32.986 66.383 0.631
(7.307) (7.565) (1.911)
7 32.742 66.647 0.612
(7.558) (7.855) (2.094)
8 32.454 66.944 0.602
(7.804) (8.132) (2.250)
9 32.148 67.253 0.599
(8.041) (8.393) (2.380)
10 31.836 67.562 0.602
(8.266) (8.635) (2.488)
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MENA
Table E.13: Variance decompositions of LNNEE and RGDPCG (order 1) - MENA
Horizon LNNEE RGDPCG LNREM
1 75.011 24.989 0
(5.752) (5.752) (0)
2 75.227 24.750 0.023
(6.335) (6.301) (0.467)
3 75.323 24.605 0.072
(6.821) (6.688) (0.975)
4 75.373 24.509 0.117
(7.158) (6.918) (1.523)
5 75.398 24.449 0.152
(7.440) (7.101) (2.008)
6 75.409 24.412 0.178
(7.709) (7.289) (2.402)
7 75.412 24.390 0.198
(7.981) (7.498) (2.712)
8 75.410 24.378 0.212
(8.262) (7.733) (2.951)
9 75.404 24.372 0.224
(8.550) (7.990) (3.137)
10 75.396 24.372 0.232
(8.845) (8.266) (3.282)
Horizon LNNEE RGDPCG LNREM
1 1.462 0.001 98.537
(1.660) (0.759) (1.832)
2 1.295 0.050 98.655
(1.762) (1.041) (2.043)
3 1.294 0.049 98.656
(1.751) (1.108) (2.081)
4 1.388 0.056 98.556
(1.757) (1.136) (2.118)
5 1.525 0.071 98.405
(1.789) (1.163) (2.177)
6 1.676 0.089 98.235
(1.845) (1.191) (2.253)
7 1.828 0.109 98.064
(1.918) (1.221) (2.340)
8 1.975 0.129 97.896
(2.002) (1.253) (2.435)
9 2.116 0.149 97.734
(2.090) (1.287) (2.532)
10 2.250 0.170 97.581
(2.179) (1.323) (2.630)
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Table E.14: Variance decompositions of LNREM (order 1) and LNNEE (order 2) - MENA
Horizon LNNEE RGDPCG LNREM
1 0 100 0
(0) (0) (0)
2 0.000 99.571 0.428
(0.455) (0.854) (0.705)
3 0.046 99.053 0.901
(0.622) (1.323) (1.225)
4 0.164 98.544 1.293
(0.877) (1.962) (1.838)
5 0.348 98.047 1.604
(1.199) (2.595) (2.369)
6 0.593 97.552 1.855
(1.582) (3.186) (2.799)
7 0.891 97.049 2.061
(2.015) (3.741) (3.146)
8 1.236 96.530 2.234
(2.490) (4.274) (3.427)
9 1.624 95.994 2.382
(2.999) (4.798) (3.657)
10 2.048 95.439 2.513
(3.534) (5.318) (3.848)
Horizon LNNEE RGDPCG LNREM
1 100 0 0
(0) (0) (0)
2 99.975 0.001 0.023
(0.544) (0.449) (0.338)
3 99.925 0.003 0.072
(1.033) (0.601) (0.876)
4 99.879 0.004 0.117
(1.645) (0.693) (1.523)
5 99.843 0.005 0.152
(2.167) (0.775) (2.053)
6 99.817 0.005 0.178
(2.575) (0.866) (2.456)
7 99.797 0.005 0.198
(2.894) (0.974) (2.761)
8 99.782 0.005 0.212
(3.152) (1.103) (2.994)
9 99.771 0.005 0.224
(3.368) (1.254) (3.173)
10 99.763 0.005 0.232
(3.559) (1.428) (3.314)
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Table E.15: Variance decompositions of RGDPCG and LNREM (order 2) - MENA
Horizon LNNEE RGDPCG LNREM
1 1.058 0.405 98.537
(1.548) (1.252) (1.872)
2 0.918 0.428 98.655
(1.429) (1.408) (1.834)
3 0.917 0.426 98.656
(1.421) (1.375) (1.861)
4 0.966 0.478 98.556
(1.440) (1.372) (1.916)
5 1.034 0.562 98.405
(1.491) (1.401) (1.999)
6 1.106 0.659 98.235
(1.569) (1.458) (2.104)
7 1.177 0.760 98.064
(1.655) (1.537) (2.223)
8 1.244 0.860 97.896
(1.744) (1.633) (2.351)
9 1.308 0.957 97.734
(1.831) (1.739) (2.482)
10 1.368 1.051 97.581
(1.914) (1.850) (2.613)
Horizon LNNEE RGDPCG LNREM
1 24.989 75.011 0
(5.640) (5.640) (0)
2 25.004 74.568 0.428
(6.479) (6.472) (0.826)
3 23.858 75.240 0.901
(7.007) (6.898) (1.472)
4 22.589 76.119 1.293
(7.299) (7.122) (2.313)
5 21.352 77.044 1.604
(7.473) (7.308) (3.023)
6 20.185 77.960 1.855
(7.586) (7.498) (3.584)
7 19.097 78.843 2.061
(7.666) (7.690) (4.023)
8 18.087 79.680 2.234
(7.725) (7.876) (4.369)
9 17.152 80.466 2.382
(7.769) (8.051) (4.642)
10 16.289 81.199 2.513
(7.798) (8.211) (4.859)
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Latin America
Table E.16: Variance decompositions of LNNEE and RGDPCG (order 1) - Latin America
Horizon LNNEE RGDPCG LNREM
1 99.075 0.925 0
(1.523) (1.523) (0)
2 98.990 1.009 0.002
(2.030) (1.999) (0.351)
3 98.696 1.086 0.219
(2.721) (2.428) (0.981)
4 98.459 1.085 0.456
(3.360) (2.737) (1.630)
5 98.357 1.044 0.600
(3.867) (3.026) (2.052)
6 98.325 0.990 0.685
(4.274) (3.313) (2.328)
7 98.325 0.934 0.741
(4.622) (3.605) (2.520)
8 98.338 0.880 0.781
(4.937) (3.907) (2.659)
9 98.357 0.832 0.811
(5.235) (4.218) (2.764)
10 98.377 0.790 0.833
(5.525) (4.540) (2.844)
Horizon LNNEE RGDPCG LNREM
1 0.138 2.449 97.412
(0.746) (1.977) (2.134)
2 0.137 2.225 97.638
(1.103) (1.950) (2.301)
3 0.137 2.543 97.320
(1.129) (2.042) (2.378)
4 0.140 2.838 97.022
(1.147) (2.091) (2.405)
5 0.145 3.072 96.783
(1.181) (2.167) (2.470)
6 0.149 3.276 96.575
(1.226) (2.269) (2.566)
7 0.152 3.461 96.387
(1.278) (2.386) (2.680)
8 0.155 3.631 96.214
(1.332) (2.510) (2.803)
9 0.158 3.786 96.056
(1.386) (2.636) (2.930)
10 0.161 3.927 95.912
(1.438) (2.762) (3.058)
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Table E.17: Variance decompositions of LNREM (order 1) and LNNEE (order 2) - Latin America
Horizon LNNEE RGDPCG LNREM
1 0 100 0
(0) (0) (0)
2 0.017 99.748 0.235
(0.448) (0.894) (0.792)
3 0.017 99.671 0.312
(0.601) (1.282) (1.179)
4 0.016 99.659 0.326
(0.725) (1.487) (1.387)
5 0.014 99.658 0.328
(0.872) (1.634) (1.513)
6 0.012 99.657 0.331
(1.061) (1.777) (1.595)
7 0.011 99.656 0.333
(1.295) (1.941) (1.654)
8 0.010 99.655 0.335
(1.566) (2.137) (1.697)
9 0.009 99.654 0.337
(1.867) (2.366) (1.729)
10 0.009 99.652 0.339
(2.191) (2.625) (1.754)
Horizon LNNEE RGDPCG LNREM
1 100 0 0
(0) (0) (0)
2 99.995 0.004 0.002
(0.588) (0.534) (0.309)
3 99.770 0.011 0.219
(1.007) (0.699) (0.873)
4 99.533 0.010 0.456
(1.444) (0.808) (1.373)
5 99.391 0.009 0.600
(1.742) (0.922) (1.674)
6 99.303 0.012 0.685
(1.968) (1.063) (1.865)
7 99.238 0.021 0.741
(2.165) (1.237) (1.998)
8 99.183 0.036 0.781
(2.357) (1.444) (2.095)
9 99.133 0.056 0.811
(2.555) (1.681) (2.166)
10 99.084 0.082 0.833
(2.765) 1.944 (2.219)
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Table E.18: Variance decompositions of RGDPCG and LNREM (order 2) - Latin America
Horizon LNNEE RGDPCG LNREM
1 0.048 2.539 97.412
(0.494) (1.966) (2.052)
2 0.053 2.308 97.638
(0.958) (1.899) (2.075)
3 0.055 2.625 97.320
(0.989) (1.970) (2.178)
4 0.067 2.911 97.022
(1.022) (1.985) (2.204)
5 0.081 3.136 96.783
(1.074) (2.008) (2.245)
6 0.093 3.332 96.575
(1.123) (2.044) (2.295)
7 0.103 3.510 96.387
(1.170) (2.093) (2.354)
8 0.113 3.673 96.214
(1.217) (2.150) (2.420)
9 0.121 3.822 96.056
(1.263) (2.211) (2.489)
10 0.129 3.959 95.912
(1.306) (2.274) (2.558)
Horizon LNNEE RGDPCG LNREM
1 0.925 99.075 0
(1.272) (1.272) (0)
2 0.766 98.999 0.235
(1.184) (1.357) (0.532)
3 0.740 98.947 0.312
(1.238) (1.624) (0.838)
4 0.740 98.935 0.326
(1.340) (1.925) (1.090)
5 0.747 98.925 0.328
(1.489) (2.207) (1.251)
6 0.758 98.911 0.331
(1.680) (2.478) (1.356)
7 0.771 98.896 0.333
(1.905) (2.750) (1.430)
8 0.786 98.879 0.335
(2.162) (3.030) (1.484)
9 0.801 98.862 0.337
(2.444) (3.319) (1.523)
10 0.817 98.845 0.339
(2.747) (3.620) (1.554)
224
References
Abdih, Y., Chami, R., Ebeke, C., Barajas, A., 2012. Remittances Channel and Fiscal Impact in the
Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia. IMF Working Papers .
Abrigo, M.R.M., Love, I., 2016. Estimation of panel vector autoregression in Stata. Stata Journal .
Acemoglu, D., Robinson, J., 2010. The Role of Institutions in Growth and Development. volume 20.
Acosta, P.A., Baerg, N.R., Mandelman, F.S., 2009a. Financial Development, Remittances, and Real
Exchange Rate Appreciation. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Economic Review .
Acosta, P.A., Lartey, E.K., Mandelman, F.S., 2009b. Remittances and the Dutch disease. Journal of
International Economics .
Adenutsi, D.E., Ahortor, C.R.K., 2008. Remittances , Exchange Rate , and Monetary Policy in Ghana.
West African Journal of Monetary and Economic Integration 8, 1–30.
Agenor, P., Montiel, P., 2008. Development Macroeconomics. Princeton University Press, third edition.
Aggarwal, R., Demirgüç-Kunt, A., Pería, M.S.M., 2011. Do remittances promote financial
development? Journal of Development Economics 96, 255–264.
Alesina, A., Campante, F.R., Tabellini, G., 2008. Why is fiscal policy often procyclical? Journal of
the European Economic Association .
Alesina, A., Tabellini, G., 1990. A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt. The
Review of Economic Studies .
Alfaro, L., Chanda, A., Kalemli-Ozcan, S., Sayek, S., 2004. FDI and economic growth: The role of
local financial markets. Journal of International Economics .
Amuedo-Dorantes, C., 2006. Remittances and Their Microeconomic Impacts: Evidence from Latin
Amercia. Migration,Trade and Development , 187–197.
Amuedo-Dorantes, C., Pozo, S., 2004. Workers’ Remittances and the Real Exchange Rate: A Paradox
of Gifts. World Development .
Anzoategui, D., Demirgüç-Kunt, A., Martínez Pería, M.S., 2014. Remittances and Financial Inclusion:
Evidence from El Salvador. World Development 54, 338–349.
Arellano, M., Bond, S., 1991. Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and
an Application to Employment Equations. The Review of Economic Studies .
Arellano, M., Bover, O., 1995. Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of error-components
models. Journal of Econometrics .
Baas, T., Maja Melzer, S., 2012. The Macroeconomic Impact of Remittances: A sending country
perspective. NORFACE MIGRATION Discussion Paper , 2012–21.
Bagehot, W., 1873. Lombard street: A description of the money mark. McMaster University Archive
for the History of Economic Thought.
Bahadir, B., Chatterjee, S., Lebesmuehlbacher, T., 2018. The macroeconomic consequences of
remittances. Journal of International Economics .
Barajas, A., Chami, R., Hakura, D., Montiel, P., 2011. Workers’ Remittances and the Equilibrium
Real Exchange Rate: Theory and Evidence. Economía .
Barro, R.J., Gordon, D.B., 1983. A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model.
Journal of Political Economy .
Beck, T., Levine, R., Loayza, N., 2000. Finance and the sources of growth. Journal of Financial
Economics .
225
Becker, G.S., 1974. A Theory of Social Interactions. Journal of Political Economy .
Beine, M., Docquier, F., Rapoport, H., 2001. Brain Drain and Economic Growth: Theory and Evidence.
Journal of Development Economics .
Benigno, P., Woodford, M., 2003. Optimal monetary and fiscal policy: A linear-quadratic approach.
NBER Working Paper Series .
Bernanke, B.S., Mihov, I., 1998. Measuring Monetary Policy. The Quarterly Journal of Economics
113, 869–902.
Bettin, G., Zazzaro, A., 2012. Remittances and financial development: Substitutes or complements in
economic growth. Bulletin of Economic Research .
Blundell, R., Bond, S., 1998. Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models.
Journal of Econometrics .
Braun, M., 2001. Why Is Fiscal Policy Procyclical in Developing Countries. Mimeo, Harvard University
.
Breitung, J., 2000. The local power of some unit root tests for panel data. Advances in Econometrics
15, 161–178.
Brown, R.P.C., 1994. Migrants’ remittances, savings, and investment in the South Pacific. International
Labor Review 133, 347–367.
Bugamelli, M., Paternò, F., 2011. Output Growth Volatility and Remittances. Economica 78, 480–500.
Bun, M.J.G., Windmeijer, F., 2010. The weak instrument problem of the system GMM estimator in
dynamic panel data models. Econometrics Journal 13, 95–126.
Buti, M., Roeger, W., In’t Veld, J., 2001. Stabilizing output and inflation: Policy conflicts and co-
operation under a stability pact. Journal of Common Market Studies .
Caballero, R.J., Krishnamurthy, A., 2004. Fiscal Policy and Financial Depth. National Bureau of
Economic Research Working Paper Series .
Canzoneri, M.B., Cumby, R.E., Diba, B.T., 2001. Fiscal discipline and exchange rate systems. Economic
Journal .
Caporale, G., Rault, C., Sova, R., Sova, A., 2009. Financial Development and Economic Growth:
Evidence from Ten New EU Members. Brunel University Economics and Finance Working Paper
Series .
Catao, L., Sutton, B., 2002. Sovereign Defaults: The Role of Volatility.
CBN, 2007. Reserves Consumptions and Future Savings: what options.
Cevik, E.I., Dibooglu, S., Kutan, A.M., 2014. Monetary and fiscal policy interactions: Evidence from
emerging European economies. Journal of Comparative Economics .
Chami, R., Barajas, A., Cosimano, T., Fullenkamp, C., Gapen, M., Montiel, P., 2008. Macroeconomic
consequences of remittances. IMF Occasional Papers .
Chami, R., Jahjah, S., Fullenkamp, C., 2005. Are Immigrant Remittance Flows a Source of Capital
for Development. IMF Working Papers .
Christiano, L., Eichenbaum, M., Rebelo, S., 2011. When Is the Government Spending Multiplier Large?
Journal of Political Economy 119, 78–121.
Christiano, L.J., Fitzgerald, T.J., 2003. The band pass filter. International Economic Review .
Cihak, M., Demirgüç-Kunt, A., Feyen, E., Levine, R., 2012. Benchmarking Financial Systems around
the World. World Bank Policy Research Working Papers WPS6175 .
226
Combes, J.L., Ebeke, C., Maurel, M., 2015. The effect of remittances prior to an election. Applied
Economics .
Corden, W.M., Neary, J.P., 1982. Booming Sector and De-Industrialisation in a Small Open Economy.
The Economic Journal 92, 825–848.
Cox-Edwards, A., Rodríguez-Oreggia, E., 2009. Remittances and Labor Force Participation in Mexico:
An Analysis Using Propensity Score Matching. World Development .
Craigwell, R., Jackman, M., Moore, W., 2010. Economic volatility and remittances. International
Journal of Development Issues .
Cukierman, A., Meltzer, A.H., 1986. A Positive Theory of Discretionary Policy, the Cost of Democratic
Government and the Benefits of a Constitution. Economic Inquiry .
Davig, T., Leeper, E.M., 2011. Monetary-fiscal policy interactions and fiscal stimulus. European
Economic Review .
De Haas, H., 2006. Migration, remittances and regional development in Southern Morocco. Geoforum
.
De Vos, I., Evaraert, G., Ruyssen, I., 2015. Bootstrap-based bias correction and inference for dynamic
panels with fixed effects. Stata Journal .
Dekle, R., Pundit, M., 2015. The Recent Convergence of Financial Development in Asia. ADB
Economics Working Paper Series 440.
Demirgüç-Kunt, A., Córdova, E.L., Pería, M.S.M., Woodruff, C., 2011. Remittances and banking
sector breadth and depth: Evidence from Mexico. Journal of Development Economics 95, 229–241.
Dixit, A.K., Lambertini, L., 2000. Fiscal Discretion Destroys Monetary Commitment. SSRN Electronic
Journal .
Djajić, S., 1986. International migration, remittances and welfare in a dependent economy. Journal of
Development Economics 21, 229–234.
Dorucci, E., Meyer-Cirkel, A., Santabárbara, D., 2009. Domestic Financial Development in Emerging
Economies: Evidence and Implications. Occasional Paper Series 102 , European Central Bank .
Dos Santos, M.D., Postel-Vinay, F., 2003. Migration as a source of growth: The perspective of a
developing country.
Dupor, B., 2000. Exchange rates and the fiscal theory of the price level. Journal of Monetary Economics
.
Durand, J., Kandel, W., Parrado, E.A., Massey, D.S., 1996. International Migration and Development
in Mexican Communities. Demography .
Dyson, T., 2010. Population and development: the demographic transition. Zed Books.
Elbadawi, I., Rocha, D.R.R., 1992. Determinants of Expatriate Workers’ Remittances in North Africa
and Europe. Policy Research Working Papers- World Bank Wps .
Epstein, L.G., Hynes, J.A., 1983. The Rate of Time Preference and Dynamic Economic Analysis.
Journal of Political Economy .
Fafchamps, M., Lund, S., 2003. Risk-sharing networks in rural Philippines. Journal of Development
Economics 71, 261–287.
Freund, C., Spatafora, N., 2008. Remittances, transaction costs, and informality. Journal of
Development Economics 86, 356–366.
Friedberg, R.M., Hunt, J., 1995. The Impact of Immigrants on Host Country Wages, Employment and
Growth. Journal of Economic Perspectives .
227
Friedman, B., Kuttner, K., 1992. Money, income, prices and interest rates. American Economic Review
82, 472–492.
Funkhouser, E., 1992. Mass Emigration, Remittances, and Economic Adjustment: The Case of El
Salvador in the 1980s. January.
Funkhouser, E., 2006. The Effect of Emigration on the Labor Market Outcomes of the Sender
Household: A Longitudinal Approach Using Data From Nicaragua. Well-Being and Social Policy .
Galasi, P., Kollo, J., 2002. The disincentive and re-employment effects of unemployment benefits. The
Hungarian labour market, Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Science .
Galí, J., Perotti, R., 2003. Fiscal Policy and Monetary Policy Integration in Europe. Economic Policy
37, 533–572.
Gapen, M.T., Chami, R., Barajas, A., Fullenkamp, C., 2009. Do Workers’ Remittances Promote
Economic Growth? IMF Working Papers 153.
Gavin, M., Perotti, R., 1997. Fiscal Policy in Latin America.
Giuliano, P., Ruiz-Arranz, M., 2009. Remittances, financial development, and growth. Journal of
Development Economics 90, 144–152.
Glytsos, N.P., 2002. The Role of Migrant Remittances in Development: Evidence from Mediterranean
Countries. International Migration 40, 5–26.
Gnimassoun, B., Mignon, V., 2016. How Macroeconomic Imbalances Interact? Evidence from a Panel
VAR Analysis. Macroeconomic Dynamics .
Gupta, S., Pattillo, C.A., Wagh, S., 2009. Effect of Remittances on Poverty and Financial Development
in Sub-Saharan Africa. World Development 37, 104–115.
Habermeier, K., Otker-Robe, I., Jácome, L.I., Giustiniani, A., Ishi, K., Vávra, D., Kisinbay, T.,
Vazquez, F., 2009. Inflation Pressures and Monetary Policy Options in Emerging and Developing
Countries - A Cross Regional Perspective , 1–78.
Hadri, K., Rao, Y., Bu, R., 2010. Testing for stationarity in heterogeneous panel data in the case of
model misspecification. Bulletin of Economic Research 3, 148–161.
Hanson, G.H., 2007. Emigration, Remittances and Labor Force Participation in Mexico. Integration
and Trade .
Hassan, G.M., Holmes, M.J., 2013. Remittances and the real effective exchange rate. Applied Economics
.
Heilmann, C., 2006. Remittances and the migration-development nexus-Challenges for the sustainable
governance of migration. Ecological Economics .
Hibbs, D.A., 1977. Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy. American Political Science Review .
Hicks, J., 1969. A theory of economic history. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Hoddinott, J., 1996. Altruism and Beyond : An Economic Analysis of Transfers and Exchanges Within
Families and groups, by Oded Stark- Book review. Journal of Economic Literature .
Huang, H., Wei, S.J., 2006. Monetary policies for developing countries: The role of institutional quality.
Journal of International Economics 70, 239–252.
Ilzetzki, E., 2011. Rent-seeking distortions and fiscal procyclicality. Journal of Development Economics
.
Im, K.S., Pesaran, M.H., Shin, Y., 2003. Testing for unit roots in heterogeneous panels. Journal of
Econometrics 115, 53–74.
228
Imai, K.S., Gaiha, R., Ali, A., Kaicker, N., 2014. Remittances, growth and poverty: NEW evidence
from Asian countries. Journal of Policy Modeling .
IMF, 2009. International transactions in remittances: guide for compilers and users. International
Monetary Fund .
Jackman, M., 2014. A Note on the Labor Market Effects of Remittances in Latin American and
Caribbean Countries: Do Thresholds Exist? Developing Economies .
Jansen, D.W., Vacaflores, D.E., Naufal, G.S., 2012. The Macroeconomic Consequences of Remittances.
ISRN Economics 2012, 1–14.
Justino, P., Shemyakina, O.N., 2012. Remittances and labor supply in post-conflict Tajikistan. IZA
Journal of Labor and Development 1.
Kaminsky, G.L., Reinhart, C.M., Végh, C.a., 2005. When It Rains, It Pours: Procyclical Capital Flows
and Macroeconomic Policies. volume 19.
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., Mastruzzi, M., 2008. Governance matters VII: Aggregate and individual
governance indicators 1996-2007. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series , 146–188.
Keely, C.B., Tran, B.N., 1989. Remittances from Labor Migration: Evaluations, Performance and
Implications. International Migration Review .
Khan, M., Senhadji, A., 2000. Financial development and economic growth: an overview. IMF Working
Paper 209.
Kirwan, F., 1986. Emigrants’ Remittances, Non-Traded Goods and Economic Welfare in the Source
Country. Journal of Economic Studies 13, 52.
Kydland, F.E., Prescott, E.C., 1977. Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal
Plans. Journal of Political Economy .
Lane, P.R., 2003. The cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy: Evidence from the OECD. Journal of Public
Economics .
Lartey, E.K.K., Mandelman, F.S., Acosta, P.A., 2012. Remittances, Exchange Rate Regimes and the
Dutch Disease: A Panel Data Analysis. Review of International Economics .
Laurent, R., 1988. An interest-rate based indicator of monetary policy. Journal of Economic
Perspectives 12, 3–14.
Leeper, E.M., 1991. Equilibria under ’active’ and ’passive’ monetary and fiscal policies. Journal of
Monetary Economics .
Leith, C., Wren-Lewis, S., 2006. Interactions between Monetary and Fiscal Policy Rules. The Economic
Journal 110, 93–108.
León-Ledesma, M., Piracha, M., 2004. International migration and the role of remittances Eastern
Europe. International Migration .
Levin, A., Lin, C.F., Chu, C.S.J., 2002. Unit root tests in panel data: Asymptotic and finite-sample
properties. Journal of Econometrics 108, 1–24.
Loayza, R., Rancière, N.V., 2006. Financial Development, Financial Fragility, and Growth. Journal of
Money, Credit and Banking 38, 1051 – 1076.
Lohmann, S., 1998. Rationalizing the political business cycle: A workhorse model. Economics and
Politics .
Lucas, R.E.B., Stark, O., 1985. Motivations to Remit: Evidence from Botswana. Journal of Political
Economy 93, 901–918.
229
Lundahl, M., 1985. International migration, remittances and real incomes: effects on the source country.
Scandinavian Journal of Economics 87, 647–657.
Magesan, A., 2015. Foreign Aid and Economic Growth in Developing Countries: An Instrumental
Variables Approach. Working Papers 2015-08 , Department of Economics, University of Calgary .
Makhlouf, F., Mughal, M., 2011. Remittances, Dutch Disease, and Competitiveness - A Bayesian
Analysis. Journal of Economic Development .
Manasse, P., 2007. Deficit Limits and Fiscal Rules for Dummies. IMF Staff Papers 54, 455–473.
Mandelman, F.S., 2013. Monetary and exchange rate policy under remittance fluctuations. Journal of
Development Economics .
Mansuri, G., 2007. Does Work Migration Spur Investment in Origin Communities? Enterpreneurship,
Schooling, and Child Health in Rural Pakistan. International migration, Economic Development and
Policy .
Melkonyan, T.A., Grigorian, D.A., 2012. Microeconomic Implications of Remittances in an Overlapping
Generations Model with Altruism and a Motive to Receive Inheritance. Journal of Development
Studies 48, 1026–1044.
Mendoza, E.G.E., Oviedo, P.M., 2010. Fiscal policy and macroeconomic uncertainty in developing
countries: The tale of the tormented insurer. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper
Series No. 12586.
Menyah, K., Nazlioglu, S., Wolde-Rufael, Y., 2014. Financial development, trade openness and
economic growth in African countries: New insights from a panel causality approach. Economic
Modelling .
Miller, D.S., 2016. Commitment versus discretion in a political economy model of fiscal and monetary
policy interaction. Journal of Monetary Economics .
Miller, M., 1998. Financial Markets and Economic Growth. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 11,
8–15.
Misati, R.N., 2007. Liberalization, stock market development and investment efficiency in Africa.
International Review of Business Research Papers Journal 3, 183–191.
Mishkin, F.S., 2007. Is financial globalization beneficial? Journal of Money, Credit and Banking .
Mongardini, J., Rayner, B., 2009. Grants, Remittances, and the Equilibrium Real Exchange Rate in
Sub-Saharan African Countries. IMF Working Papers 09, 1.
Mundaca, B.G., 2009. Remittances, financial market development, and economic growth: The case of
Latin America and the Caribbean. Review of Development Economics .
Muscatelli, V.A., Milano-bicocca, U., Tirelli, P., 2004. Fiscal and Monetary Policy Interactions in a
New Keynesian Model with Liquidity Constraints , 1–35.
Narayan, P.K., Narayan, S., Mishra, S., 2011. Do Remittances Induce Inflation? Fresh Evidence from
Developing Countries. Southern Economic Journal .
Newey, W.K., West, K.D., 1987. A Simple Positive-Definite Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation-
Consistent Covariance Matrix. Econometrica 55, 703–708.
Niimi, Y., Ozden, C., Schiff, M., 2008. Remittances and the brain drain: Skilled migrants do remit
less! ADB Economics Working Paper Series .
Nordhaus, W.D., 1975. The Political Business Cycle. The Review of Economic Studies .
Nyamongo, E.M., Misati, R.N., Kipyegon, L., Ndirangu, L., 2012. Remittances, financial development
and economic growth in Africa. Journal of Economics and Business 64, 240–260.
230
Orozco, M., 2007. Remittances, the rural sector and policy options in Latin America. USAID and
BASIS Collaborative Research Support Program (CRSP) .
Orozco, M., Fedewa, R., 2005. Leveraging Efforts on Remittances and Financial Intermediation. Inter-
American Development Bank .
Orrenius, P.M., Zavodny, M., 2010. Mexican immigrant employment outcomes over the business cycle,
in: American Economic Review.
Persson, T., Tabellini, G., 2003. The Economic Effect of Constitutions: What do the Data Say? MIT
Press, Cambridge, MA .
Rajan, R., Zingales, L., 2003. The great reversals: the politics of financial development in the twentieth
century. Journal of Financial Economics 69, 5–50.
Ramirez, M., Sharma, H., 2013. Remittances and growth in Latin America: a panel unit root and
panel cointegration analysis. Yale university Economics Department 9.
Rapoport, H., Docquier, F., 2006. Chapter 17 The Economics of Migrants’ Remittances.
Richter, S.M., 2008. The Insurance Role of Remittances on Household Credit Demand. American
Agricultural Economics Association .
Rivera-Batiz, F., 1982. International Migration, Non-Traded Goods and Economic Welfare in the
Source Country. Journal of Development Economics 11, 81–90.
Rodriguez, E., 2000. Does International Migration Bene t Non-Migrant Households? Evidence from
the Philippines. Operations Evaluation Department, The World Bank .
Rodrik, D., 2008. The real exchange rate and economic growth. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity
39, 365–439.
Rogoff, K., Sibert, A., 1990. Elections and Macroeconomic Cycles. The Review of Economic Studies ,
1–16.
Roodman, D., 2009. How to do xtabond2: An introduction to difference and system GMM in Stata.
Stata Journal .
Ruiz, I., Vargas-Silva, C., 2010. Monetary Policy and International Remittances. The Journal of
Developing Areas 43, 173–186.
Sahay, R., Čihák, M., N’Diaye, P., Barajas, A., Bi, R., Ayala, D., Gao, Y., Kyobe, A., Nguyen, L.,
Saborowski, C., Svirydzenka, K., Yousefi, S.R., 2015. Rethinking financial deepening: Stability and
growth in emerging markets. Working Paper , 41.
Semmler, W., Zhang, W., 2012. Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interactions in the Euro area. ECB
Monthly Bulletin , 205–227.
Senbeta, S., 2011. How applicable are the new Keynesian DSGE models to a typical low-income
economy? MPRA Paper 30931.
Sharma, K., 2010. The Impact of Remittances on Economic Insecurity. Journal of Human Development
and Capabilities 11, 555–577.
Siegfried, N., Schiopu, I., 2006. Determinants of workers’ remittances: evidence from the European
Neighbouring Region. Working Paper Series 688, European Central Bank .
Singer, D.A., 2010. Migrant remittances and exchange rate regimes in the developing world. American
Political Science Review .
Stein, E.H., Streb, J.M., 1998. Political stabilization cycles in high-inflation economies. Journal of
Development Economics .
231
Stock, J., Watson, M., 1991. A probability model of the coincident economic indicators. Cambridge
University Press 1991, 63–90.
Stratan, A., Chistruga, M., Clipa, V., Fala, A., Septelici, V., 2013. Development and side effects of
remittances in the CIS countries: the case of Republic of Moldova. CARIM East- Consortium for
Applied Research on International Migration .
Svirydzenka, K., 2016. Introducing a New Broad-based Index of Financial Development. IMF Working
Paper , 1–43.
Talvi, E., Végh, C.a., 2005. Tax base variability and procyclical fiscal policy in developing countries.
Journal of Development Economics 78, 156–190.
Taylor, J.B., 1997. The Policy Rule mix: a Macroeconomic Policy Evaluation. Stanford university ,
1–24.
Thams, A., 2006. Fiscal Policy effects in the European Union. European Union Politics 3, 139–150.
Vacaflores, D.E., 2012. Remittances, Monetary Policy, and Partial Sterilization. Southern Economic
Journal 79, 367–387.
Vacaflores, D.E., Kishan, R., 2014. Remittances, international reserves, and exchange rate regimes in
9 Latin American countries, 1997-2010. Applied Econometrics and International Development 14,
97–116.
Van Dalen, H.P., Groenewold, G., Fokkema, T., 2005. The effect of remittances on emigration intentions
in Egypt, Morocco, and Turkey. Population Studies .
Vidangos, I., 2009. Fluctuations in Individual Labor Income : A Panel VAR Analysis. Finance and
Economics .
Widgren, J., Martin, P., 2002. Managing Migration: The Role of Economic Instruments. International
Migration .
Woo, J., 2009. Why do more polarized countries run more procyclical fiscal policy? Review of
Economics and Statistics .
Woodruff, C., Zenteno, R., 2007. Migration networks and microenterprises in Mexico. Journal of
Development Economics 82, 509–528.
World Bank, 2010. Global Economic Prospects: Crisis, Finance, and Growth. World Bank Policy
Research Working Papers .
World Bank, 2018. Migration and Development Brief: Recent Developments and Outlook. World
Bank, Washington DC .
Zachariah, K.C., Mathew, E.T., Rajan, S.I., 2001. Social, Economic and Demographic Consequences
of Migration on Kerala. International Migration .
Zouheir, A., Sghaier, I., 2014. Remittances, Financial Development and Economic Growth: The Case
of North African Countries. Romanian Economic Journal 17, 137–170.
232
